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DISCLAIMER 
This budget support evaluation forms part of a methodological test undertaken under the supervision 
of the Budget Support Steering Group of the DAC. 
The evaluation period covers the years 1996 to 2009. The evaluation report was made available in 
November 2010, and was finalised between December 2010 and February 2011. The current national 
situation does not affect the evaluation results.  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This report presents the results of the 
evaluation of European Commission budget 
support operations in Tunisia between 1996 
and 2009. The main objectives of the 
evaluation were to: 
- further develop the evaluation of the EC 
country programme in Tunisia, through a 
specific evaluation of budget support, and 
- test the 3-Step approach developed within 
the OECD/DAC, in order to evaluate BS 
operations. 
 
The scope of the evaluation covers seven 
budget support operations, out of a total of 
fourteen, funded by the EC in Tunisia over 
the 1996-2008 period: general budget support 
SAF I, II, III and IV, and sector budget 
support in the areas of secondary and higher 
education and vocational training. These 
operations cover just over 60% of the EC 
budget support in the period, including the 
general budget support managed together with 
the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. 
 
II. GENERAL CONTEXT OF EC-TUNISIA 
COOPERATION  
At the beginning of the 1970s, Tunisia started 
to open up its economy through exports of 
manufactured goods, combined with domestic 
market protection and a favourable oil 
situation, given that at the time the country 
was a net oil exporter. However, the end of 
this favourable oil situation and inefficiencies 
in the state-controlled economic system led to 
a wide-ranging and long-lasting financial, 
economic and social crisis, from the end of the 
1970s to the mid-1980s. In response to this 
crisis, the country changed course both 
politically and economically, in particular 
through a series of macroeconomic reforms 
within the framework of a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) developed in 
agreement with the World Bank and the IMF. 
In the 10 years from 1986 to 1995, major 
changes occurred in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilisation and social pacification. However, 
the country’s economy essentially remained 
closed and dominated by a dualistic system: 
competitive offshore / protected and state-
controlled domestically. The need to make the 
leap towards liberalisation of the domestic 
market and competitive integration in the 
international economy therefore became 
increasingly urgent. 
 
Within the framework of the Barcelona 
Process, the Association Agreement (AA) with 
the EU represented an excellent opportunity 
to make this leap forward. It allowed the 
country to embark on competitive integration, 
accompanied by a strong international 
partnership involving political agreements, 
financial support and access to appropriate 
standards and technologies. In 1995 Tunisia 
became the first country in the region to sign 
the AA and, in the same year, it joined the 
WTO. In 2008 the Free Trade Area stipulated 
by the AA came into force, following 12 years 
of extensive competitive transformations. 
Over this period (1996-2008), the country 
made very significant progress in terms of 
economic growth and stability, social well-
being and training of human capital. Thanks to 
its increased competitiveness, the country has 
become more attractive to foreign capital. 
However, there are still weaknesses and work 
yet to be done, particularly in terms of 
competition within the domestic market and 
employment. Progress still needs to be made, 
which partly depends on extending and 
deepening ties with the EU. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
The reference methodological framework for 
the evaluation corresponds to the 
methodology developed within the 
DAC/OECD. It is based on establishing an 
intervention logic that encompasses two main 
assumptions: (i) the programmes evaluated 
support the government’s strategies and 
contribute (together with other factors internal 
and external to these strategies) to their 
achievement in terms of economic, social and 
institutional policies; and (ii) the development 
results are determined by multiple factors 
involved in the context, including the 
government’s economic, social and 
institutional policies. 
 
It is impossible to identify – and would in fact 
be contradictory to attempt to identify, given 
the government’s appropriation practice and 
principles – direct links between such complex 
support programmes and the intended 
development results. The methodology 
involves dividing the evaluation into two parts, 
plus a third synthesis part (3 Steps). In the first 
part, the impact of programmes on changes in 
the economic, social and institutional policies 
applied by the government is evaluated. In the 
second part, the relationship between the 
intended development results and these 
changes in economic, social and institutional 
policies is evaluated. Finally, by cross-
referencing these two evaluations, the 
relationship between the support programmes 
and the development results can be assessed. 
 
The intervention logic consists of five levels 
that underlie any budget support operation: 
Level 1: BS inputs; Level 2: BS direct outputs; 
Level 3: induced outputs, i.e. government 
outputs directly or indirectly supported by the 
BS; Level 4: outcomes for beneficiaries; Level 
5: impacts on a more general level. 
 
IV. OVERALL EVALUATION 
As a result of the methodology adopted, the 
evaluation enabled to highlight the important 
contribution of the EC’s budget support to 
achieving the development results recorded by 
the country over the period analysed. 
 
The budget support provided a framework for 
dialogue, technical support and financial 
support, which reinforced the implementation 
of the government’s strategies. By making use 
of the framework of opportunities offered by 
the AA, these strategies enabled major 
economic and social reforms to be achieved, 
which have formed the foundations of the 
success in terms of the economic growth and 
social well-being recorded by the country. 
 
The evaluation revealed a very strong link 
between the reforms implemented by the 
government and the development results 
achieved by the country (STEP 2). 
Furthermore, it highlighted the important link 
between budget support and the quality of the 
reforms in question (STEP 1), thereby 
enabling to show a significant link between 
budget support and development results 
(STEP 3). 
 
Obviously, together with the successes, the 
evaluation (both STEP 1 and STEP 2) 
highlighted the weaknesses of the processes 
evaluated. In particular, inefficiencies remain 
in the economic context, which are preventing 
the country’s growth from developing to the 
level needed to fully respond to the high 
demand for employment, especially among 
young people. Therefore, the reform processes 
were launched in technically complex and 
delicate areas, with regard to the interests at 
stake, need to continue. These challenges will 
be at the centre of the future cooperation 
between Tunisia and the EU, because the 
European partner can help, as it did in 1995, 
to open up new integration prospects, through 
which Tunisia can find the necessary support 
and motivation. 
 
V. INITIAL LESSONS TO BE LEARNT 
FROM USING THIS METHODOLOGY 
Using this methodology proved to be 
particularly productive, as it allowed to identify 
the links between budget support and other 
contextual factors (global partnership, country’s 
expertise, etc.), given that the assessment of 
these links was limited or absent in previous 
evaluations. It also allowed an improved 
assessment of the BS action mechanisms, 
highlighting for example the link between the 
granting of funds and the reinforcement of 
policy dialogue and of the close partnership for 
developing and implementing the reforms. 
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However, the attempt to standardise the 
Evaluation Questions, particularly in STEP 1, 
caused lengthy delays and repetitions. It is the 
view of the evaluators that it would have been 
better to keep to the initial recommendations 
of the methodology, i.e.: bear in mind all the 
themes, but structure these within a maximum 
number of 10 EQs, adapted to the country in 
question. 
 
Finally, the parallel conduct of STEPS 1 and 2 
proved highly appropriate. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The conclusions and recommendations are 
articulated into three groups (strategic 
framework, institutional set-up of the 
programmes and sectoral strategies). 
Recommendations are linked to the 
conclusions. 
 
Conclusions 
The conclusions on the strategic framework 
underline the positive contribution of the EC-
Tunisia cooperation to the country’s economic 
and social development. The main factors 
behind this success are identified in the AA, 
which has created a new and effective 
framework of opportunities for Tunisia (C1.1), 
and reflected in the determination and 
competence of the Tunisian institutions, 
which have steered and implemented the 
agreed reforms (C1.2). 
GBS has proved to be the most appropriate 
method for supporting the main economic 
reforms, having been the only instrument to 
allow the partners to establish a forum for 
close dialogue on the main aspects of the 
formulation and implementation of these 
reforms (C1.3). SBS has been useful in 
supporting reforms in the education sector, 
but the sector approach has been limited 
(C1.4). In general, budget support has 
occurred within the context of the AA, 
helping to establish a framework for complex 
and integrated dialogue between Tunisia and 
the EU (C1.5). 
 
The conclusions on the institutional set-up of 
the BS programmes confirm that the 
instrument was appropriate to the context, 
particularly as regards the assessment of 
eligibility conditions and the targeting of 
conditionalities (C2.1). In terms of 
programming, there was good 
complementarity between GBS and specific 
projects funded by the EC, despite a sector 
approach that is still limited (C2.2). 
 
During the period in question, the use made 
of technical assistance in the BS programmes 
funded by the EC remained limited, although 
improvements and innovative approaches 
were seen towards the end of the period 
(C2.3). As for the other BS inputs, the funds 
granted played a facilitating role. The policy 
dialogue and harmonisation with other 
partners was very good for GBS, but less so 
for SBS (C2.4). 
 
The conclusions on the thematic and sectoral 
strategies stress that GBS has helped Tunisia 
to combine macroeconomic stability with 
growth (C3.1). GBS helped to significantly 
boost the private sector over the 1996-2008 
period, although elements of weakness still 
persist in relation to the reform of the 
business environment and the liberalisation of 
the domestic market (C3.2). GBS contributed 
to the implementation of tax reform and tariff 
dismantling, and therefore to the positive 
results in terms of foreign trade (C3.3). 
 
SBS contributed to the significant 
achievements in terms of reforming secondary 
and higher education and vocational training, 
where the results are encouraging but still 
limited, particularly in terms of employment 
(C3.4). GBS specifically helped to improve 
economic governance and legality in the 
business world, where progress was made, 
although the standards achieved are not yet 
sufficient (C3.5). 
 
Recommendations 
The recommendations on the strategic 
framework highlight the importance of using 
the EU-Tunisia partnership to make a new 
strategic leap in cooperation (R1.1 – C1.1 and 
C1.2) and of using BS to complete the main 
reforms (e.g. domestic market and 
employment) and extend them to new sectors 
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(e.g. services and agriculture) (R1.2 and R3.1 – 
C1.3 to 5, C3.1 to 4). 
 
The recommendations on the institutional set-
up point to the possibility and importance of 
using BS to support not only reforms for 
which the plans have already been finalised, 
but also reforms requiring further 
development during their implementation 
(R2.1 – C2.1). Continuing to combine various 
instruments in priority sectors (BS, technical 
assistance and equipment projects) and 
reinforce the sector approach is also 
recommended (R2.2 – C2.2). This 
reinforcement requires firm strategic guidance 
by the government, involving the harmonised 
participation of the various international 
partners in the sectors concerned, whatever 
cooperation instruments are put in place (R2.3 
– C1.4 and C2.2). 
 
As regards the BS inputs, flexible technical 
assistance should be integrated in the budget 
support, by increasingly using interinstitutional 
TA, particularly to support reforms and 
institutional strengthening (R2.4 – C2.3). It is 
also recommended that the BS amounts are 
not reduced (particularly the grants provided 
by the EC) and that a certain degree of 
quantitative stability is ensured in future years. 
The policy dialogue and harmonisation 
between the international partners should find 
the SAF experience to be a very useful 
reference (R2.5 – C2.4). 
 
The recommendations on the thematic and 
sectoral strategies confirm the importance of 
renewing support for growth and 
employment. Support for competitiveness 
oriented reforms, particularly in relation to 
services and agriculture, in order to increase 
investment and job creation, could usefully 
involve various forms of budget support: a BS 
programme covering a complex and multi-
sectoral range of economic policies, using the 
positive experience of the multilateral SAFs, 
and a more targeted BS programme in the 
rural development sector. The 
recommendations also underline the need to 
continue combining various cooperation 
instruments to complement BS, in order to 
improve the quality of the education and 
vocational training system, and support 
decentralised development, consolidation of 
infrastructures and expansion in new 
economic sectors, as underlined in the 
evaluation of the EC country programme. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report presents the results of the evaluation of European Commission (EC) budget support 
operations in Tunisia, as requested by the Evaluation Unit of the Directorates-General for 
Development, External Relations and EuropeAid. This evaluation is intended to supplement the 
country level evaluation of the EC cooperation with Tunisia, using a methodology specific to the 
evaluation of budget support operations. 
 
1.1. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATIONS 
The evaluation has two objectives (see Annex 1 – Terms of Reference – ToR):  
- Use the methodological approach to evaluate budget support operations, which has been recently 
developed within the OECD, in order to assess its applicability and learn lessons from it.  
- Supplement the results of the country level evaluation with the results of the evaluation of seven 
budget support operations, and in particular: i) provide the respective Commission services and 
the general public with a general and independent assessment of these budget support 
operations; ii) identify the main lessons of this cooperation in order to help government and 
Commission officials to make better use of budget support in current and future cooperation 
between the Commission and Tunisia.  
 
In this context, the scope of the evaluation covers seven (out of a total of fourteen) budget support 
operations funded by the EC in Tunisia over the 1996-2008 period: 
 
Table 1: EC budget support operations in Tunisia 
 
 
PROGRAMME TITLE 
YEAR OF 
DECISION 
AMOUNT 
COMMITTED (EUR) 
SAF I (Structural Adjustment Facility I) 1996           100,000,000  
SAF II  (Structural Adjustment Facility II) 1999              80,000,000  
SAF III  (Structural Adjustment Facility III) 2001              80,000,000  
SAF IV  (Structural Adjustment Facility IV) 2005              78,000,000  
PAC (Competitiveness support programme) 2006              41,000,000  
PAGBO (Goal-oriented budget management support programme) 2007              30,000,000  
G
en
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PAI (Integration support programme) 2008              50,000,000  
Support programme for the reform of primary education  2000              40,000,000  
Health insurance 2000              40,000,000  
Support for the modernisation of the port sector 2002              20,000,000  
Support for the modernisation of higher education 2003              48,000,000  
Support for the reform of secondary education 2005              30,000,000  
MANFORM II (Support for the vocational training sector) 2006              30,000,000  
Se
ct
or
 B
ud
ge
t 
Su
pp
or
t -
 S
BS
 
Support programme for matching education to employment in 
Tunisia 
2008              65,000,000  
  TOTAL             732,000,000  
 
*The budget support operations shaded grey were not covered by this evaluation. 
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1.2. REPORT STRUCTURE   
This report is structured as follows:  
- The second chapter sets out the general context of cooperation between the EC and Tunisia. 
- The third chapter presents the methodology, including a summary of the intervention logic, the 
three-step approach, and the evaluation process. 
- The fourth chapter provides a summary of the answers to the evaluation questions formulated 
in the desk phase. This chapter is arranged into six sections, which set out the main findings 
resulting from the evaluation questions, organised according to the three steps of the 
methodology.  
- The fifth and sixth chapters present the main conclusions and recommendations of the 
evaluation.  
- The final section provides a summary of the conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
2. GENERAL CONTEXT OF EC-TUNISIA COOPERATION   
The following sections set out: i) the national context, including an historical overview identifying a 
series of factors likely to have influenced Tunisia’s economic and social performance during the 
period in question; ii) the cooperation between the EC and Tunisia; iii) the budget support operations 
funded by the EC in Tunisia, particularly the BS operations covered by this evaluation; and iv) the 
budget support of the development banks (WB and AfDB) having funded the programmes 
coordinated and harmonised with the European budget support.  
 
2.1. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL CONTEXT SINCE 
INDEPENDENCE: MAIN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STAGES 
On gaining its independence in 1956, Tunisia, which has a semi-arid climate, had few natural 
resources and its economy was essentially based on subsistence agriculture and mineral exploration. 
However, the government embarked on a proactive policy of accelerated development, with the main 
aim being to pull the country and its population up to a level comparable with certain European 
countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. The last half-century has been marked by 
four main stages of development: 
 
1956 – 1969. This was the period of national construction. Three initiatives stand out due to their 
political, economic and sociocultural impact: 
- In August 1956, just after independence, promulgation of the Law on Personal Status, which 
granted Tunisian women rights and a freedom that were virtually unique in the Arab world. 
- In 1958, creation of the Banque Centrale de Tunisie (Central Bank of Tunisia) and a national 
currency: the dinar. 
- From 1961 until 1969, an economic development policy based on the cooperative system in 
agriculture and trade, creation of industrial centres in various regions of the country (iron and 
steel, chemical, textile, paper and mechanical industries), nationalisation of colonial land in 1964, 
and the initial development of tourism. In all sectors, the State was the promoter, owner and 
manager. 
 
1970 – 1986. This period saw the economy begin to open up to a certain extent. However, 
government control of the market and state ownership of the majority of production prevented a 
genuine economic take-off. Some significant measures were adopted, including: 
- Creation of the Agence de Promotion des Investissements (API) (Investment Promotion Agency), 
which subsequently became the Agence de Promotion de l’Industrie (Industrial Promotion 
Agency).  
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- Promulgation of the Law of April 1972, which granted important competitive advantages to 
wholly exporting companies. 
- Promulgation of a social pact and introduction of collective agreements to govern relations 
between employers and employees. 
- The start of exporting, combined with domestic market protection and a favourable oil situation 
(at the time the country was a net oil exporter), helped to create numerous jobs and clearly 
improved the population’s standard of living. 
 
However, the end of this favourable oil situation and inefficiencies in the state-controlled economic 
system led to a financial, economic and social crisis, resulting in the bloody events which destabilised 
the country’s political structures: the dispute with the trade unions in January 1978, the Gafsa revolt 
in January 1980, and the ‘bread riots’ in January 1984. The country’s situation deteriorated very 
quickly on all levels, and extremist religious movements developed. The years 1982 to 1986 were the 
toughest that Tunisia had known since its independence. 
 
1987 – 1994. Following political changes in 1986-87, a new direction was taken, in particular through 
a series of macroeconomic reforms in the context of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
developed in agreement with the World Bank and the IMF. Remarkable changes subsequently 
occurred, including: 
- control of inflation, which was brought down from 7.1% in 1986 to 2.2% in 1995; 
- gradual liberalisation of prices and investments; 
- devaluation and convertibility of the dinar, by creating an interbank exchange market; 
- growth in exports of manufactured goods (particularly textiles and mechanical goods) under the 
offshore arrangements1; 
- reform of the tax system and introduction of VAT; 
- promulgation of an Investment Code; 
- reform of public enterprises; 
- privatisation of the stock market; 
- reform of the financial sector: reinforcement of the regulatory and supervisory powers of the 
Central Bank, adoption of prudential rules, creation of the Banques d’Affaires (business banks). 
 
At the end of this period, although major changes had been made to the economic context compared 
to the previous period (see the table below), the Tunisian economy was not integrated in the global 
economy and the stability and competitiveness gains did not last. Several preparatory studies for the 
1997-2001 Plan and the opinions of influential partners such as the World Bank indicated the need to 
make the leap towards integration and competitiveness in relation to the global market. 
                                                   
1  Export support measures are still combined with domestic market protection measures (e.g. agreements with car 
manufacturers, quotas assured by the EU for Tunisian goods, etc.). 
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From 1995. Based on this understanding and in view of the opportunities offered by the Barcelona 
Process launched by the EU, Tunisia decided to continue on its course towards an open economy, 
supported by the positive prospect of Euro-Mediterranean integration: 
 
- In 1995 it was the first country to sign a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with the EU, 
involving a political, economic and sociocultural global partnership and providing for a free trade 
area, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 
- In 1995 it also joined the WTO. 
- It signed a free trade agreement with certain countries in the Mediterranean region (MENA). 
 
These trade agreements (with the EU, WTO and MENA region) offer a wider prospect of 
Euro-Mediterranean global partnership, but require extensive work to improve various sectors of the 
economy, so that their competitive integration in the new context can be assured, as also the 
institutional framework and management of human resources. Over the last decade, several reforms 
have been launched and largely implemented.  
In the economic area, the following should be noted: 
- improvement of macroeconomic management and budgetary equilibrium; 
- upgrading of manufacturing; 
- total tariff dismantling for all manufactured goods originating from the EU; 
- improvement of the business environment and promotion of private investment; 
- rationalisation and reinforcement of competitiveness in the banking sector; 
- improvement of basic infrastructures and telecommunications; 
- withdrawal of the State from the economy (privatisations). 
 
In the social area, the following should be mentioned: 
- improvement of the performance of the education system to increase the employability of young 
people and move towards a knowledge-based economy; 
- improvement of employees’ purchasing power and welfare cover for all workers. 
Other reform and modernisation issues have been tackled and will be taken into account during the 
evaluation, particularly with regard to the results targeted jointly by the EU and the Tunisian 
government, through the implementation of general and sector budget support operations. 
Table 2: Key ratios of the macroeconomic situation in Tunisia between 1984 and 1994, and key aggregate 
growth rates over the 1984-1994 period 
Key ratios of the macroeconomic situation between 1984 and 1994 
     1984                  1994 
Key aggregate growth rates over the 
1984-1994 period 
GFCF/GDP 35.9% 24.5% GDP 3.8% 
National savings/GDP 25.6% 20.2% GDP per inhabitant 1.6% 
Exports/GDP 33.0% 44.9% Exports 7.5% 
Current account balance/GDP -10.3% -4.2% Imports 4.9% 
Total debt/GDP 49.6% 61.5% 
Government 
consumption 3.1% 
Debt servicing/exports 22.5% 18.9% Private consumption 2.9% 
Debt interest/GDP 3.2% 3.4% GFCF 3.4% 
Imports/GDP 44.3% 47.9%   
Source: World Bank, Tunisia at a glance 
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We only need to note here that, over this period, 
Tunisia has made a leap forward in terms of the 
economy’s general competitiveness. It is ranked 36th 
out of the 134 countries included in the Global 
Competitiveness Index 2008-20092 (countries are 
ranked on a scale from 1: high level of 
competitiveness to 139: minimum level of 
competitiveness). In nearly all the breakdowns of the 
index, Tunisia is well ahead of the other countries in 
the region, as shown by the tables on sophistication 
and innovation in the economy and on 
competitiveness growth factors (see Annex 10: 
Competitive framework of certain MEDA countries). 
Particularly with regard to the growth factors of 
global competitiveness, Tunisia is at a high general 
level. It is also at very high levels with regard to 
higher education and vocational training, and goods 
market efficiency, whereas its performance (while still well above the regional average) is not so good 
in terms of labour market efficiency (103rd) and financial market sophistication (77th) (see 
Annex 10). 
 
2.2. OVERVIEW OF EU-TUNISIA COOPERATION BETWEEN 1996 AND 2008   
From 1996 to date, there have been several successive programming cycles in EU-Tunisia 
cooperation. The signature of the Association Agreement (AA) and the Barcelona Declaration (in 
1995) formed the start of a long process, which has developed in line with the strategic framework set 
out in the MEDA and MEDA II Regulations and also in the reform of Community external aid, 
which has led to the formulation of the new European Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
The priority objectives of the respective strategy papers and indicative programmes for the period, 
the budget support operations of which are covered by the evaluation, are set out below, whilst a 
general view of EU-Tunisia cooperation between 1996 and 2008 is presented in Annex 5.  
 
The NIPs for 1996-1999 and 2000-2002 (MEDA) were based on the objectives set by the 9th 
Tunisian Development Plan (1997-2001), and focused on the following priorities: 
a) Support economic reforms in the macroeconomic and fiscal areas, privatisation, deregulation 
of maritime transport and ports, foreign trade, financial sector and social policy area. 
b) Improve the economic environment for the private sector through the privatisation of public 
enterprises, attraction of foreign investment, development of business services and 
improvement of vocational training. 
c) Establish a socioeconomic and environmental balance in rural and urban areas through 
support for the fair development of natural resources, job creation, access to health services 
and increased involvement of economic partners and civil society organisations.  
                                                   
2 The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, World Economic Forum. The global competitiveness index is an indicator 
consisting of 12 pillars, which reflect the various dimensions of competitiveness. The global index results from the 
following pillars, which are grouped into three main categories, according to the economy’s level of development: a) 
Basic requirements: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and health and primary education; b) 
Efficiency enhancers: higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, financial 
market sophistication, technological readiness, and market size; c) Innovation and sophistication factors: business 
sophistication and innovation.  
Figure 1: Global competitiveness index 
 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009, World 
Economic Forum 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 6 
 
The MEDA II Regulation and the Strategy Paper 2002-2006 were more in line with the AA 
objectives, as recommended by the Marseilles Conference in November 2000. This strategy was 
based on the 10th National Development Plan 2002-2006, on the sustainable development strategy 
prepared by Tunisia in the context of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
(post-Rio process), and on the Mediterranean Action Plan in order to reinforce synergies with 
regional cooperation. In this context, the 2002-2006 cooperation objectives became: 
a) consolidation of rule of law and good governance; 
b) liberalisation of foreign trade and south-south integration; 
c) economic reforms and consolidation of market economy institutions; 
d) modernisation of services and development of infrastructure; and 
e) enhancement of human resources and social protection. 
 
2.3. BUDGET SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE EC AND TUNISIA   
 
From 1996, under the MEDA Regulation, budget support gradually increased to become the most 
important financing modality during the 1996-2008 period. As indicated in Figure 2, over the 1996-2008 
period, 61% – i.e. EUR 732 million out of a total of EUR 1 197 million – of the EC’s financial 
cooperation was funded through budget support (of which 38% was GBS and 23% SBS)3.  
 
Figure 2: Overall allocation by financing modality, 
1996-2008 
 
GBS
38%
Project
31%
SBS
23% EIB Subsidy
8%
 
Source: CRIS, adapted by DRN 
                                                   
3 The proportion of budget support therefore went from 48% of commitments for the MEDA I programming 
period (1996-1999) to 75.4% of commitments for the MEDA II period (2000-2006), to 57.3% under the 
NIP 2007-2010 in the context of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 
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This reflects the maturity of the Community cooperation, the trust placed in the quality of 
management by the government (particularly as regards public finances and expenditure control), the 
good level of appropriation and tailoring of reform programmes and, more generally, the trend 
towards greater responsibility being given to the partner country.  
 
In particular, since signing the Association Agreement, the EC has used both general (GBS) and sector 
(SBS) budget support to finance 14 operations accounting for a total commitment of EUR 732 million 
over the 1996-2008 period4.  
 
Figure 3: Sectoral distribution of budget support operations, 1996-2008 
Public Sector and 
economic reforms 
- PSER
63%
Human resource 
development and 
social protection - 
HRDSP 34%
Business 
environment and 
private sector 
development  - 
BEPSD
3%
 
Source: CRIS, adapted by DRN 
 
As shown by Figure 3, 63% of the budget support was used to finance operations in the ‘public 
sector and economic reforms’ macro-sector (PSER-EUR 459 million), 34% in the ‘Human resource 
development and social protection’ macro-sector (HRDSP-EUR 253 million), and 3% in the 
‘Business environment and private sector development’ macro-sector (BEPSD-EUR 20 million)5. 
 
More specifically, the general budget support was wholly used to fund operations in the PSER area, 
whereas over 90% of the sector budget support was used to fund human resource development and 
social protection (HRDSP)6, and another 7% to fund the support programme for the modernisation 
of the port sector.  
 
                                                   
4  
GBS Project SBS EIB Subsidy Grand Total 
459,000,000.00 374,782,529.33 272,794,475.10 91,150,000.00 1,197,727,004.43 
   
5 The inventory of budget support operations is in Annex 7. 
6 As regards social protection, this involved the support programme for the reform of the health insurance system.  
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Furthermore, it can be seen that, with regard to human resource development and social protection 
(HRDSP) in general, although several financing modalities were used – project aid, sector budget 
support, thematic lines, network programmes and exchanges of experience (Tempus) – there was a 
clear prevalence for the use of budget support. In total, 83% of the funds allocated over the period 
evaluated were allocated through budget support. From MEDA II, all programmes (except for 
Tempus and the thematic lines) to support the sector have involved budget support. 
 
2.4. ANALYSIS OF THE BUDGET SUPPORT OPERATIONS COVERED BY THE EVALUATION 
The seven budget support operations specifically covered by this evaluation account for 61% of the 
amounts allocated in the form of budget support under the EC-Tunisia cooperation over 
the 1996-2008 period (i.e. EUR 446 million out of EUR 732 million). It is particularly worth noting 
that all the general budget support operations covered by this evaluation involve the area of public 
sector and economic reforms (PSER), whereas all the sector budget support operations target human 
resource development and social protection (HRDSP).  
 
The following tables provide an overview of the budget support operations covered by the 
evaluation.  
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Table 3: General budget support (GBS) operations covered by the evaluation: intervention objectives and sectors 
General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention 
sectors 
Conditionalities7 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
Structural Adjustment Facility I – SAF I, 1996. Operation conducted jointly with the World Bank – ECAL I (loan of USD 75 million) 
Help the Tunisian government to 
implement a programme of reforms 
responding to the new challenges 
associated with setting up a free trade 
area (FTA). 
 - Long-term consolidation of 
macroeconomic stability within a 
liberalised economy. 
- Regulatory reform in order to open up 
the economy. 
 - Broadening of the private sector’s role 
in the economy. 
- Increased flexibility in the labour 
market. 
Conditionalities common to the donors linked 
to: 
- consolidation of macroeconomic stability;  
- deregulation and facilitation of 
exchanges/foreign trade; 
- labour market: i) improved flexibility of the 
labour market; ii) reduction in labour costs 
while improving social protection.  
Conditionalities specific to the EC linked to: 
- trade liberalisation; 
- withdrawal of the State from the economy 
(acceleration of privatisations); 
- reform of the financial system; 
- improvement (rationalisation, improved 
targeting) of social public expenditure. 
EUR 100 million 
Two fixed tranches: 
- First tranche of EUR 40 million 
disbursed after signature of the 
Financing Agreement and meeting of 
the conditionalities imposed.  
- Second tranche of EUR 60 million 
disbursed after meeting of the 
conditionalities imposed. 
Structural Adjustment Facility II – SAF II, 1999. Operation conducted jointly with the World Bank – ECAL II (loan of USD 159 million) and the African Development Bank – PAC I 
(loan of USD 140 million) 
Support the economic reforms adopted 
by the Tunisian government in order to 
consolidate the liberalisation of the 
Tunisian economy and, in particular, 
help ensure the success of the free trade 
area with the European Union, as 
stipulated in the AA. 
- Financial sector. 
- Withdrawal of the State from the 
economy. 
- Primary education. 
- Higher education. 
- Macroeconomic framework.  
Conditionalities common to the donors linked 
to: 
- reform of the financial sector (rationalisation 
of the banks; modernisation of the banking 
system; development of the financial market; 
improvement of the insurance sector); 
- introduction of a prudent macroeconomic 
policy while encouraging accelerated growth. 
Conditionalities specific to the EC linked to: 
- withdrawal of the State from the 
economy/privatisation programme; 
- reforms in the primary education sector;  
- reforms in the higher education sector. 
EUR 80 million 
Two fixed tranches: 
- First tranche of EUR 40 million during 
the first half of 1999, after meeting of 
the conditionalities.  
- Second tranche of EUR 40 million in 
principle at the beginning of 2000, after 
meeting of the conditionalities. 
                                                   
7 SAF I and II were marked by the presence of two matrices of conditions: one shared between the donors, and the other specific to the EC, involving additional conditions. As from SAF 
III, the donors have mainly used the same matrix of conditions. 
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General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention 
sectors 
Conditionalities7 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
Structural Adjustment Facility – SAF III, 2002. Operation conducted jointly with the World Bank – ECAL III (loan of USD 252.5 million) and the African Development Bank – PAC II 
(loan of EUR 216 million) 
Help to: 
Consolidate the stability of the 
macroeconomic framework. 
Conditionalities linked to: 
consolidation of macroeconomic stability. 
Improve the environment for private 
enterprise. 
Environment for private enterprise: 
improvement of legislative, regulatory and 
incentive frameworks, improvement of 
government services, and continued 
withdrawal of the State from the economy.  
Modernisation of the legislative framework 
and restructuring of the institutional 
organisation of the telecoms sector. 
Improve the level of general 
competitiveness in the Tunisian 
economy, in the context of its gradual 
integration in global markets.  
Provide businesses and the economy as 
a whole with more effective financial 
intermediation services. 
Improved performance of financial 
intermediation services (rationalisation and 
modernisation of the insurance sector, 
distribution of roles between banks and 
financial markets). 
EUR 80 million (EUR 79.5 million in 
budget support and EUR 0.5 million in 
monitoring and evaluation) 
Four tranches, including three variable 
tranches8:  
- Initial fixed tranche of EUR 41.7 million 
disbursed after signature of the 
Financing Agreement and meeting of 
the conditionalities. 
- Three variable tranches (each of 
EUR 12.6 million) to be disbursed after 
specific conditionalities laid down in the 
matrix for each sector are met: 
i) environment and private investment; 
ii) financial sector; iii) ICT. 
Structural Adjustment Facility IV – SAF IV, 2005. Operation conducted jointly with the World Bank – ECAL IV (loan of USD 150 million) and the African Development Bank – PAC 
III (loan of EUR 117 million) 
Help to improve the level of general 
competitiveness in the Tunisian 
economy, in order to encourage its 
integration in the FTA with the EU and in 
global markets.  
Consolidation of the private sector and 
business environment. 
Environment for private investment: 
i) development of new opportunities for 
private investment; ii) creation of contestable 
markets9; iii) improvement of the tax 
environment for investment. 
EUR 78 million (EUR 77.75 million in 
budget support and EUR 0.25 million in 
monitoring and evaluation) 
Two fixed tranches (EUR 39 + 38.75 
million) to be disbursed after either the 
                                                   
8 Under the variable tranche method, disbursement does not occur on a specific date; funds become available when certain conditions are met/structural reforms are agreed. This method 
allows disbursement linked to the completion of one part of the programme to be dissociated from another part of the programme, which affords the country a certain degree of flexibility 
in its timetable of reforms. Otherwise, if disbursement occurs on a specific date, this is termed a dated tranche.  
9 The contestable market is a market in which potential competition (the ‘threat’ of a competing business entering the market) guarantees competitive prices, even where the market is 
actually dominated by one or more businesses. This theoretical model was developed by the economists William Baumol, Panzar and Willig in 1982 (Contestable markets and the theory of 
industry structure). 
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General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention 
sectors 
Conditionalities7 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
Acceleration of financial sector reform. i) Improved performance of the banks; ii) 
rationalisation and consolidation of control in 
the insurance sector; iii) improvement of 
financial information on businesses and 
consolidation of governance and transparency 
rules. 
general conditions for disbursement 
(satisfactory medium-term 
macroeconomic framework) or the 
specific conditionalities for individual 
tranches are met. 
The general conditions for 
disbursement of all the tranches involve 
maintaining a satisfactory medium-term 
macroeconomic framework, as agreed 
with the Tunisian authorities. The 
specific conditionalities for 
disbursement of individual tranches 
involve completion by the Tunisian 
authorities of the various reform 
activities to stimulate the environment 
for private investment, consolidation of 
the financial sector and maintenance of 
a stable macroeconomic framework. 
Maintenance of a stable 
macroeconomic framework. 
Consolidation of macroeconomic stability: 
control pressure on the external current 
account and budget deficit. 
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Table 4: Sector budget support (SBS) operations covered by the evaluation: intervention objectives and sectors 
General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention sectors Conditionalities10 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
Support programme for the modernisation of higher education in Tunisia (PAMES), 2004 
Help to achieve the general 
objectives set out in the 10th 
Plan of the Tunisian 
government (2002-2006), 
namely growth in 
employment, competitiveness 
and income and also 
development of a knowledge 
society. 
Help to improve the relevance of the higher 
education offer, which will result in:  
i) improvement in the short-term employability 
of young people and reduction in 
unemployment among first-time job-seekers;  
ii) improvement of competitiveness in the 
Tunisian economy through a more appropriate 
response to the increasing demand for 
advanced technicians (short courses) and 
engineers; and  
iii) assistance with establishing a ‘knowledge 
society’, including the promotion of equal 
opportunities, democracy and openness. 
Conditionalities linked to: 
- implementation of the government’s strategy in the 
higher education sector; 
- presentation and update of the MTEF for the higher 
education sector; 
- effective implementation of the donor coordination 
mechanism;  
- employability, quality of education and programmes, 
process of decentralisation and empowerment of 
universities, evolution and development of the 
partnership with the private sector. 
EUR 48 million (EUR 47 million in budget 
support, EUR 0.75 million in TA and 
EUR 0.5 million in monitoring and 
evaluation) 
Three annual tranches (EUR 11, 14 and 22 
million):  
- First fixed tranche11 of EUR 11 million, 
which can be released on signature of the 
agreement.  
- Second and third mixed tranches. The 
fixed parts (EUR 5 million for the second 
tranche and EUR 7 million for the third 
tranche) to be disbursed after 
examination of the conditionalities with 
regard to the WG’s sectoral strategy. The 
variable parts (EUR 9 million for the 
second tranche and EUR 15 million for 
the third tranche) to be released 
depending on the achievement of the 
targets set jointly with the WG on higher 
education.  
Support programme for the reform of secondary education in Tunisia, 2006 
                                                   
10 SAF I and II were marked by the presence of two matrices of conditions: one shared between the donors, and the other specific to the EC, involving additional conditions specific to the 
Community support. As from SAF III, the donors have mainly used the same matrix of conditions. 
11 Under the fixed tranche method, the amount to be disbursed is fixed, whether it is disbursed in full or not disbursed at all. Otherwise, under the variable tranche method, the amount 
disbursed for each tranche is linked to the results of the policies/reforms and varies according to the level of achievement of the targets and/or specific performance indicators laid down 
in the matrix of measures. The mixed tranche includes a fixed part and a variable part.  
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General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention sectors Conditionalities10 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
Help to improve the 
performance of secondary 
education with regard to 
international standards and to 
increase the contribution of 
secondary education to the 
employability of young 
people, by allowing access to 
courses preparing them for 
higher education and/or the 
labour market. 
- Improve initial and continuing training of 
teachers. 
- Introduce the new courses proposed from 
the second year of secondary education.  
- Improve the quality of school life.  
- Help consolidate the measures aimed at 
empowering stakeholders in the system on a 
decentralised level.  
- Ensure a general introduction to information 
and communication technologies (ICT). 
Conditionalities linked, for the fixed part, to: 
- implementation of the government’s strategy in the 
secondary education sector;  
- presentation and update of the MTEF for the 
secondary education sector;  
- holding of the annual donor coordination meeting.  
Conditionalities linked to the variable part: 
achievement of targets set for specific indicators such 
as: i) territorial equity in the introduction of courses; ii) 
percentage of establishments with economy and 
service, trade and business, IT and multimedia, and 
industrial IT sections; iii) rate of successful completion 
of the second stage by a cohort of students; iv) first 
and second year student ratios; v) first year orientation 
percentage; vi) percentage of headmasters and 
headmistresses recruited based on their qualification 
profiles; vii) ratio of new teachers/trainers; viii) 
compulsory ICT lessons in the third and fourth years. 
EUR 30 million (EUR 29.4 million in 
budget support, EUR 0.3 million in TA and 
EUR 0.3 million in monitoring and 
evaluation) 
Three tranches (EUR 10 million, 
EUR 9 million and EUR 10.4 million).  
- First fixed tranche linked to the 
signature of the Financing Agreement.  
- Second and third mixed tranches. The 
fixed parts (EUR 3 million for each 
tranche) to be disbursed after 
examination of the conditionalities. The 
variable parts (EUR 6 million for the 
second tranche and EUR 7.4 million for 
the third tranche) to be released 
depending on the achievement of the 
targets set jointly with the WG on 
secondary education. 
Support programme for the vocational training sector in Tunisia (MANFORM II), 2007 
Help to implement the reform 
undertaken by the MEF under 
the 11th National Development 
Plan (2007-2011), in particular: 
ensure the high quality of the 
public and private vocational 
training system in order to 
meet the needs of business and 
adapt to technological changes, 
with a constant determination 
to respond to and complement 
the higher education systems. 
Help to: 
- promote vocational training in order to make 
this a path to success; 
- continue improving the vocational training 
system;  
- develop the efficiency of the vocational 
training system. 
Conditionalities linked to: i) continued implementation 
of the strategy of the WG in the vocational training 
sector; ii) consolidation of the structures responsible for 
implementing the sectoral strategy and sectoral MTEF; 
iii) annual donor coordination meeting; 
iv) establishment of a national observatory of skills and 
trades, and introduction of works councils in centres 
managed by the Agence Tunisienne de Formation 
Professionnelle; v) training rates with enterprise 
(targets); vi) promotion of continuing training actions 
(targets); viii) systematic training and retraining of 
trainers (targets); viii) establishment and training of a 
unit of educational inspectors specialising in VT 
(targets); ix) development, validation and establishment 
of a framework for the recognition of qualifications in 
the apprenticeship system. 
EUR 30 million (EUR 29.3 million in budget 
support, EUR 0.4 million in TA and 
EUR 0.3 million in monitoring and 
evaluation) 
Three annual tranches, of which:  
- First fixed tranche of EUR 10 million 
linked to the signature of the agreement.  
- Second and third mixed tranches to be 
disbursed during the next two budget 
years. The fixed parts (EUR 4.1 million for 
the second tranche and EUR 3.6 million for 
the third tranche) to be disbursed after 
examination of the conditionalities with 
regard to the WG’s sectoral strategy. The 
variable parts (EUR 5.6 million for the 
second tranche and EUR 3.6 million for the 
third tranche) to be released depending on 
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General objectives Specific objectives / Intervention sectors Conditionalities10 Amount and Methods of disbursement 
the achievement of the targets set jointly 
with the WG on vocational training.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS   
The reference methodological framework for the evaluation corresponds to the methodology 
developed within the DAC/OECD12,13.  
 
3.1.1. The intervention logic model 
The intervention logic model used by this method is based on the following key assumptions: 
· the programmes evaluated support the government’s strategies and contribute (together with 
other factors internal and external to these strategies) to their achievement in terms of 
regulatory and institutional changes; and 
· the development results are determined by multiple factors involved in the context, including 
the regulatory and institutional changes made by the government. 
 
The logic diagram has five analysis levels for budget support operations, as follows: Level 1: BS 
inputs; Level 2: BS direct outputs; Level 3: government induced outputs, directly or indirectly 
supported by the BS; Level 4: outcomes for beneficiaries; Level 5: impacts on a more general level. 
The intervention logic diagram and the details on the various levels are contained in Annex 6. 
 
3.1.2. The Three-Step Approach and the Evaluation Questions 
According to this methodology, it is impossible to identify – and would in fact be contradictory to 
attempt to identify, given the government’s appropriation practice and principles – direct links 
between such complex support programmes and the intended development results. The method 
therefore involves dividing the evaluation into two parts, plus a summary third part (3 Steps). In the 
first part, the impact of programmes on the regulatory and institutional changes made by the 
government is evaluated. In the second part, the relationship between the intended development 
results and these regulatory and institutional changes is evaluated. Finally, by cross-referencing these 
two evaluations, the relationship between the support programmes and the development results can 
be assessed. 
 
Step 1:  Evaluation of the specific intervention logic of budget support, i.e. the bottom-up process 
covering the first three levels of the evaluation framework, from GBS/SBS inputs 
(Level 1), through outputs (Level 2), to induced outputs (Level 3). 
Step 2:  Evaluation of the outcomes and impacts of the government strategy supported by 
GBS/SBS, i.e. the top-down process of the impact (Level 5) and outcomes (Level 4), from 
the strategy to its determining factors, including the achievement of government strategies 
in general, and particularly those affected by GBS/SBS. 
Step 3:  Exploration of the links between the processes and results of GBS/SBS and the impact of 
the government strategy. 
 
In line with this methodology, the evaluation was structured around a series of evaluation questions. 
The final formulation of these questions basically consisted of all the ‘compulsory’ questions defined 
by the joint working group established at DAC level, which must be applied in tests of the new 
                                                   
12 See Methodology for Evaluations of Budget Support – Test.  
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2008/budget_support_en.htm 
13 Annex 6 sets out the evaluation methodology with more detailed information on the process and lessons learnt. 
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evaluation methodology14, and further specific questions added by the team and linked to the 
intervention logic supporting the seven budget support operations covered by the evaluation15. 
 
In Step 1, the team examined the intervention logic of GBS/SBS, especially the context in which 
GBS/SBS operations occurred, and the nature of the inputs provided (Level 1 of the intervention 
logic, EQ 1.1-1.4), their direct outputs (Level 2, EQ 2.1-2.3), the induced outputs of the government 
strategy to which these operations contributed, and the associated government actions (Level 3, EQ 
3.1-3.6). For these three levels, the evaluators examined the type of influence that GBS/SBS had 
through the flow of financial effects and political and institutional effects, and also other possible 
systemic effects. 
 
In Step 2, the team analysed the changes targeted by GBS/SBS at the impact and outcome levels 
(EQ 4.1-4.4) and attempted to identify the links between the impacts, outcomes and induced outputs 
of the government strategy, by emphasising the institutional and reform processes (induced outputs) 
more directly linked to the intended outcomes and impacts (EQ 5.1-5.4). Other external or internal 
factors that may have contributed to these impacts and outcomes were also taken into account.  
 
It was essential to complete these two steps in order to allow a final evaluation of the contribution of 
GBS/SBS to the intended development results. This evaluation represents the third step of the 
methodology. In practice: Step 1 evaluates the causal links between the budget support and the 
government induced outputs directly supported by the budget support; Step 2 evaluates the causal 
links between these induced outputs and the development results (outcomes and impacts) targeted by 
the budget support; Step 3 is an exercise that supplements and integrates Step 1 and Step 2 in order 
to evaluate the contribution of GBS/SBS to the development results. 
 
The nature of the analyses in Step 3 is different from the other two steps. This step involves a 
comparative exercise between the results of the first two steps. It aims to identify the consistency, 
complementarity and possibility of integration between them. In practice, during this final step, the 
most significant effects of GBS/SBS (positive/negative/unexpected) revealed during Step 1 are 
compared with the most significant results (positive/negative/unexpected) and associated 
determining factors identified during Step 2. The potentially strong or weak links are examined and 
the mechanisms through which these develop (or not) are analysed. 
 
As regards taking into account a counterfactual scenario through which the effects of GBS/SBS may 
be evaluated, complex evaluations such as this do not allow for the construction of a general 
counterfactual model or the identification of general counterfactual situations that exist in reality16 
(see the Issue Paper cited). Counterfactual alternatives were therefore identified on a case-by-case 
basis in the answers to the various questions. 
 
The most common alternative scenario – particularly appropriate for Step 1 of the proposed 
methodology – is represented by the use of the project instrument, as opposed to GBS/SBS. As 
regards Step 2, the counterfactuals particularly involve alternative economic policies (or simply 
‘alternative’ countries) taken into account both in the statistical analyses and in the historical analysis 
of the country’s development. 
 
For each evaluation question, the evaluation team produced a number of judgement criteria and 
indicators. Judgement criteria are the elements allowing a full answer to be given to the evaluation 
question. They are fed by a series of indicators, which are themselves fed by information collected 
during the desk and field phases.  
                                                   
14 These tests were conducted simultaneously in Tunisia, Mali and Zambia. 
15 These questions are summarised in Volume 3, in Annexes 11, 15 and 17.  
16 Counterfactual situations can be identified in the evaluation of projects limited in terms of the number of measures 
and their application in space and time, such as conditional transfers of liquid assets or other similar projects. 
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The information collected during these two phases (Volume 3 sets out all the information collected 
for each indicator) was analysed in order to validate/invalidate the judgement criteria to which this 
information refers. On this basis, the evaluators produced answers to the evaluation questions. The 
conclusions were formulated from the answers to the evaluation questions and led to a series of 
recommendations aimed at helping to improve the current and future strategies and programmes of 
the EC (cf. Chapter 6) focused on budget support. 
 
3.1.3. The evaluation process 
The following diagram summarises the various steps of the evaluation and the outputs of each step. 
Annex 6 details the methodological approach followed.  
 
Figure 4: Evaluation process – Steps and activities 
 
 
 
3.1.4. Data collection and analysis methods 
The answers to the evaluation questions were based on:  
- Document analysis, including strategic and contractual documents (NIP, Financing agreements, 
Progress reports, Evaluation reports), etc. (see Annex 2). 
- Analysis of CRIS data and documentation on the programme/project cycle, which allowed the 
analysis to be broadened to activities and induced outputs (or direct outputs) programmed and 
effectively achieved (effectiveness); qualitative and quantitative correspondence between 
allocations and financial commitments in the inception and performance phases of operations 
(see Annexes 7-8). 
- Approximately 108 interviews with: i) officials from the European Commission services in 
Brussels and Tunisia (interviews with 18 people); ii) representatives of national authorities 
(35 people, and 25 people from the Chamber of Deputies): MDCI staff responsible for 
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programming and coordinating cooperation with the EU and for managing and monitoring the 
various sectoral programmes; officials responsible for programmes/projects and/or associated 
sectors, including staff from programme management units (PMU) for selected projects; 
representatives of public institutions (ministries, agencies) responsible for the intervention 
sectors of cooperation initiatives and having been involved in and/or beneficiaries of 
programmes/projects funded by the EU; iii) representatives of EU Member States (7 people) 
and other donors (4 people) (World Bank, African Development Bank, etc.); iv) non-state actors: 
civil society organisations, private sector, academic world (9 people as detailed in the list in 
Annex 3, plus another 10 people who did not want their details revealed, see section 2.4 for 
more information). - The initial plan for the data collection methodology envisaged two focus 
groups: one with representatives of civil society on themes of governance and human rights, and 
the other with representatives of the private sector to discuss changes in the business 
environment. No focus groups were formed: in this context, the team considered that the best 
alternative was to conduct individual interviews, during which representatives of interested 
institutions and organisations could express their views in a less formal manner. With regard to 
civil society, the decision was made in consultation with the DUE, given the restrictions in force 
(compulsory prior authorisations), whereas, for the private sector, the decision was taken due to 
the reticence of the individuals contacted to participate in this type of meeting. This was linked 
to the recent adoption of the Law on Economic Security, which had a negative effect on the free 
expression of people likely to participate.  
- Statistical analysis (see Annex 16).  
- Briefing and debriefing discussions and meetings during which the hypotheses and preliminary 
conclusions were discussed with the main participants.  
 
The documentation collected was systematically analysed using the matrix of detailed answers to the 
evaluation questions (cf. Annexes 11-16). All the sources used are detailed in the evaluation matrix.  
 
All the information and data collected from the various sources (documents, database, oral qualitative 
information) was cross-checked, i.e. analysed and compared to verify the hypotheses and preliminary 
answers, in order to provide the key elements for producing the findings on the evaluation questions, 
conclusions and recommendations of this evaluation. 
 
The judgement approach applied is a summary taking into account: 
- the information collected on the content and value of the indicators associated with each of the 
judgement criteria, as defined during the inception phase of the evaluation, and reviewed or 
clarified (for a minority of them) either during the desk phase or during the field phase; 
- the search for consistency between the judgements associated with the same evaluation question 
and between all the judgements given; 
- the search for simplicity and clarity in the formulation of judgements; 
- the desire to present judgements which can be used to precisely and exhaustively answer the 
evaluation questions; 
- the quantitative representation of judgements, on a scale from ‘poor’ to ‘very good’; 
- the observations of the reference group. 
 
3.2. EVALUATION LIMITS 
Despite trying to find a balance between the successive phases and optimise the time available, the 
evaluation exercise was essentially limited by: 
- the need to take on board, during the process, new ToR produced within the DAC, which 
resulted in fairly radical changes, particularly the switch from 10 to 24 EQs, with 21 basic 
evaluation questions17;  
                                                   
17 In agreement with the Reference Group, the team selected a total of 24 EQs due to the need to break down the 
questions by sector. 
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- weaknesses in the matrix used, which led to the definition of multiple indicators, which 
sometimes resulted in similar answers and therefore repetitions and redundancies in the 
answers to the questions in Levels 1, 2 and 3 of Step 1; 
- lengthy delays in obtaining documentation, despite the assistance of EC representatives, both in 
Brussels and Tunis;   
- institutional memory limits, i.e. the unavailability of certain information or key contacts due to 
staff rotation at the Headquarters, at the DUE and in the ministerial departments and other 
organisations involved; 
- duration of the evaluation: certain information collected at the start of the mission was obsolete 
and out of date one year later; 
- limits of the judgement approach, which particularly depends on the limits of the data collected 
plus: 
- sometimes divergent or, at the very least, qualified opinions of experts from the 
Headquarters, the DUE, the Tunisian government and projects; 
- sometimes biased opinions of certain contacts who did not want to be too critical about a 
financial and technical partner as important as the European Union. 
 
Despite these difficulties, by systematically cross-checking the information collected on one theme, 
the evaluators managed to produce judgements which they believe reflect the truth fairly accurately, if 
this absolute concept can be applied to evaluation (exercise necessarily involving an element of 
subjectivity, which evaluation techniques try to minimise).  
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4. ANSWERS TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
The aim of this chapter is to present the most important findings emerging from the answers to the 
evaluation questions. The team used a dual approach during the synthesis phase, namely: 
- preliminary analysis and structured synthesis work using the 24 evaluation questions selected for 
the evaluation, with this work being presented in Volume 3, Annexes 11-17; and  
- synthesis work grouping together the themes emerging from several evaluation questions, in 
order to better highlight the most important findings, and therefore improve the readability of 
the synthesis report.  
 
The answers provided by the team to the evaluation questions are based on the 
validation/invalidation of the judgement criteria associated with each question, carried out based on 
the information collected for the indicators relating to these criteria. The details of this analysis (data 
collected, all the findings associated with the judgement criteria) appear in the evaluation matrix 
(Volume 3) and in the presentation fiches for the budget support operations evaluated (Volume 2, 
Annex 8). 
 
4.1. STEP 1 – LEVEL 1. QUESTIONS RELATING TO LEVEL 1 OF THE INTERVENTION 
LOGIC: QUALITY OF PROGRAMMES   
According to the evaluation ToR, the questions relating to Level 1 of the intervention logic aim to 
evaluate the content of the programmes in relation to the context. These questions particularly 
concern the following four points: 
· the components (inputs) of the programmes, judged in relation to the strategic criteria of the 
budget support (EQ 1.1); 
· the relevance of the programmes in relation to the country’s economic and social context and 
its development strategies (EQ 1.2); 
· the account taken in the programmes of the country’s eligibility criteria and specific capacities 
(EQ 1.3); and 
· the presence in the programmes of non-financial inputs (TA and dialogue) in line with the 
government’s priorities and systems (EQ 1.4). 
 
4.1.1. Programme components and their effective availability (EQ 1.1) 
The GBS programme inputs consisted of funds, conditionalities and a well-structured dialogue 
framework, whereas the SBS programmes also included significant technical assistance components, 
including capacity development support. These inputs were further supplemented by amounts 
allocated for operation monitoring and evaluation activities.  
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Table 5: Outline of inputs envisaged and effectively provided   
 
Column1 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Facility I, 
SAF I                
(1996-1998) 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Facility II,  
SAF II          
(1999-2001) 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Facility III,  
SAF III          
(2002-2004) 
Structural 
Adjustment 
Facility IV,   
SAF IV          
(2005-2009) 
TOTAL AMOUNT ALLOCATED TO 
PROGRAMME,                             of which 
100,000,000 80,000,000 80,000,000 78,000,000 
POLICY DIALOGUE ü ü ü ü 
BUDGET SUPPORT ü ü ü ü 
Amount of Budget Support allocated 100,000,000 80,000,000 79,500,000 77,750,000 
Amount of Budget Support disbursed 100,000,000 80,000,000 66,906,000 77,750,000 
% Budget Support allocated/disbursed 100.00% 100.00% 84.16% 100.00% 
MONITORING & EVALUATION 
x x ü ü 
Amount of Monitoring & Eval. allocated  -   -  500,000 250,000 
Amount of Monitoring & Eval. disbursed  -   -  198,470 121,107 
% M&E allocated/disbursed  -   -  39.69% 48.44% 
 
Column1 Programme for the 
modernisation of 
higher education in 
Tunisia - PAMES                   
(2004-2007) 
Support for the 
reform of 
secondary 
education (2006-
2008) 
Support 
programme for 
improving 
vocational training 
- MANFORM II 
(2008-2009) 
TOTAL AMOUNT ALLOCATED TO 
PROGRAMME,                         of which 
48,000,000 30,000,000 30,000,000 
POLICY DIALOGUE  ü ü ü 
BUDGET SUPPORT ü ü ü 
Amount of Budget Support allocated 47,000,000 29,400,000 29,300,000 
Amount of Budget Support disbursed 45,800,000 26,280,000 28,667,733 
% Budget Support allocated/disbursed 97.45% 89.39% 97.84% 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  ü ü ü 
Amount of TA allocated 750,000 300,000 400,000 
Amount of TA disbursed 834,900 303,374 91,360 
% TA allocated/disbursed 111.32% 101.12% 22.84% 
MONITORING & EVALUATION ü ü ü 
Amount of Monitoring & Eval. allocated 250,000 300,000 300,000 
Amount of Monitoring & Eval. disbursed 50,290 0 50,397 
% M&E allocated/disbursed 20.12% 0.00% 16.80% 
 
Source: Adapted by the team from the CRIS database. The amounts are taken from the contracts recorded in CRIS. The dates 
refer to the period of implementation.  
 
The analysis of the various categories of inputs envisaged and provided reveals that:  
· the funds committed by the EC to budget support were almost totally disbursed and 
transferred to the Central Bank as envisaged (JC111); 
· the correspondence between the non-financial technical assistance and capacity-building inputs 
envisaged by the SBS operations and the inputs effectively provided is not clear in the case of 
MANFORM II (see below), but seems good for the other programmes (JC112); 
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· the extent and structure of the political and policy dialogue framework, in which the BS 
programmes are included and to which they contribute, represent one of the specific 
characteristics of BS in Tunisia and more generally in the region (JC113). 
 
Funds   
The funds for the seven budget support operations covered by the evaluation amounted to a total of 
EUR 442 950 000, of which EUR 425 403 733 were disbursed and transferred to the Central Bank as 
envisaged, i.e. 96% of the total.  
 
Technical assistance 
As shown by the table, none of the four SAFs covered by the evaluation provided for TA 
components and/or capacity-building activities. The only TA envisaged was included in the 
monitoring/evaluation envelope. The reason for this particular situation – confirmed during the field 
mission – was that the SAFs relied on the TA provided by the WB (through analytical work and 
diagnostic studies18) and on other specific programmes funded by the EC. In the EC’s most recent 
GBS programmes – not included in the evaluation – TA was reintroduced (e.g. PAGBO). 
 
On the other hand, all the SBS operations included TA components amounting to between 
EUR 300 000 and EUR 750 000 (i.e. between 1% and 1.5% of the overall programme envelope), 
which were intended to support the implementation of certain activities envisaged by the Tunisian 
government’s sectoral policies. As for the two programmes closed by the date of analysis of the CRIS 
data, i.e. Higher Education and Secondary Education, all the amounts envisaged were disbursed, 
although the provision of technical expertise was significantly delayed. As for the MANFORM II 
programme, only 22.8% of the amount envisaged for TA was disbursed, because the government did 
not deem it appropriate to use all the available amounts during the project. The parties’ explanation is 
that the TA had been programmed with a certain surplus so that any needs not identified could be 
met. This is possible, but it also indicates a limit in the dialogue, as it could have been agreed to use 
the available inputs for analytical support or various training, in the context of implementing the 
reform (JC112). 
 
Dialogue framework 
The GBS programmes funded by the EC (in collaboration with the WB and AfDB) aim to provide 
technical and financial support to the Tunisian government in order to implement reforms agreed 
within the partnership framework of the Association Agreement (AA) and Neighbourhood Action 
Plan (NAP). These reforms are monitored jointly by Tunisia and the EU, through the permanent 
system for technical and sectoral dialogue set up by this framework. These programmes are therefore 
the result of the complex and systematic dialogue that exists between the EU and Tunisia at political 
and policy level. At the same time, they represent one of the forums for this dialogue, as they are 
designed to allow a constant exchange of opinions and information on the specific reform measures 
in the economic and sectoral areas in question. The partnership framework of the AA includes the 
EU-Tunisia Council of Ministers and the Association Committee, the sectoral sub-committees of the 
ENP, and joint sessions for formulating and monitoring the BS programmes. It firstly ensures an 
effective link between each programme and the development, poverty reduction and 
Euro-Mediterranean integration results of the EU-Tunisia partnership. Secondly, it should allow close 
monitoring of the intended reform processes. The institutionalisation of the dialogue on individual 
programmes could be improved, as structured meetings are currently planned only for 
formulation/negotiation and for monitoring missions. Thirdly, a practice of constant contact between 
partners seems to be well-established between one monitoring mission and the next, during the 
implementation of the programmes (JC113). 
 
                                                   
18 See below (Level 2). 
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4.1.2. Consistency of programmes with the EC’s approaches and strategies and their 
relevance in relation to the economic and social context and the government’s 
policies (EQ 1.2) 
The AA and National Development Plans 
Since the signature of the AA, all the cooperation between the EU and Tunisia has been restructured 
around the three main Barcelona dimensions (political, economic and social). The budget support 
programmes particularly involve the objectives of the economic and social dimensions. In particular: 
the GBS programmes specifically respond to the objective of increasing the competitiveness of the 
Tunisian economy in a Euro-Mediterranean integration framework; and the SBS programmes in the 
area of education and vocational training specifically respond to the objective of modernising the 
labour market, containing emigration and moving towards a knowledge society (JC121). 
Furthermore, the five-year development plans drawn up by the government have incorporated the 
AA’s dimensions and objectives, by developing them into political and economic action plans. In this 
way, the objectives, outcomes and targets envisaged by the BS operations have fully reflected the 
government’s development plans and the specific reforms included within these plans. This is clearly 
apparent from the analysis of the Financing Agreements for the programmes, both for GBS and for 
SBS. As regards GBS, as from SAF III, the link between the programmes and the reforms established 
by the government’s development plans is indicated in great detail (JC124).  
Within this general framework, the specific programmes have been structured in such a way as to 
help the government tackle the main challenges involved in the reforms to be implemented. A high 
level of correspondence is evident between the objectives and matrices of conditionalities of the BS 
programmes and the objectives and actions indicated in the government’s development plans, 
whether this involves the 9th Plan (SAF I and II) or the 10th Plan (SAF III, SAF IV, PAMES, 
PARES, MANFORM) . 
 
Regional programmes, project aid and various sectoral operations (JC122) 
The GBS and SBS programmes have been formulated in line with the guidelines defined in the 
MEDA and ENPI regulations, which explicitly provide for budget support as one of the most 
effective ways of supporting the transition to the FTA and the relevant economic and social reforms. 
Although cross-references between the national BS programmes and the EC’s regional programmes 
are very limited, the latter have supported regional integration processes in the area of infrastructure, 
with a view to establishing a regional regulatory framework, which is consistent with those supported 
by the national GBS.  
 
As regards links between the BS programmes, the government’s sectoral policies and other 
programmes of the EC and other donors, references are limited in the GBS documents or virtually 
absent in SAF I and II, depending on the style of the former structural adjustment programmes. As 
from SAF III, the documents seem to be more interdependent. In the case of SBS, references to 
other programmes and links between the SBS programmes and the government’s sectoral 
policies/reforms are consistently presented. 
 
EC’s approach to budget support (JC123) 
Bearing in mind the Guidelines on the Programming, Design & Management of General Budget 
Support, published by EuropeAid in 2007, and other previous guideline documents, GBS in Tunisia, 
while meeting most of the criteria required, has several particular characteristics, especially with regard 
to the verification of eligibility conditions and the object and method of management of 
conditionalities.  
 
The eligibility conditions, particularly the public finance management framework, have not been 
systematically evaluated. Variable tranches have been used only in SBS. As for the conditionalities, 
less attention has been paid to public finance management problems than to support for reform 
processes, and the triggers for disbursement, in the SAFs, are not outcome indicators in the proper 
sense. 
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According to the information collected and analyses conducted, these choices are based on the 
particular characteristics of the context: 
· Public finance management framework. In 1995 the country already had nearly 10 years’ experience 
of structural adjustment, in partnership with the World Bank and IMF. Over those years, the 
public finances were analysed in depth and systematically monitored. SAF I continued this 
exercise, although the new objective of the AA radically broadened its horizon. In the TAP for 
SAF I, the eligibility conditions explicitly mention the structural adjustment agreements with 
the WB and IMF (TAP, page 15). Over the period covered by the evaluation, other exercises to 
evaluate the Tunisian public finances were carried out and confirmed a high level of reliability 
and capacity on the part of the government: in particular, periodic supervision by the WB and 
IMF’ the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) of the WB in 2004; reports 
published by the government (such as budget implementation reports); and finally the PEFA 
Report19, which was recently published. 
· Matrices of conditionalities. The existence of a global partnership framework between the EU and 
Tunisia, based on a series of shared strategic results, together with dialogue and monitoring 
instruments, ensured the targeting of all cooperation actions between the two partners, 
preventing the achievement of their results from being regarded as conditions specific to a 
single programme. The FAs explicitly referred to this strategic framework, but the matrices of 
conditionalities for the programmes referred more to specific actions linked to the 
implementation of reforms, acting as a reminder or road maps for monitoring the envisaged 
reform processes (JC123). 
· Fixed tranches and indicators in GBS. The non-use of variable tranches in GBS is due to a 
requirement for uniformity with the other donors and better correspondence between the fixed 
tranches and the conditionalities not based on outcomes (which could be achieved at different 
levels), but on practical reform actions (whether or not realised). In SBS, the situation is 
different (see below). 
· Duration limited to two years. The SBS in question has a duration of two years, which is normally 
considered to be too short to ensure the continuity and predictability that should exist in this 
support instrument20. In the Tunisian case, it was noted that this limited duration allowed the 
framework of the dialogue and conditionalities to be updated in line with the priorities of the 
reform process specific to each period, without harming continuity. The programmes actually 
covered 10 years without any significant interruptions. The reason for this particular 
characteristic is the partnership framework of the AA, which provided the long-term context in 
which GBS is incorporated (not just the EC’s programmes). The SBS case is different: a more 
flexible and long-term sectoral strategic approach, particularly in terms of TA, would have 
allowed the support to benefit from a longer duration. 
 
These particular characteristics have sometimes been interpreted as weaknesses (MEDA evaluation, 
Court of Auditors). However, many of these could be regarded as a justified adaptation of the budget 
support instrument based on the partnership framework existing between Tunisia and the 
development banks, on the one hand, and between the EU and Tunisia on the other hand. The 
evaluation method based on the ‘3 STEPS’ has allowed the function of the partnership framework 
and its role in the formulation of the programme to be highlighted (JC123). 
 
4.1.3. Choice and institutional set-up of BS programmes (EQ 1.3) 
Justification for choosing BS (JC132) 
The justification for choosing the BS method is not explained in detail in the GBS programmes. This 
is mainly due to the fact that this aid method was a tried and tested practice in the country. The FA 
                                                   
19 Public Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) Report, EC, WB and AfDB, 2010. 
20 EuropeAid, Guidelines cited. These indicate that ‘at least three years’ is an adequate duration for SBS. 
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for SAF I contains repeated references to the WB’s 10 years of structural adjustment and to the good 
results achieved through this type of aid. The SBS case is different, with the FAs containing more 
explicit justification, which refers to ‘the good quality of public finance management, mechanisms for 
measuring the results of implementing the policies ..., and reliable mechanisms for scrutinising public 
expenditure’ (FA, PAMES – TAP, 3.5, page 38). Moreover, the general formulation of the 
programmes is based on diagnostic studies and a joint analysis of the context and priority economic 
and social challenges facing the country in relation to the specific themes and sectors involved, which 
ensures in principle the capacity of the programmes to respond to the government’s priorities and to 
the country’s needs and capacities.  
 
Institutional set-up of GBS (JC131) 
The GBS in question demonstrates a high degree of continuity, marked by the following particular 
characteristics: 
· Implementation period that is relatively short, approximately two years. 
· Limited variation in financial allocations, between EUR 100 000 000 (SAF I) and 
EUR 78 000 000 (SAF IV)21.  
· Strategic framework explicitly linked to the AA objectives. 
· Matrices of conditionalities covering a large number of indicators, marked by huge differences 
between the envisaged measures, including macroeconomic indicators and process indicators 
linked to the achievement of activities (launch of reforms, revision of regulatory frameworks, 
improvement of procedures, and operational decisions on major issues, such as privatisations 
or sensitive institutional measures). The dispersion of the measures was partly reduced in 
SAF IV by the switch to the system of disbursement or ‘star’ conditionalities (JC131). 
· Virtually identical methods of disbursement. SAF I, II and IV provided for two disbursements 
with fully fixed tranches (four with variable tranches in SAF III). 
· Technical assistance. Lack of specific and complementary technical assistance components in 
the SAFs, offset by the availability of TA from the development banks involved in co-financing 
and other Commission programmes (JC131 and JC112). 
 
Institutional set-up of SBS (JC131) 
The SBS in question, funded solely by the EC, has some different characteristics: 
· Extended operational phase (the duration of MANFORM II is 36 months). 
· Significant reduction in amounts: from EUR 48 million for the first programme (secondary 
education) to EUR 30 million for subsequent programmes. This reduction is even more 
significant if the very first SBS is taken into account, which is not covered by the evaluation 
(primary education). 
· Change in conditionalities and typology, and use of indicators: change from a series of mainly 
process indicators linked to the achievement of activities (Primary Education SBS) to a series 
of indicators expressing the expected outcomes of the programmes, in terms of both process 
and direct output, and genuine development results (enrolment rate etc.). In addition, annual 
targets are identified and linked to a weighting percentage, which allows the amount to be 
disbursed through the variable tranche to be defined.  
· Increase in number of tranches: change from two fixed tranches for the primary education SBS 
to three annual tranches for the three programmes, with the first being a fixed tranche on the 
signature of the FA, and the other two being mixed, i.e. divided into fixed and variable 
sub-tranches, with the disbursement of the variable parts being linked to the analysis of specific 
performance/achievement of the targets indicated for each indicator selected. 
· Technical assistance: as from the Support programme for the modernisation of higher 
education in Tunisia – PAMES (2004), a technical assistance component was introduced 
                                                   
21 By contrast, the GBS allocations overall (taking into account the loans provided in this respect by the WB and 
AfDB) vary significantly, as the demand for BS loans from the government varies according to the period (see 
Table 3 above). 
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which, in the case of the Support programme for the reform of secondary education – PARES, 
also included the purchase of equipment. 
 
4.2. STEP 1 – LEVEL 2. QUESTIONS RELATING TO LEVEL 2 OF THE INTERVENTION 
LOGIC: QUALITY OF DIRECT OUTPUTS   
According to the evaluation ToR, the questions relating to Level 2 of the intervention logic aim to 
evaluate the direct outputs of programmes, in particular: 
· direct effects caused by the transfer of funds (EQ 2.1); 
· direct effects caused by the establishment of a framework for dialogue on the government’s 
development policies (EQ 2.2); and 
· direct effects caused by the programmes in terms of capacity-building and aid harmonisation 
and alignment, including coordination between the various international partners (EQ 2.3). 
 
4.2.1. Increased government control over international cooperation funds (EQ 2.1). 
Quantity and percentage (JC211) 
The international cooperation funds granted to Tunisia over the 1996-2008 period amounted to a 
total of approximately EUR 10 billion, of which nearly 50% was in the form of soft loans. As the 
latter were loans to the State from international financial institutions (WB, AfDB and EIB) or 
regional financial institutions (AFESD and IDB), they all went through the national budget. Aside 
from the EC, the donors using the BS method were the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank. 
 
Soft loans granted through the BS instrument have existed since the second half of the 1980s 
(structural adjustment funds from the World Bank). Since 1996 these funds have increased 
significantly and been redirected to support the objectives of the EU-Tunisia AA of opening up to 
international markets and Euro-Mediterranean integration. In 1996 the EC and the WB launched 
SAF I and ECAL I, doubling the budget support funds (structural adjustment) that the country had 
previously received. In 1999 the AfDB joined the group, and recently France and other donors have 
also considered participating. 
 
Even though the BS quantities and their percentage in relation to total soft loans have increased over 
the years, the relative weight of BS in public expenditure has remained modest: in 2006 the total 
amount of BS was equivalent to 1.55% of expenditure, and in 2007 and 2008 it was 1.90% and 0.61% 
respectively. This explains why officials at the Ministry of Finance and the BCT, as also members of 
the Finance Committee in the Chamber of Deputies, considered during this evaluation that BS was 
less a source of funding than a useful ‘accompaniment’ having supported the Tunisian economic 
reform movement. 
 
Predictability (JC212) 
In this respect, the modest differences, where they exist, between forecasts and disbursements and 
the disbursement delays have not had any negative consequences on the planning of public 
expenditure in terms of the annual budget, nor in the medium term on the capacity to implement 
public policies. 
 
The amounts agreed have sometimes been disbursed late, but the level of disbursement was always 
very high during the period in question. The delays were often due to having to wait to meet one or 
other of the conditionalities. 
 
The PEFA Report (Indicator D-1: ‘Predictability of budget support’) gives a score of D+, which is 
the result of a B for component i): ‘Over the last three financial years (2006, 2007 and 2008), effective 
direct budget support has in one year only been more than 10% below the forecasts’, and a D for 
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component ii): ‘Effective delays in weighted disbursements exceeded 50% in 2006 and 2007. There 
was no delay in 2008’ (JC212). 
 
4.2.2. Forms and content of policy dialogue and TA, and relations between the two 
(EQ 2.2) 
Forum for dialogue at programme level (JC221) 
The nature of the BS programmes as results of the complex dialogue established by the AA and – at 
the same time – as forums in which this dialogue can develop and be specified (see 4.1.1 above) has 
been underlined. 
 
Each BS programme creates a forum for dialogue on the formulation and practical implementation of 
structural and sectoral reforms, which manifests itself in structured opportunities for 
negotiation/formulation/monitoring of programmes, but also in an exchange of information and 
viewpoints throughout the whole reform process. The latter is more informal and constant in the 
SAFs, whilst it is particularly linked to the TA operations in SBS. 
 
The relationship between TA and dialogue is rather different in GBS as opposed to SBS. In GBS, TA 
(for example, the WB’s forward-looking studies22) feeds the dialogue, particularly in the programme 
formulation phase. During implementation, it is guided and mobilised by the dialogue in order to 
respond to specific problems23 and collaborate in (or comment on) government studies etc. In SBS, 
TA does not provide significant analytical bases for the dialogue between the partners during the 
formulation phase. It is particularly intended for evaluation of the eligibility conditions (public finance 
management, sectoral strategies, outcome indicators). Its contribution to the development of reforms 
and/or production of an analytical framework, which can help to develop ongoing reforms, is 
limited24. In the implementation phase, it is not flexibly managed according to the dialogue 
priorities, but is mainly deployed according to a predetermined programme. Its outputs help with 
implementation of the reforms (MTEF) and feed the dialogue, as they highlight the progress made or 
not made in relation to the agreed objectives. 
 
Dialogue at programme level feeds dialogue in the sub-committees, particularly helping with 
assessment of the reforms, and is reflected in the annual reports on the ENP and in annual 
discussions between the parties. 
 
The government and EC representatives, with reference to the SAFs, have confirmed that the 
political and policy dialogue framework, in which the BS programmes are included and to which they 
contribute, represents a genuine added value of the EC’s BS programmes. This type of dialogue 
should subsequently have been consolidated in the more recent SBS programmes, particularly prior to 
formulation, with greater involvement of the EC’s internal technical services in terms of conducting 
the dialogue and not just acting as consultants. 
 
The conditionalities help to monitor reforms (JC222) 
As regards the conditionalities, it should be noted that, in GBS, but also partly in SBS, the process 
indicators are more important than the outcome indicators (see above). In other contexts, these 
aspects could indicate a low level of trust between the parties and the need for the donor to scrutinise 
the beneficiary’s management. However, in the Tunisian context, the existence of a broader political 
partnership framework has allowed various levels of dialogue to be used (committee/sub-
committees/programmes). Furthermore, the establishment of an operational road map at BS 
                                                   
22 WB forward-looking studies, Project Performance Assessment Report (ECAL I, II and III), 2004. 
23 For example, support for the preparation of the Action Plan for the active management of public debt, provided 
for by SAF III (and by the budget support of the development banks). See also EC, ENP Progress Report, 2006. 
24 This characteristic is apparent on examining the programmes, and is underlined as a limit, particularly of those 
programmes under preparation, by Tunisian cooperation officials. 
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programme level has allowed: i) the government and donors to closely monitor certain crucial 
moments of the reforms, by being able to intervene through targeted studies and/or opinions on the 
ongoing process; and ii) a sort of external discipline to be created, which facilitates certain internal 
political and institutional movements (this is what often happens in political processes within the EU 
Member States or enlargement countries). 
 
TA helps to formulate and monitor reforms and encourages dialogue (JC142-JC221) 
TA is not a direct part of the general budget support programmes under evaluation. However, several 
TA activities and/or economic and sectoral studies conducted in parallel with or prior to the GBS 
programmes have extended the economic analysis, contributed to the correct targeting of reforms, 
and provided a reference basis for defining specific measures under the matrices of conditionalities. 
The contribution and usefulness of these studies are confirmed by the programme evaluation reports 
(SAF III – EC, ECAL – WB, PAC – AfDB) and also by interviews conducted at the level of the EU 
Delegation in Tunisia. 
 
Among the studies conducted by the GBS partners in order to help the government guide the reform 
processes covered by the budget support, the following can be cited as the most important: 
· The WB was the lead partner in the applied research that accompanied the budget support. 
The following can be mentioned, among others: Country Economic Memorandum: 1995; 
Tunisia’s Global Integration and Sustainable Development: Strategic Choices for the 21st 
Century25; Tunisia - Private Sector Assessment Update - Meeting the challenge of 
globalization - 200026; Promotion of private investment and the role of incentive policy: 
analysis and recommendations, FIAS/WB - 2002; Active management of public debt - 2003; 
Review of development policies: Taking advantage of trade integration to stimulate growth 
and employment, WB and Tunisian Government - 2004. 
· The AfDB has brought to the partnership its experience in the area of development banks, 
having funded major programmes in Tunisia and having a high level of expertise. It also 
conducted an important study on Japanese support in the insurance sector, the outputs of 
which were used in the reforms supported by GBS under the relevant conditionalities. 
· The EC used the expertise gained in the competitiveness support projects for the banks and 
insurance in order to finalise the specific conditionalities of SAF III. Likewise, a study funded 
by the EC on privatisation in the context of the PATP was used to finalise the strategies and 
conditionalities of the SAFs. 
 
In addition to the studies, the internal expertise of the partners, particularly of the World Bank, and 
the expertise available from other TA projects was used to review and/or comment on the numerous 
studies produced by the government further to the GBS conditionalities. 
 
In the context of general budget support, the positive experience with TA (excluding SAF, but linked 
to GBS), as a capacity development instrument and flexible tool combined with policy dialogue, has 
led the EC to include TA components in new programmes, which are not covered by the evaluation. 
This is the case, for example, with PAGBO in which TA is also implemented using instruments such 
as TAIEX or twinnings (P3A), which guarantee a high level of appropriation on the part of 
beneficiaries and flexible implementation. 
 
In SBS, TA is generally divided into two aspects: one part is intended to support the MTEF, the 
implementation of which is one of the conditions for disbursement; the other part is more flexible 
and is linked to the implementation of sub-sectoral reform. The part supporting the MTEF has been 
                                                   
25 These two works were fundamental in the formulation and monitoring of SAF I and II (and ECAL I and II, and 
PAC I). 
26 This study details the constraints limiting the private sector’s competitiveness in terms of legal and administrative 
obstacles, access to financing, etc., and makes precise recommendations, some of which are included in the GBS 
matrices, as from SAF III.  
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well used and has helped to initiate and extend the MTEF adoption process, which is still ongoing 
and which represents one of the most important improvements in the country’s budget policies. The 
other part has been used to complement the first part, or has not been used, as in the case of 
MANFORM II. 
 
Finally, a few points need to be made on TA management. The TA envelope is actually managed by 
the government, but in many cases this uses the DUE and – through this – the Framework 
Contracts27 to access TA or other flexible instruments such as P3A and TAIEX. Theoretically, the 
government could launch invitations to tender or follow its own procedures for TA management, but 
it prefers to use the DUE and its expertise. This involves extra work for the DUE, but ensures a truly 
daily dialogue. 
 
4.2.3. Alignment and harmonisation (EQ 2.3) 
Alignment with the government’s objectives (JC222) 
The high level of correspondence between the BS programmes and the objectives and guidelines of 
the National Development Plans has facilitated the establishment of a performance evaluation 
framework aligned with the government systems, which in turn has facilitated the joint assessment of 
the general and specific outcomes targeted by the BS programmes. 
 
In particular, the document analysis and interviews with participants during the field mission 
highlighted the following achievements:  
· sharing of macroeconomic indicators (BCT-Institut National de la Statistique);  
· joint government/partner monitoring of the conditionalities of the GBS programmes; 
· joint government/EC (sole partner) monitoring of the SBS programmes;  
· for the SAFs, good coordination and constant exchange of information between co-financers 
and the government have helped to ensure a certain flexibility in assessing the achievement of 
complex measures; 
· experience gained during the implementation of the SBS programmes has led to the adoption 
of simplified methods for verifying the achievement of indicators and to recognition of the 
contribution to dialogue and alignment made by the TA component, which has been extended 
to the new SBS and GBS programmes (JC222). 
 
Coordination and harmonisation between international partners and sector approach (JC231) 
The GBS programmes taken into account (the only ones to be co-financed) are marked by a high 
level of harmonisation and coordination between the donors, both in the programming phases and in 
the monitoring and negotiation phases28. In fact, the matrices of conditionalities, the preparation and 
monitoring missions, and the decisions on disbursements have increasingly become a joint and shared 
affair over the years. This high level of collaboration and consultation is confirmed both by the 
progress/completion/evaluation reports and by opinions expressed by donors and the government 
during field missions. As regards the evaluation of conditionalities, the three donors have adopted an 
                                                   
27 With timeframes allowing quality inputs to be accessed. 
28 Each programme includes a programming phase, which mainly involves studying the reforms being prepared, 
using analyses conducted by the government and partners. In this phase, the priorities and objectives of the 
programmes are discussed, agreed and translated into matrices of conditions. The finalisation of these matrices 
requires an understanding of the reform process envisaged and a position to be taken by the partners in terms of 
targeting the measurable changes that are the most sensitive and representative of the achievement of the content to 
be supported. This phase is accompanied by a negotiation, which is generally quite long (several months), in order to 
reach agreement on the matrices. The negotiation resumes in the output monitoring phases, as it must be assessed 
whether and to what extent the conditions have been met. The negotiations on the outputs have sometimes been 
very complex and have often led to delays in disbursements. This shows that meeting the conditions is not a formal 
act, but a genuine challenge for the government, which – having accepted this challenge and included it in its own 
programme – uses it as an element of self-discipline, in order to better target its internal energies and better 
overcome any resistance from outside. 
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identical stance, particularly with regard to the ICT tranche – the only conditionality not achieved – 
which was not disbursed by any of the three donors. With SAF IV, the progress reports, which were 
linked to disbursement of the star tranches, stem from the joint monitoring missions involving the 
European Commission, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The coordinated 
intervention of these three major donors has provided political, technical and financial support, which 
has reaffirmed the authorities’ desire for reform and helped them to accelerate the rate of these 
reforms. 
 
Outside GBS, harmonisation with other donors seems very limited, if not absent. In a sector such as 
education, several major donors act simultaneously, using different instruments, each having its own 
forums for dialogue, targets or conditionalities, and its own TA and monitoring instruments. In 
general, although all the partners agree on the government’s plans, we cannot talk about sector 
approaches in the proper sense of the term (OECD-DAC). Such approaches imply that the 
government is in the driving seat (criterion effectively met), but also that the international partners 
manage their contributions in a harmonised and complementary manner under the government’s 
coordination (criterion not yet met). A genuine sector approach would facilitate dialogue between the 
external partners and the exchange of experience through their specific contributions, and would 
reinforce the efficiency of the support. Moreover, such an approach would allow duplication and its 
associated costs to be reduced (see below). This lack of exchange is particularly apparent in the 
sector-by-sector strategic discussions and analyses. Capitalisation on experience has become difficult 
due to a certain degree of separation between programmes and a lack of institutionalised bodies open 
to the partners. Certain improvements have been made, although these affect more recent projects 
not covered by the evaluation (set-up of the PEFESE, which is ongoing). 
 
The issue of limited coordination and harmonisation between the sector operations of the main 
donors (with the exception of the broad guidelines, which they largely share, and specific areas such 
as GBS, in which there is strict integration) has different causes, and in particular: 
· in key sectors such as education, a limited sector approach prevents government contacts 
responsible for coordination and guidance from being identified, as is the case with the 
MDCI in the area of economic reforms; 
· the dual responsibility, in relation to donors, of the sectoral ministries and the MDCI, and the 
separate management – within the MDCI – of the various main donors. The system is 
complicated, but could be simplified through a functional sector approach. In the meantime, 
it would be useful to set up bodies for coordination and harmonisation between the 
participants, promoted by one of the partners. 
 
Internal consistency and complementarity of BS and other EC programmes JC232) 
A cluster approach29 between the BS programmes and other EC programmes is evident. The EC 
programming documents set out a clear framework of sectoral strategies rooted in the main 
dimensions of the AA. These strategies cover sets (or clusters) of programmes, without, however, 
any functional coordination mechanisms between these programmes being envisaged. 
Coordination is ensured by several factors, in particular: in terms of EC operations, through constant 
exchanges between the various project/programme managers and the DUE’s thematic organisation; 
in terms of strategic consistency, through the high degree of complementarity envisaged in the 
formulation of the various actions; and in terms of convergence and institutional coordination, 
through the high degree of appropriation by the government. 
 
                                                   
29 The term ‘cluster approach’ is used here generically to mean the combination of different and relatively 
independent aid instruments having a synergetic effect. In comparison to the sector approach, this term refers more 
to the complementarity of different actions managed by one or more donors, even in different sectors. In the 
literature on development, the term ‘cluster approach’ is used with different meanings. For example, it can be used to 
mean a mechanism for coordinating humanitarian aid (United Nations) or to identify all interconnected enterprises 
within a value sector (chain), or in other contexts. 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 31 
In the ‘macroeconomic management and economic reforms’ macro-sector, the EC has funded 
11 operations totalling approximately EUR 513 million, i.e. 43% of the total amount allocated in the 
evaluation period. In the ‘business environment and private sector development’ macro-sector, the 
EC has funded seven operations totalling approximately EUR 140.5 million (or eight operations 
totalling EUR 170.5 million, including the EIB), i.e. 14.5% of the total amount allocated. Finally, as 
regards the ‘human resource development and social protection – HRDSP’ macro-sector, the EC has 
funded 12 operations totalling approximately EUR 305 million, i.e. 26% of the total amount 
allocated. 
 
Reduction of transaction costs (JC233) 
The field missions confirmed that the high level of coordination and harmonisation achieved allowed 
the donors to optimise the use of resources, and the government to save time and energy in terms of 
monitoring, meetings and document production. This resulted in a significant reduction in transaction 
costs in the management of GBS, compared to the management of hypothetical programmes of the 
same financial scope with three separate and different counterparts and, potentially, different action 
plans and/or conditionalities. However, as noted in the SAF III evaluation report, closer sharing of 
technical assistance for monitoring and pooling accompanying analytical resources could have 
resulted in subsequent savings.  
 
This situation is not repeated in the case of SBS. The fact that the EC is the only donor using the BS 
method in these sectors and the more limited levels of coordination between donors creates problems 
with overlapping negotiations, dialogue bodies and technical work, with these problems being 
multiplied by the number of donors. 
The government recognises that this situation of separation between the various donors in certain 
sectors results in additional costs and significant dispersion of effort. There are more negotiation and 
monitoring meetings, and there is more pressure on the resources needed to manage such a 
heterogeneous multiplicity of contributions. The government representatives, while underlining the 
good level of consistency and coordination that they ensure between the various external 
contributions, have indicated their readiness to improve the existing situation of dispersion and 
inefficiency. 
 
The main reason for the failure to reduce transaction costs in non-GBS areas is the weakness of the 
sector approach, as illustrated above. 
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4.3. STEP 1 – LEVEL 3. QUESTIONS RELATING TO LEVEL 3 OF THE INTERVENTION 
LOGIC: GOVERNMENT REFORM PROCESS AND ROLE OF BS 
4.3.1. Methodological clarifications 
Before beginning the evaluation at the next ‘levels’ of the intervention logic, methodological 
clarifications are needed. From Level 3, the indirect effects of the BS programmes are evaluated. 
Assessments are made of situations forming part of the current economic and social reality of the 
country, such as the content and results of certain reforms supported by the programmes evaluated. 
Causal links between the programmes evaluated and these results need to be identified, as these links 
are often not directly observable and must be assumed by default. The following notes will help 
readers to understand the approach followed: 
 
a. Reference period. The evaluation covers the period from 1995-96 to 2007-08. During this 
period the government, with the support of its international partners, completed complex 
and ambitious reform processes, which have made Tunisia into one of the most reformist 
countries in the region. Naturally, as we will see, many reforms require subsequent progress, 
and others must be tackled with more determination. In recent years, and particularly since 
2007-08 with the first signs of the international economic crisis, the weaknesses in the 
process (especially in investment and employment policies) have been at the centre of the 
government’s concerns (11th Plan) and the dialogue between Tunisia and its partners. The 
limits of the progress made and the new challenges are briefly considered in the evaluation, 
but these limits should not, however, negatively influence the overall judgement of the 
achievements in the first 10 years following signature of the AA with the EU (see also section 
4.4). 
 
b. Global partnership and GBS. The specific condition for BS in Tunisia (and particularly GBS) 
has been that it should form part of an international partnership structure, with the AA with 
the EU at its centre, which is also firmly supported – due to their stabilising and integrating 
effects – by the Bretton Woods institutions and the AfDB (see Figure 24). In addition to 
assessing this condition (deemed by the evaluation to be one of the main factors in the 
success of BS), which will occur later on, it is important to highlight at this point a 
mechanism which influences the whole BS action (particularly GBS) and which should be 
borne in mind when reading this report. GBS is an instrument which makes the global 
partnership and political/policy dialogue on the main economic and sectoral reforms practical 
and credible. The practical dimension is provided by the fact that BS creates a joint forum for 
discussing content and monitoring reforms, through a specific dialogue, a framework of 
verifiable changes, technical support and financial resources. Credibility is provided by the fact 
that BS is evidence of the direct commitment of the international partners to support the 
reforms whose principles and objectives are set out in the global partnership. Given this 
condition, it is possible for the ‘external’ contribution to certain government decisions – for 
example, the fundamental decision to use revenue from privatisations to service debt – to be 
identifiable in a (non-divisible) mix of factors, including high-level dialogue on policies, but 
also the specific contributions of GBS. GBS may have acted directly through its specific 
conditionalities, close dialogue, targeted TA and financial participation. However, it has 
certainly acted indirectly by consolidating policy dialogue. Where there are major challenges 
and opportunities in the global partnership, as in the case of Tunisia, this second way in 
which GBS works is much more important than the first. 
 
c. Evidence of direct contribution. Certain measures have therefore been implemented due to 
the direct contribution of BS, and overall the government’s achievements would not have 
been the same without BS. It is clear from interviews with representatives of both parties that 
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numerous strategic joint discussions and certain joint studies have had a direct effect on the 
content of reforms (tax reform, privatisations, restructuring of public debt, etc.). Equally, 
sometimes difficult negotiations have been held on certain points, both during the 
formulation of programmes and during the monitoring and assessment of conditionalities. 
The information collected highlights specific episodes, particularly in the most recent SAFs, 
as in the case of the ICT tranche in SAF III, which is the only tranche not having been paid 
because the partners have deemed that the award procedures for the second mobile 
telephone concession were not transparent. Other episodes having involved disagreements 
between the partners, which, however, have been positively resolved following tough 
negotiations, have been reported for SAF IV: the delay in adopting legislation allowing 
foreign nationals to acquire a majority holding in insurance companies has led to major delays 
in disbursements; as the measures adopted by the BCT to monitor the capacity of banks to 
manage credit risks were not considered appropriate, the partners required formal 
rectification of the BCT’s position, which occurred; on health insurance, the interruption in 
disbursement for a period of time allowed the government to rethink and redirect the reform 
along the agreed lines, particularly with regard to the consultation of specialist doctors. 
However, aside from these specific episodes, in a partnership context as strong and complex 
as this one, evidence of the direct contribution must be sought more in the convergence of 
results in relation to the joint commitments, in the coordination and in the sequence of 
actions by the partners (government and donors). 
 
4.3.2. Management of tax policies and macroeconomic framework (EQ 3.1)    
Increased national revenue and tax policy (JC311) 
The State’s own resources, including privatisation revenue and grants, increased at a significant rate 
over the whole period, recording an average growth rate of 7%. Fiscal pressure increased moderately, 
from 20.5% to 22.8% between 1995 and 2008. 
 
The restructuring and modernisation of tax policy over 
the period in question were fairly radical. The trade 
liberalisation and tariff dismantling resulting from the 
Association Agreement generally did not have a 
negative fiscal impact thanks to the reforms 
implemented and offsetting by various fiscal deposits. 
The fall in customs revenue (from 22% of tax revenue 
in 1995 to only 5.7% in 2008) was more than offset 
initially by a significant rise in VAT revenue (from 25% 
of tax revenue in 1995 to 32% in 2008), and latterly by 
a pronounced increase in direct taxation, fed by growth 
in the export sector. 
 
The SAFs, supported by the EC, WB and AfDB, 
closely accompanied this reform process. In particular, 
the issue of tax reforms appeared in the successive 
SAFs, including: 
· Support in SAF I for ‘Tax reforms to offset the loss of customs revenue resulting from the 
entry into force of the FTA’. The measures particularly included the extension and review of 
VAT. 
· SAF III focused on ‘reinforcing the stability of the macroeconomic framework ... by preparing 
a tax base expansion plan, intended to give public finances a greater degree of flexibility and 
long-term viability’. 
· SAF IV aimed to ‘adopt an action plan for tax reform’. 
 
Figure 5: Government consumption       
              % of GDP (WB-WDI) 
 
Source: World Bank - WDI 
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The conditionalities included in the SAFs involved concrete measures allowing the government to be 
monitored and supported in the important stages of the reform process, such as: approval of codes 
on tax rights and tax obligations; improvement of company taxation and harmonisation of 
onshore/offshore tax regimes; extension of VAT and acceleration of repayment times for relevant 
VAT credits; preparation of reform plans, etc. The SAFs also contained measures supporting an 
increase in non-tax revenue, such as privatisations. 
 
All the taxation conditionalities contained in the SAFs were met in full (albeit partly in some cases), 
such that disbursement of the respective payment tranches was possible in all cases. The PEFA 
Report of June 2010 confirms the good quality of Tunisian tax policy and its functionality in terms of 
promoting private investment. The report also identifies the new challenges for Tunisian taxation 
with a view to its rationalisation, reduction of the many costly and often inefficient reliefs, and 
extension of administrative taxation. 
 
Aside from the conditionalities and the monitoring and dialogue activities carried out in relation to 
the achievement of these conditionalities, account should also be taken of the role played by studies 
conducted by the GBS partners and/or by the government with the support of the partners (see 
Level 2 above). 
 
Control of budget deficit (JC311) 
Overall the prudent macroeconomic policy adopted by the government is reflected in the stabilisation 
of the budget deficit, at around 3% of GDP over the last five years, and in the reduction of public 
debt. The budget deficit, excluding grants and privatisation revenue, was kept at around 3.5% of 
GDP in 2002 and 2003, as opposed to 3.8% in 2001 and more than 4% before 1995, thanks to a 
significant reduction in operating and equipment expenditure and a substantial increase in revenue. 
Debt financing was basically ensured through issues of Treasury bonds.  
  
The good performance of Tunisian public finances is also underlined by the PEFA Report, according 
to which the following factors should be taken into account: 
· good performance of tax and non-tax revenue, excluding oil taxation: customs revenue, 
corporation tax, VAT, profits of public enterprises;  
· marked increase in oil taxation revenue and oil and gas revenues (particularly in 2008), due to 
an increase in national crude oil production in 2007 and the increase in oil prices on the 
international market, particularly in 2008; 
· continued control of public expenditure, excluding public debt; 
· dynamic management of public debt (see PEFA Report, introductory part, 2.2 on the 
‘description of budget goals’). 
 
However, the PEFA Report, as also the conclusions of the IMF Article IV consultations, stresses the 
need to rationalise subsidies and target them at the most needy sections of the population. 
 
The role of the SAFs in helping the government to maintain budgetary equilibrium involved the 
measures already mentioned on tax policy, as well as debt management measures (see below). The 
financial contribution should also be taken into account, bearing in mind the limits mentioned in 
section 4.2.1 above, with the average value of BS being just above 10% of the budget deficit.  
 
Public debt management (JC311) 
The performance in terms of reducing public debt was better than expected. The government 
adopted an active debt management policy, restructured foreign debt during the 2005-2007 period 
and devoted at least two-thirds of privatisation revenues (in 2006 the partial privatisation of Tunisie 
Telecom brought in USD 2.35 billion to the State’s coffers) to reducing public debt. The level of 
official external borrowings improved significantly between 1995 (38.5% of GDP) and 2008 (28.9%), 
with this trend having accelerated since 2003. This also led to a reduction in the total borrowings of 
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the Tunisian State. The total public sector debt fell from 58.3% of GDP in 2005 to 50.7% in 2007, 
and then to 47.5% in 2008. 
 
The total external borrowings of the Tunisian economy also fell, although they have remained 
relatively high: 68.3% of GDP in 2004, 58% in 2006 and 52.8% in 2008. Risks are limited by the fact 
that 80% of this stock is long term, largely negotiated with multilateral or bilateral official bodies 
(including the development banks), and that 75% has been contracted at fixed interest rates 
(I.3.1.1.5). 
 
This prudent management of public debt has enabled Tunisia to maintain a stable credit rating of 
BBB/BAA2 among the credit rating agencies. This analysis is confirmed by the one conducted for 
the PEFA Report (see Indicator PI-17). 
 
Analysis of the overall external financing required shows that the relative weight of international aid 
(in the form of grants) on average covered – between 1998 and 2008 – 3% of the total financing 
required and 0.4% of GDP. According to the IMF (Article IV consultations, December 2009), there 
was ‘limited need for external borrowing’ thanks to privatisation revenues and the resources of the 
banking system. The report admits that the national banking system could on its own have financed 
the additional budget deficit for 2009 (+1.5% to tackle the economic crisis) without harming the 
economy’s financing requirements. Furthermore, the report underlines the capacity of the Tunisian 
economy to withstand external shocks, having consolidated its position, particularly due to: 
· increased reserves which, between 2001 and 2008, rose from 2.5 to 5 months of imports and 
from 55% to 150% of short-term debt, and 
· relative reduction in foreign debt which, between 2001 and 2008, fell from 148% to 83% of 
exports. 
 
Once again, as with the tax reform, Tunisia’s good performance in terms of debt management was 
possible due to the priority given by the government to this area with the support of the EC, WB and 
AfDB through the SAFs, particularly SAF III and IV, which envisaged: 
· implementing a unified and computerised database on public and private foreign debt 
(SAF III – Measure 2.1); 
· adopting an Action Plan for active public debt management (SAF III – Measure 2.2); 
· introducing a middle office within the Ministry of Finance, responsible for formulating the 
public debt management strategy (SAF IV);  
· creating a structure within the Ministry of Finance, responsible for the integrated 
management of public debt (SAF IV); and  
· publishing a report on public debt management (SAF IV). 
 
In particular, the active and integrated management of public debt was at the centre of the dialogue 
supported by the SAFs. All the measures mentioned were discussed and agreed during the 
programme preparation, and were duly validated during monitoring missions for the disbursement of 
the respective tranches. The integrated approach, supported by the SAFs, facilitated the 
implementation of a debt absorption strategy, which – thanks to privatisation revenues – has already 
allowed the outstanding public debt to be reduced. It has also enabled: more active management to 
cover and monitor the interest rate risks on the international financial markets (e.g. conversions from 
variable rates to fixed rates); active management of exchange reserves; and refinancing of risks 
through new issues of long-term Treasury bonds on the local market. 
 
Consolidation of macroeconomic stability (JC312) 
Overall the government has maintained the stability of the macroeconomic framework by adopting a 
prudent policy. In particular:  
· Inflation has remained under control, at 3% on average per year over the whole period: this 
target has been achieved thanks, in part, to the rationalisation of monetary policy intervention 
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instruments, strict coordination with budget policy, and an active policy to absorb excess 
liquidity generated by the privatisations or external flows. In terms of analyses (with the 
assistance of the EC), the BCT has set up a specialised financial and economic analysis centre, 
which has become an essential instrument, particularly for the forecasts needed for sound 
macroeconomic management. 
· The BCT carefully manages the key interest rate according to the economic situation, 
favouring alignment between the level of growth of credits to the economy and economic 
activity. As an example, the acceleration in inflation in 2006 (4.5%) led the BCT to increase 
the key interest rate. More generally, the strategy adopted in the gradual liberalisation of the 
sector has clearly allowed this to be protected from the twists and turns of the international 
economic situation. Over the last 15 years, the money market rate has been one of the 
decisive elements in supporting the investment and development efforts. 
· The Central Bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market has reduced since the start of 
the 2000s and is now limited to liquidity injection operations, given the structural deficit in 
the foreign exchange market. Having said that, focusing on aligning the nominal and real 
effective exchange rates has helped to maintain a satisfactory level of competitiveness.  
 
Finally, we should highlight that several measures have been adopted to improve access to credit in 
the private sector. These include the creation of the Banque de Financement des Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises (BFPME) and the Société Tunisienne de Garantie (SOTUGAR), which have led to a 
significant improvement in the number of projects sponsored by new developers and SMEs. In fact, 
the Tunisian economy is still largely financed by the banking system, in which the public banks (STB, 
BNA, BH, BFPME and BTS) assume a preponderant role. Outstanding debt owed to the banks 
nearly tripled between 1995 and 2008, increasing from TND 11 billion to TND 32.8 billion, with the 
share of debt owed by the public sector falling from 12% to 7% of the total and the share of debt 
owed by services and private individuals increasing from 42% to 67%. On the other hand, financing 
of private investment by the financial market is still limited and accounted for 8.2% of investments in 
2008, with a very small increase compared to 1995 (6%). 
 
None of the GBS programmes analysed involves specific conditionalities linked to monetary policies 
and exchange rates, but all the SAFs have, as the centre of their strategic framework, maintaining a 
solid and reactive macroeconomic framework, including monitoring inflation. Evidently, the partners 
felt that it was sufficient to include the pillars of stability in terms of principle, and that it was not 
necessary to identify specific measures. 
 
Contribution of the SAFs to the improvement of tax policies and macroeconomic 
management (JC313) 
The direct contribution of the SAFs particularly involved the reform of taxation and its alignment 
with tariff dismantling, the integrated approach to public debt management, and support for 
improving macroeconomic forecasting capacities. The evidence of this contribution can be found in 
the specific studies conducted under the GBS programmes (see Level 2 above), whose 
recommendations were adopted by the government, and in the tough negotiation of conditionalities, 
both prior to and after the implementation of programmes. A specific contribution also came from 
the financial contribution, within the limits mentioned (sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.2): for example, the first 
tranche of the SAF III programme disbursed in June 2002 helped, with the disbursements from two 
other donors, to stabilise the State’s budget at a time of crisis. 
 
The indirect contribution of the SAFs (see the methodological clarifications above) was probably 
more important than the direct contribution, by helping to consolidate the AA partnership 
framework within which Tunisia could take the risk of launching and successfully pursuing such 
important tax reform and courageous restructuring of public debt management. We can say that: 
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· the AA partnership has supported the government’s reformist determination and has created 
political and economic opportunities, which have enabled courageous, but also prudent and 
effective, macroeconomic management30; 
· the political dialogue and policy dialogue linked to the AA (and/or parallel to the AA in the 
case of the development banks) has allowed a shared framework of objectives, strategic 
references and models to be established, and also the necessary support to be provided, such 
as GBS; 
· the latter has in turn reinforced the credibility of the partnership framework overall and has 
provided the specific support mentioned. 
 
4.3.3. Public finance management (EQ 3.2) 
Improvement of public finance management, including at sectoral level (JC321) 
The PEFA mission conducted in 2010 largely confirmed the results of the CFAA study carried out by 
the World Bank in 2003-2004. The diagnosis in relation to public finance management is generally 
positive. It is even very positive in comparison to regional standards. 
 
Credibility 
Both the CFAA and the PEFA Report underline the good credibility of the Tunisian budget. 
Revenues are on average higher than the forecasts in the finance law. Expenditure is always within 
10% of forecasts, even in years affected by external shocks. Overall the PEFA Report confirms the 
positive diagnosis of the CFAA, particularly with regard to the exhaustiveness of the information 
contained in budget documentation, public access to this information, the exhaustiveness of the 
budget and the transparency of intergovernmental budget relations (in particular with local 
authorities), and also monitoring of the overall budget risk. Among the weaknesses, the PEFA Report 
highlights the budget nomenclature. 
Transparency and coverage 
The analysis conducted for the PEFA Report confirmed that no extra-budgetary funds had escaped 
scrutiny by internal or external financial supervision bodies. As regards monitoring of the overall 
budget risk attributable to other public sector bodies (particularly the public banks), the PEFA Report 
shows that very significant efforts to rationalise these risks have been made in recent years. 
 
Predictability and implementation control 
The Ministry of Finance ensures excellent monitoring and forecasting of cash flows. Debt and 
guarantee monitoring is very good, and the loan reduction and guarantee granting mechanisms are 
very well structured, controlled and recorded. As regards internal control of non-wage expenditure, 
the PEFA Report confirms the existence of several types of control (ex-ante by the public 
expenditure supervisory body, and then ex-post before payment by the accounting 
officer/paymaster). In addition, two other supervisory bodies (Contrôle Général des Finances within 
the Ministry of Finance and Contrôle Général des Services Publics) ensure correct use of public 
funds. 
 
The Haut Comité du Contrôle Administratif et Financier is responsible for coordinating the various 
supervisory bodies and following up their recommendations. Furthermore, the PEFA Report found 
in this respect that ‘this multi-institutional system of internal control and monitoring, which is specific 
to Tunisia, seems very effective but also cumbersome in terms of implementation and coordination, 
both for the supervisory bodies and for the authorities scrutinised during the 120 control missions 
carried out annually (ignoring the audits by the Court of Auditors)’.  
 
                                                   
30 The previous partnership experience between Tunisia, the World Bank and the IMF should also be noted, as this 
allowed the foundations for sound macroeconomic management to be constructed. This experience contributed to 
the wider partnership centred on the AA. 
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Accounting and financial reports: the PEFA Report also underlines the quality of budget 
implementation data, which is qualified as ‘generally fair and high quality’. A summary monthly report 
is duly produced and published on the Ministry of Finance’s website, whilst a substantial annual 
report provides an analysis of all the categories of income and expenditure. 
 
As for the annual financial statements, the report confirms the very high quality content of the Law 
regulating the annual budget, but notes two main weaknesses: firstly, the absence of a full statement 
of the State’s financial assets and liabilities, and, secondly, the delay in producing the final results of 
the budget implementation by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Political priorities and budget definition 
It is clear from the PEFA study that the MDCI is increasingly involved in preparing the national 
budget, particularly in identifying the priority projects in terms of infrastructure and improving the 
management of public services. Joint committees involving the MDCI and the Ministry of Finance, as 
well as the technical ministries, also regularly meet to review the state of progress in programmes and 
projects. 
 
There is no doubt that budget preparation is increasingly integrated in the guidelines of the five-year 
plans, which have now become sliding plans, and that the implementation of MTEFs (sector or 
general) has helped to make the budget process more participative between the Ministry of Finance 
and the sectoral ministries, and even with members of the Chamber of Deputies or Chamber of 
Councillors. However, the Ministry of Finance seems to regret not being involved in preparing the 
sector MTEFs until the final phase. Currently, the MTEF covers 50% of budget expenditure. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the improvement of public finance management (JC322) 
The contribution of BS programmes to the improvement and high level of public finance 
management, as recorded by the CFAA and the PEFA Report, mainly occurs on two levels: 
· contribution to the reduction in budget risk, which was examined in the previous chapter, for 
example in terms of the integrated management of public debt or rationalisation of the State’s 
economic activities (banks and public enterprises operating at a loss); and 
· a specific contribution, particularly to the introduction, extension and consolidation of 
goal-oriented budget management and the MTEF method. 
 
As regards the contribution to goal-oriented budget management, this was initially included in SBS in 
order to support the reform of higher education conceived in 2002 and launched in 2004, and then in 
SAF IV, which applied from 2004, and in successive SBS in the education sector. A recent GBS 
programme implemented by the EC, which specifically focuses on goal-oriented budget management 
and which started in 2008, is not covered by this evaluation. 
 
The initial sector MTEFs were launched in 1999 in the primary education sub-sector. In 2004 the 
MERST launched the MTEF in the higher education sub-sector, and in 2007 the Ministry of Finance 
launched the MTEF in the vocational training sub-sector. In both these cases, the SBS programmes 
funded by the EC helped to launch the system, particularly through specific technical assistance 
activities and conditionalities for monitoring the implementation of reforms. At the same time, from 
2007 the government began developing a general MTEF, which establishes sector envelopes based on 
the macroeconomic parameters and priorities of the Plan. This instrument, which facilitates dialogue 
between the sectoral ministries and the Ministry of Finance, and also between the latter and the 
MDCI, has been promoted with the support of SAF IV, which provides for a specific measure. This 
partnership between the EC and the government in the area of GOBM is supplemented by the 
PAGBO GBS, in which the TA component is important.  
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4.3.4. Sectoral reform processes 
4.3.4.1. REFORM PROCESS IN THE AREA OF INTEGRATION IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 
AND COMPETITION IN THE DOMESTIC MARKET (EQ 3.3.a) 
Quality of the reform process (JC33a1/2) 
The process of trade liberalisation accomplished by Tunisia has demonstrated a good capacity to 
coordinate different sectoral policies involving domestic and international trade, industry, state 
taxation, etc. In particular, Tunisia’s capacity to dismantle customs tariffs without this having 
involved any net loss in tax revenues denotes excellent coordination of the various sectors of 
government. 
 
In particular, the evaluation highlights:  
· the high priority given by the government to the integration process;  
· the existence of constant exchanges between the cabinet and relevant ministries on the 
implementation of reforms, with an important coordination role for the MDCI;  
· increased participation of the various ministries involved in implementing the AA and the 
ENP Action Plan in the work of the sectoral sub-committees; 
· existence of exchanges and debate between the government and Parliament in order to 
discuss the reforms, and priority actions in the various sectors; 
· high level of government institutions – particularly the Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et 
des Etudes Quantitatives (ITCEQ) – having helped to define international trade policies; 
· constructive collaboration with the main donors, which has become particularly apparent in 
the joint formulation and implementation of the SAFs. The most recent budget support 
programmes funded by the EC expressly provide for the establishment of steering 
committees within the government, with the participation of various ministries and 
departments. 
 
The evaluation has also highlighted how the standardisation and upgrading programmes in the 
domestic market were designed and implemented through complex and effective collaboration 
between several ministries and departments covering a multitude of areas (industry, trade, 
environment, research and technology, training, etc.). The upgrading programme (Programme de 
Mise à Niveau – PMN) was launched by the government in 1995, in line with the signature of the 
AA. The government’s activity has also been supported by a well-structured set of external support 
measures, consisting of GBS programmes (SAFs) since 1995, and major projects funded by the EC 
under the AA, such as the industrial modernisation programme (Programme de Modernisation 
Industrielle) since 2002.  
 
Consultation of interested economic actors (JC33a3) 
Tunisia is noted for a high level of dissemination of information on the national economy and its 
regulatory framework. Much progress has also been made in terms of improving access to this 
information. As an example, various data, information and sectoral studies are available on the 
websites of the Institut National de la Statistique, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank of Tunisia, 
Ministry of Industry and ITCEQ, and also on the websites of the upgrading programme and the 
industrial modernisation programme. 
 
The evaluation also noted a certain amount of progress in the consultation process between the 
government and representatives of the private sector, particularly through the mixed Chambers of 
Commerce (annual meeting between the MDCI and the CCs with the participation of other 
ministries) and the Management Unit of the industrial modernisation programme within the Ministry 
of Industry. Moreover, leaders of business associations who were interviewed confirmed that they 
feel that their needs are duly taken into account in the process of defining policy, particularly through 
the results of national surveys organised by the mixed Chambers of Commerce on the ‘status’ of 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 40 
businesses, in order to target the relevant areas to improve the business environment and solve the 
problems of business. To improve communication with the private sector, the government is 
currently setting up listening units (one-stop shops) in all the ministries. 
 
Despite everything, opinions differ on the quality of the consultation processes with interested 
economic actors. On the one hand, the government’s National Development Plans highlight the 
importance of all active components of civil society participating in the definition and monitoring of 
development programmes and policies, and the PAC evaluation report31 confirms the commitment 
to greater participation by the private sector and civil society in the definition and implementation 
of reforms. On the other hand, a File Note32 drawn up by the EC Delegation in Tunisia highlights 
that ‘the level of involvement of other stakeholders (particularly the private sector) is [still] 
insufficient’. 
 
The evaluation team tried to expand on this aspect of private sector participation by organising a 
focus group of Tunisian businesspeople, but it was not possible to get people to participate without 
going through official bodies such as the Chambers of Commerce. 
 
Legislative, regulatory and institutional framework (JC33a4) 
The Euro-Mediterranean association agreements between the EC and the Southern Mediterranean 
countries provide for a significant (WTO-compatible) but gradual (12 years) and asymmetric 
liberalisation of trade. From the start, Tunisia has been the most advanced Euro-Mediterranean 
partner in terms of introducing the FTA. The dismantling of customs duties began in 1996, i.e. before 
the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement entered into force in 1998, and – except for agri-food 
products – the agreed timetable has been rigorously respected. Duties on imports from the EU fell 
from around 100% in 1996 to 4% in 2007, i.e. three years before the deadline set for completing this 
liberalisation.  
 
In parallel with tariff dismantling, the government has set up a whole series of actions aimed at 
reinforcing the legislative, regulatory and technical/institutional framework for trade liberalisation, on 
the one hand, and aimed at reviewing competition policy in the domestic market, on the other hand. 
These actions have resulted in several procedures being modified in order to increase the 
simplification and transparency of transactions, including:  
· Customs. The Customs Code has been harmonised with the Community Code [SAF I – 
Expected results]. The reorganisation of the Directorate-General for Customs, which is 
answerable to the Ministry of Finance, started in the mid-1990s. A new Customs Code, 
intended to boost the country’s economic competitiveness and ensure compliance with its 
international commitments in the customs area, was adopted in June 2008. The implementing 
regulations are currently being drawn up. 
· Administrative simplification. Administrative customs clearance procedures have now largely 
been rationalised and modernised. This has allowed import-export transactions to become 
more fluid and reduced their costs [SAF III – Objective B.3]. Tunisia was ranked 32nd out of 
121 countries for the ‘Efficiency in customs administration’ indicator in the 2009 Annual 
Report from the Davos World Economic Forum, i.e. in first place in Africa and in 3rd place 
in the Arab world, behind Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. 
· Tax simplification. Repayment times for VAT credits have been reduced, to the benefit of 
exporters, since 2000. They now stand at one week [SAF III: max. 30 days]. Other tax 
simplifications have been introduced. 
                                                   
31 AfDB, Tunisia: Programmes d’Appui à la Compétitivité I et II (Competitiveness Support Programmes I and II), 
Rapport d’évaluation de performance de programmes (Programme performance evaluation report), 2006 (paragraphs 
3.3.3 & 4.3.5). 
32 Macroeconomic support in Tunisia: lessons learnt and thoughts on future possible interventions, March 2009. 
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· Standardisation. Important progress has been made in aligning horizontal and sectoral 
legislation, and also in the institutional organisation and upgrading of the associated 
infrastructure (standardisation, accreditation, metrology, statistics, etc.), including laws on 
consumer protection and food safety, which have been harmonised with EU legislation. 
· Competition. Competition policy and its application in Tunisia have been improved, 
particularly with regard to the formal private sector. The reinforced independence and 
increased powers of the Conseil de la Concurrence (Competition Council) [supported by 
SAF III, and then by SAF IV] have been a central element in this change. The number of 
referrals and requests for opinions from the Conseil de la Concurrence is gradually increasing, 
although the Conseil’s independence remains limited by the resources that it has available to 
deal with the increasing number of cases. Efforts are being made to reinforce the capacities 
of the main competition bodies, although business leaders still regard anti-competitive or 
informal practices (25% to 30% of trade is apparently informal) as a major constraint on 
business development [SAF III – B.5 and SAF IV – Axis II]. 
· Inshore/Offshore. The harmonisation of investment incentive regimes for wholly exporting 
businesses and for businesses operating on the domestic market [SAF IV – Objectives] has 
been continued through the following measures: i) wholly exporting businesses can sell part 
of their production on the domestic market and their sales are subject to all the taxes and 
duties applicable to other businesses; ii) the taxation of export income and profits has been 
harmonised between wholly and partly exporting businesses. 
 
The ENP Progress Report for 200733 confirms that ‘implementation of the trade dimension of the 
Association Agreement has been positive ... Most of the problems, such as those involving 
pharmaceutical products and processed agricultural products have been solved ... A new specialised 
structure on rules of origin has been created within the customs administration ... As regards the 
movement of goods and technical regulations, extensive work has begun to ensure regulatory and 
institutional convergence with the Community acquis. Tunisia continues to work to improve sanitary 
and phytosanitary regulation, institutions and practices ... In terms of services, Tunisia indicated in 
2008 its willingness to engage in bilateral negotiations with the EC on the liberalisation of trade in 
services and the right of establishment’. As in most countries, progress in terms of competition is also 
significant, albeit slower due to internal resistance and pressure.  
 
Reliability of monitoring systems (JC33a5) 
The systems for monitoring the reforms and their results correspond to the various levels of the AA 
architecture. Joint monitoring at a high political level is ensured by the Association Committee and 
sectoral sub-committees. Furthermore, general monitoring is ensured by each of the parties with 
regard to their respective responsibilities and competences. In this way, the government, through its 
specialised bodies (BCT, MDCI, INS, other ministries and institutions) monitors the macroeconomic 
framework, sectoral reforms and the real economic and social situation. For its part, the Commission 
annually monitors the implementation of the ENP, using data collected and prepared by the 
government, specialised international bodies and programmes that it funds. Finally, there is frequent 
and joint internal monitoring within the BS programmes by the government and its partners. More 
generally, it should be underlined that Tunisia’s capacity for the collection and analysis of data in 
economic areas is good, but this is not yet the case in social areas, where statistical systems are still 
limited. The monitoring of economic reforms is, however, better than monitoring in sectors such as 
education or employment, which needs to be reinforced. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the above reform processes (JC33a6) 
The issues of foreign trade, trade facilitation and domestic market reform have been supported by 
several programmes run by the EC and other donors, particularly the GBS programmes, but also 
                                                   
33 ENP Progress Report – Tunisia, 2007, pages 8 and 9. 
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through other wide-ranging programmes, such as those supporting the implementation of the 
Association Agreement and the Neighbourhood Action Plan (P3A and P3A-II). 
 
The methods used by the SAFs to influence the processes examined above have already been 
described, but are worth quickly recalling: 
· The indirect method, involving reinforcement of the AA, which has created a favourable 
political framework and a significant economic opportunity so that the government can 
continue the general process of competitive integration in international markets. The AA, 
with its sectoral agreements and specific support programmes, has also helped the 
government to define the road map for international trade and domestic market reform. 
· The direct method, involving the creation of a forum for dialogue, negotiation and support 
(technical and financial) for implementing specific reforms, to which partners not having 
participated in GBS have not had access. In SAF I, trade liberalisation played an important 
role, including harmonisation of customs law. This was also included in the matrices of the 
other SAFs through measures ‘not to be forgotten’, such as measures to increase the fluidity 
of customs transactions, repayment of VAT credits, action plan for competition and the 
Conseil de la Concurrence, and harmonisation between the inshore and offshore markets. 
For all these measures, technical analyses, discussions and negotiations have occurred 
between the GBS partners to help achieve them. 
 
4.3.4.2. Reform process to boost the competitiveness of the business environment, 
financial services and infrastructures (EQ 3.3.b) 
Quality and coordination of the process and participation of the private sector (JC33b1/2)  
Further to the findings already made in response to EQ 3.3.a above, it is worth noting that, in the 
area of competitiveness policies, Tunisia’s capacity for intellectual production and analysis is high 
quality: the ITCEQ has carried out some very important studies in terms of monitoring the impact of 
reforms, competitiveness of factors, etc. It has set up the Observatoire National de la Compétitivité 
(National Observatory of Competitiveness). Studies and action plans have also been developed by the 
Tunisian authorities in the context of GBS, such as: i) the report on the ‘Promotion de 
l’investissement privé et le rôle de la politique d’incitations : analyse et recommandations’ (Promotion 
of private investment and the role of incentive policy: analysis and recommendations), FIAS, 2002; 
and ii) ‘Etude sur la Participation Privée dans les Infrastructures en Tunisie’ (Study on Private 
Participation in Infrastructures in Tunisia), MDCI and World Bank, 2003.  
 
As for the consultation and participation of the private sector, in addition to the findings already 
made, the participation of representatives of the private sector in the Conseil National de la Fiscalité 
(National Taxation Council) [whose establishment was provided for by conditionality 3.1 of SAF III] 
should be noted. 
 
Competitiveness policies implemented (JC33b3) 
Reduction of administrative and tax barriers 
The activities aimed at reducing administrative authorisations [supported by SAF III and IV] firstly 
led to the abolition or replacement with an a posteriori control procedure of 54% of the 500 or so 
administrative authorisations identified. As regards the remaining authorisations, 63 were abolished 
and 46 were replaced with specifications (switch from an a priori control to an a posteriori control). At 
the end of August 2007, the progress report for SAF IV noted that ‘the number of administrative 
authorisations still in place is 115’ compared to a target of 120. Despite this progress, several 
comments were made in the progress reports or completion reports of donors (EC, AfDB, WB), in 
particular with regard to the quality of the simplification process, irrespective of its significant 
quantitative advances. These comments particularly concern the following issues: highly regulated 
sectors remain without any apparent justification; specifications often do not reduce the 
administrative burden, but simply move this a posteriori; the onshore sector is still characterised by the 
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State’s extensive and dominant intervention in the economy, which discourages domestic investment 
and job creation. 
 
Several other measures have been introduced to facilitate the creation and management of businesses. 
In addition to the general taxation measures mentioned in EQ 3.1 above, the following can be noted:  
· one-stop shop, which facilitates the creation of start-ups in industry and services;  
· conduct of a study on import monopolies [supported by SAF III – 1.3];  
· review of company law and modernisation of legislation on accounts scrutiny (audit, 
audit office, in particular), etc. [supported by SAF III – section B.4 and SAF IV – 2.17-
2.19];  
· measures to encourage the establishment and governance of companies (e.g. possibility 
of foreign investors having a majority holding in the capital of insurance companies, or 
improvement of the management and transparency of businesses) [supported by SAF IV 
– 2.16]. 
 
Withdrawal of the State from the economy 
The rate of privatisation of public enterprises has been slow since the beginning of the reforms, 
compared to the targets set. This is due to fears associated with social costs, lack of sectoral 
regulatory frameworks from the outset, and limited experience. Despite everything, the management 
of privatisations has improved over time, to the point of now being an exercise that is very much an 
integral part of the business culture, accepted by management and labour and well-controlled by the 
authorities. This positive dynamic has had to be recognised by the SAF partners as well, which have 
disbursed all the tranches (except for the ICT tranche), despite the conditionalities sometimes having 
been only partly met34. 
 
Aside from the exceptional operation to sell, for TND 3 billion, 35% of the capital in Tunisie 
Télécom in 2006, the bulk of the privatisation and restructuring operations in the public sector took 
place during the 1997-2003 period (85.5% of revenue and 54.8% of operations). As time has passed, 
these operations have involved ever larger enterprises, covering both SMEs/SMIs and large 
enterprises (Société Nationale de Distribution des Pétroles), the banking sector (UIB, Banque du sud) 
and the ICT sector (GSM, Tunisie Télécom). 
 
By the end of January 2006, 207 privatisation or restructuring operations had been carried out 
totalling TND 5.525 billion. However, it should be noted that over 70% of this revenue was received 
during the 10th Plan thanks to the sale of 35% of the capital in Tunisie Télécom, as mentioned 
above, for a sum of TND 3.032 billion.  
 
Financial services 
The reform of the financial sector has been one of the government’s main priorities in the various 
National Development Plans (9th, 10th and 11th). It has therefore been at the centre of the measures 
supported by GBS. This issue has been included since SAF I. The matrix for SAF II included the key 
measures of a plan to rationalise the banking sector. Consolidation measures were included in SAF III 
and again in SAF IV. Likewise, for insurance, detailed conditionalities have been included since 
SAF II, in particular in SAF III and IV. It can be said that the financial sector is the subject of the 
largest number of conditionalities in all the SAFs. 
 
In general, the results in terms of macroeconomic stability and growth also reflect successive 
improvements in the consolidation of the banking sector and in the operation of the financial sector 
as a whole. However, the level of profitability in the banking sector remains low, due to the limited 
                                                   
34  See also the measures in SAF I, Macroeconomic framework – section on Withdrawal of the State from the 
economy; SAF II – section on Withdrawal of the State from the economy (specific to the European Union); SAF III 
– section B.6 Continuation of the policy for State withdrawal from the real and financial sectors.  
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financial capacity of the banks. More specifically, the reforms have helped to make the allocation of 
capital more efficient, by reinforcing the capital bases of institutions in the banking sector and by 
modernising the regulatory framework of the financial sector, through: 
· restructuring/modernisation of the banking system: a new banking law, which reduces the 
obstacles to entry, new prudential regulation, rationalisation of the portfolio of banks, 
mergers and privatisations; 
· rationalisation of the insurance sector; 
· improvement of the quality and availability of financial information.  
 
The sector has become much more competitive, with an impact on the whole economy, even though 
the State’s presence in the banking sector remains significant (nearly 50%). 
 
Reform of the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector 
The government has implemented a major reform process in the telecommunications sector 
[supported by the EC, see SAF III, ICT component, section D], including: (i) a medium- and long-
term ICT sectoral strategy has been formulated for each of the sub-components; (ii) a new regulatory 
framework complying with international standards, including the creation of regulatory agencies, has 
been introduced; (iii) the telecoms sector has been opened up to the private sector. As a result, the 
2nd operator (Tunisiana) quickly began providing services to the public in December 2002.  
 
The GSM segment [directly covered by SAF III] has been opened up to competition, which has had a 
very marked impact on the Tunisian population. Currently, two GSM operators are active in Tunisia 
(Tunisie Télécom and Tunisiana) and two VSAT licences have been granted, one to Tunisie Télécom 
(historical operator controlled by the Tunisian State), and the other to Divonna, which is 60% 
controlled by Tunisian capital (Planet) and 40% by Monaco Télécom. This is despite a ‘measure not 
completed’ finding, as assessed by the three donors, which has led to the non-disbursement of the 
variable tranche of conditionality 36.4 of SAF III, which covered ‘the granting of a 2nd GSM licence 
through a competitive and transparent invitation to tender process, and publication by Tunisie 
Télécom of a standard interconnection offer whose form and content are acceptable to the World 
Bank’. 
 
General findings on the achievements in the sector 
The ENP Progress Report 2007 notes that the Tunisian government: 
· has included within its priorities ‘the promotion of foreign investment ... the introduction of 
an attractive framework for the establishment of businesses and company law ...’; 
· has ‘continued to implement a very prudent policy of gradual liberalisation of payments and 
capital movements ...’; 
· has ‘proceeded to rationalise its tax system and ensure convergence between its onshore and 
offshore regimes ...’; 
· has ‘continued to afford particular importance to introducing the Euro-Mediterranean 
Charter and, more specifically, to the issues of business competitiveness, innovation and 
promotion of investments’;  
· ‘has undertaken, in a determined manner, a gradual process of improving the environment ... 
for business, improving conditions of access to financing for businesses, and creating and 
improving business and innovation’. 
 
Reliability of monitoring systems (JC33b4) 
See EQ 3.3.a. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the above improvements (JC33b5) 
The references to the SAF matrices in the above paragraphs show how, in each sub-sector, these 
matrices have contained very strict and relevant links to the content of the reforms, not only in terms 
of general guidelines and broad objectives, but particularly with reference to ‘actions not to be 
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neglected/forgotten’, indicators and/or guarantors of process quality, whose appropriation by the 
government has been very high. 
  
The progress and evaluation reports highlight the marked correlation between improvements seen in 
the various areas of business competitiveness and inputs provided by the SAFs, particularly SAF III. 
The Completion Report (February 2006) for the Competitiveness Support Programme III (PAC III), 
funded by the AfDB, confirms that, ‘rather than the financing, the essential support is probably the 
solidity of the analytical foundation and the consistency of the solidly rooted measures. The level of 
appropriation of these reforms by the government is reflected in the completion of nearly all the 
measures ... Furthermore, the correct coordination of actions by the co-financers on the one hand 
and the Tunisian administration on the other hand has allowed for high-quality dialogue and has 
therefore been a decisive factor in the programme’s success’. 
 
The reform of the financial sector is the area where the direct contribution of the SAFs has been 
most significant, in terms of design (see the cited studies of the WB and AfDB) and in terms of 
support for implementation, as shown by the very detailed conditionalities in SAF II, III and IV, 
compliance with which has been meticulously verified. The high level of public ownership of the 
banks and the political sensitivity of the issue of credit risks has made intervention very difficult, 
requiring significant analysis capacity, flexibility and determination. The information collected 
highlights various tough discussions and negotiations on the conditionalities with regard to the banks, 
insurance and privatisations. 
 
At the indirect level, the partnership supported by GBS has also helped to implement the reform 
process in the sectors concerned. The prospect of Euro-Mediterranean competitive integration has 
certainly been one of the driving forces behind the reform of the financial sector, in addition to the 
direct contributions of GBS. In the other sub-sectors, where the direct effect of GBS has been more 
limited, the general partnership has played an even more decisive role, together with other support 
instruments, such as technical assistance projects. However, it should be noted that the latter are 
limited to technical support and do not involve the strategic management of the reforms, as BS does.   
 
4.3.4.3. Reform of higher education and vocational training (EQ 3.3.c) 
Reform of the institutional framework (JC33c1) 
Since 2002 major institutional changes have been made in the education sector, such as: 
- 2002: unification of vocational training with primary and secondary education under the 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MEF) (Decree No 2002-2057). 
- 2002: creation of the Conseil Supérieur pour le Développement des Ressources Humaines 
(Supreme Council for Human Resource Development) (Decree No 2002-1047), whose role is 
to issue opinions on national policy guidelines for education, vocational training and 
employment. Its members include the ministers for higher education, education, vocational 
training and employment. 
- 2008: new framework laws on education (Law No 2008-9), vocational training 
(Law No 2008-10), which underline the complementarity between these sub-sectors, and 
higher education, with the new law (Law No 2008-19) placing employability and business 
creation at the heart of the mission of universities. 
- 2009: creation of GOBM steering units in the MEF and MERST. 
 
The responsibilities of the Study, Planning and Programming Offices of the MEF and MERST in 
terms of analysing the sector’s statistical data and supporting the planned implementation of 
strategies have also been reinforced. Moreover, the law on vocational training provides for the 
creation of an Observatoire National des compétences et des métiers (National Observatory of Skills 
and Trades), whose aim is to anticipate the needs of the economic sector and monitor vocational 
training graduates. 
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Dialogue and coordination with the Ministry of Finance have also developed: firstly in the context of 
preparing the MTEF, which must be submitted for approval by the Interministerial steering 
committee in which the Ministry of Finance is involved; and secondly with regard to GOBM, which 
is guided by the Ministry of Finance in close collaboration between the latter and the steering units at 
sectoral level. 
 
These changes have encouraged intra-sectoral links and therefore ensured better quality participation 
by the ministries in the preparation of sub-sectoral policies, which is increasing the complementarity 
and consistency of these policies in terms of the end objective, which is employability. The new 
vocational Baccalaureate introduced by the 2008 laws is evidence of this progress, as it allows access 
to university and to the professional world by creating bridges between general education and 
vocational training and by ensuring alternation between school and training establishments. 
 
In terms of public finance management at sectoral level, the introduction of the MTEF practice has 
increased the capacity for reform monitoring and guidance at sub-sectoral level. According to the 
progress reports for the EC programmes, the MTEF now represents a genuine decision-making 
support tool with regard to the programming and definition of the expected results35. 
 
Improvement of the quality of policies (JC33c2/4/6) 
For each of the three sub-sectors, there is an MTEF updated every three years, which determines the 
cost of the strategy for the period. In the case of the MEF, a general MTEF for the sector, covering 
education and vocational training, is currently being finalised. For the MERST, the MTEF also covers 
all universities. All the MTEFs allow the financing needs and any deviations over the three-year 
period to be identified. 
 
In the case of VT at least, the MTEF structure includes a breakdown of the objectives by results and 
figures for these results based on unit costs, with the definition of financing needs taking account of 
the macroeconomic framework assumptions. Based on the documentation consulted and despite a 
positive assessment of MTEF quality and use by the experts who monitored the EC’s SBS 
programmes, the MTEFs seem to be more financial documents, which still lack an analysis of sectoral 
policy and in which it is difficult to see the link with the strategy and targeted results. 
 
In general, the link between sectoral strategies still seems limited. The framework laws determine the 
objectives, missions and institutional framework of a sub-sector. The presidential programmes (such 
as ‘Ecole de demain’ and ‘Tunisie de demain’) provide additional guidelines, defining long-term 
objectives and priorities. The National Development Plans set out the main qualitative and 
quantitative objectives to be pursued over the period. The strategy documents of the ministries 
express all this in terms of objectives, funding lines and results to be achieved. However, this logic is 
not always explained in these documents, and it is difficult to see how and to what extent the various 
objectives are pursued, and how the various types of sectoral policy/guidance document are linked. 
Moreover, the documents are quite complex, with several levels of objectives and several intervention 
dimensions, but with a very limited number of outcome indicators, which are sometimes difficult to 
attribute to the dimensions and objectives. Sometimes, for one sub-sector, there are several reference 
documents and their interaction is not clear.  
 
Despite that, the following can be said:  
· In the three sub-sectors, internal efficiency (success rate) and external efficiency (openings) 
are one objective of the strategies pursued (quality of inputs and relevance of courses). 
Efficiency is a specific concern in secondary education, which is apparent from the measures 
introduced to reduce the number of students having to repeat years. 
                                                   
35 This is clear for the MTEF for vocational training and secondary education. For higher education, the team does 
not have any documentation. 
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· Although none of the documents consulted clearly presents the situation for the various 
beneficiary groups, all the programmes and strategies have the objectives of improving the 
quantity of the education offer and ensuring fair access to education for all the regions of the 
country. For secondary education, there is also the objective of improving teaching and living 
conditions in and access to boarding schools. 
· Gender disparity is not analysed in the documents and, as a result, there are no objectives or 
outcome indicators for this aspect.    
 
In general, outcome indicators are little used in the forecasts in development plans and sectoral 
strategy documents. Those indicators mentioned in the forecasts are never broken down by 
geographical area, specific group of beneficiaries or gender. The statistical data processed by the 
ministries reveals some fairly significant and general weaknesses, a lack of systematic application and 
continuity in the preparation of indicators, and also very few links between the objectives of the Plans 
and the outcome indicators. 
 
However, the system does currently have quality standards for the administrative and educational 
management of establishments in each Governorate. These achievements need to be further 
consolidated by effectively introducing new courses and accompanying these with capacity-building 
actions. As for higher education, the government is implementing innovative educational approaches 
based on the development of skills, in order to improve the relevance and quality of the offer. 
 
Bearing in mind these findings and the complex strategic work needed in this sector, the analysis, 
management and monitoring capacities of the implementing agencies should be subsequently 
reinforced. 
 
Improvement of transparency and participation in the process (JC33c3)  
There are several possible bodies through which civil society actors can be consulted: the Conseil 
Economique et Social (Economic and Social Council) provided for by the Constitution, the Conseil 
Supérieur pour le Développement des Ressources humaines (Supreme Council for Human Resource 
Development) (2002), the Commission permanente pour la promotion de l’emploi (Standing 
committee for employment promotion) (2004) and, in terms of strategy implementation, the 
consultative councils of schools (2006) and the regional educational project (2007). However, the use 
of these instruments to define and monitor strategies and programmes still seems limited and 
unsystematic. 
 
As for the contribution of civil society, the participation of businesses in vocational training 
programmes, through several collaboration agreements, seems positive. However, the employment 
promotion programmes are not common knowledge among the general population and sometimes 
even among potential beneficiaries, where the business is the direct beneficiary. According to the 
opinions of civil society representatives, young people do not know about the employment 
promotion programmes and cannot see their usefulness. It therefore seems essential to better target 
these young people and/or to better publicise these employment promotion programmes among 
their target groups and the population as a whole. 
 
In terms of the availability and dissemination of information, the sector does not seem to have any 
real information strategy for its policies and results: the ministries’ websites do not include statistics 
or any publications on strategy or the situation of the sector, although these data and publications are 
available at the BEPPs. 
 
Improvement of the offer in terms of quality and quantity (JC33c5) 
Secondary education. The progress reports (of the EC and national bodies) show that the results with 
regard to the quantitative improvement of the offer in terms of territorial equity, through both the 
introduction of new courses and those establishments with sections regarded as key, have been 
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remarkable and better than the targets set. On the other hand, progress has slowed, which is affecting 
the quality of inputs, guidance and relevance of the offer, such as: the quality of the DREF’s school 
projects and the rate of their development; the level of supervision of new teachers, which has been 
lower than expected; the delay in recruiting headmasters and headmistresses according to the new 
qualification profile; and the introduction of compulsory teaching of ICT. Despite everything, the 
percentage of young people successfully graduating has been higher than the target set. In general, 
these deviations do not seem to be endangering the result of the reform, and the SBS progress report 
concludes that all the conditionalities can be regarded as met. 
 
Vocational training. The June 2009 progress report for the SBS programme highlights that two 
indicators relating to the guidance of the sector (start of work by the observatory) and the quality of 
the offer (inspection system) have not been fully met. It should be underlined that the failure to meet 
these indicators is due to an implementation delay rather than failure to carry out the work. The 
progress report therefore determines that the conditionalities for disbursement have, however, been 
met. 
 
Higher education. According to the available data, between 2004 and 2007 the sector achieved the 
following performance: enrolment rate among young people aged 19-24 years increased from 29% to 
35%; number of new students enrolled in up-and-coming courses increased from 24% to 32%; 
number of up-and-coming courses created/renewed increased from 28 to 50; student/teacher ratio 
fell from 22.5 to 19; number of training hours per trained teacher increased from 1.5 to 6; number of 
establishments evaluated increased from 0 to 16; number of international agreements concluded by 
universities increased from 107 to 260. The SBS programme progress report indicates that major 
shortcomings still exist, particularly with regard to the quality of education and the link with the 
labour market. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the improvements expected at sectoral level (JC33c7) 
Financial contribution. As regards the specific weight of the financial contribution, the calculation is 
without doubt a guideline only and to be viewed with a great deal of caution, as a purely hypothetical 
reference, because the fungibility of BS funds requires their weight to always be considered in relation 
to all public expenditure. Having said that, the EC’s financial contribution, solely in relation to the 
needs of the sub-sectors, has been significant. This is particularly true for higher education and 
vocational training, where this contribution respectively accounts for 75% and 60% of the residual 
financing need for the reference period. If this sum had not been available, the government would 
have had to partly abandon some of the main goals (such as the introduction of new courses, or 
territorial equity in higher education, or the quantitative and qualitative increase in the secondary 
education and vocational training offer) or it would have had to reduce the amount for certain 
equivalent operations in other sectors. 
 
Technical assistance. The main non-financial contribution is TA with the initiation and consolidation 
of the MTEF method in the planning and management of public expenditure, in the three sub-
sectors. The MTEF was initiated thanks to the TA provided under SBS and has contributed to the 
progress mentioned above in the strategic management of the sector, even if – as we have seen – a 
series of weaknesses remain in its application. Furthermore, the experience with the MTEF at sectoral 
level has acted as a test for extending GOBM to the national level. It is significant that the MTEF was 
not included in the National Development Plan but has proved to be a successful experiment. 
 
Conditionalities and performance indicators. These are the indicators included in the SBS 
performance matrices, as key indicators of the success of the reform process, on which the dialogue 
and TA have been focused: 
· For secondary education, they involve the quality of the offer, in particular the introduction of 
ICT and new courses, measures to improve school performance (student career guidance, 
supervision of teachers, initial training of teachers, equipment of establishments) and 
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measures to improve the relevance of the offer and efficiency of the guidance by supporting 
the decentralisation process and reinforcement of the DREF. All these outcomes are 
included in the 10th Plan and in the national report on the development of 
education 2004-2008. TA was provided solely for the MTEF, on the one hand, and for the 
identification and monitoring of indicators, on the other hand. It is therefore highly likely that 
SBS did not contribute directly to the new and important framework law for the sector 
(2008). Furthermore, it should be noted that, during the EC support, secondary education 
was also supported by other donors, particularly the AfDB and WB, whose PAQSET II 
programme targeted secondary education with similar objectives to the EC: improvement of 
quality, decentralisation and guidance of the sector. 
· For higher education, there is the same correspondence between the indicators of the EC’s SBS 
programme and the results targeted by the government, particularly territorial equity, 
introduction of new courses (economics, ICT), increase in the rates of completion of the 
various education stages, quality of staff, student/teacher ratios, etc. However, other donors 
are also widely present in this sector, such as the WB which, with the PARES programme, 
has set similar objectives, particularly decentralisation and quality of the offer. The separation 
between the various donors and their limited coordination does not allow the different 
contributions to be determined. By contrast, distinctions are possible for budget management 
and the introduction of the MTEF, which have been specifically supported by the EC’s SBS. 
· For vocational training, the disbursement indicators cover key aspects of the reform, such as 
partnership with business and certain aspects of the quality of the offer (educational 
inspection, conformity of centres, skills-based approach) for which the government has 
achieved positive results according to the analysis in the 10th Plan. The size of the EC’s 
financial contribution and the lack of other significant donors should allow the statement that 
a very significant contribution has been made to both the qualitative and quantitative results 
achieved by the government. Added to these results are the MTEF and capacity-building in 
terms of the ministry’s forecasting through the Observatoire National des compétences et des 
métiers, which are two aspects firmly supported by the EC via TA and which have two 
indicators (the first and last) for disbursement. 
 
In general, the EC’s SBS has encouraged the government to commit to reforming the education 
sector as a fundamental sector in the competitive integration process in the Euro-Mediterranean 
context and in the global market. The main encouragement has come from the financial contribution 
dependent on sector reform, but the presence of a significant TA component has allowed frequent 
dialogue to occur on the formulation and implementation of the reform at very important stages in 
the process, particularly the MTEF, which was initiated due to the partnership established in the first 
SBS (primary education). Other important contributions in the dialogue and TA have involved other 
aspects, as mentioned above, including significant capacity development work. The latter seems to be 
particularly appreciated by the beneficiary Tunisian managers, in the areas of data processing, 
planning and budgeting. Aside from the MTEF, the SBS contribution to capacity-building in 
competent institutions in the sector specifically involves the capacity to identify indicators in the 
formulation phase of programmes and also monitoring capacity. However, this monitoring capacity is 
still significantly limited, as mentioned above, which is being discussed and negotiated with the 
donors involved. 
 
Using the level of disbursement as an index of achievement of the institutional performance targeted 
by SBS in the sector, we can say that this index is high, as disbursements have reached between 87% 
and 98% of the amounts envisaged. 
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4.3.5. Reorganisation of public expenditure (EQ 3.4) 
Improved distribution of sectoral, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral budget expenditure and 
allocations, according to strategic objectives, in particular for the target sectors (JC341) 
The policy of prudent management of public expenditure was examined in the above sections. Over 
the period in question, at current prices, the State’s budget expenditure increased by an annual 
average rate of 7%, compared to a GDP growth rate of approximately 8.5%. Given the State’s 
expenditure, excluding Treasury loans and advances and debt servicing, this expenditure has grown 
by 8.06%.  
 
The ‘Development’ (Title I) and ‘Administrative Expenditure’ (Title II) components developed 
differently over the period, with the latter having increased more rapidly than the former, i.e. 8.40% 
compared to 7.46%. The relative fall in ‘development expenditure’ is the result, firstly, of an 
improvement in budget management policies and, secondly, of the reinforcement of the State’s 
service functions to the detriment of its production functions. 
 
 
The breakdown of administrative expenditure into Wages and Other expenditure for the 2004-2009 
period shows that the ‘Wages’ component has remained the most important in terms of allocations 
throughout the period in question, although the ‘Other expenditure’ component has seen a higher 
annual growth rate (respectively 7.99% and 15.57%). In terms of the main aggregates, there has been 
a relative fall in investments and wages compared to a slight increase in current expenditure and a 
significant increase, within the latter, in non-wage expenditure. 
 
As regards the functional distribution of public expenditure, social expenditure has increased by 
11.59% per year, compared to general expenditure (+4.91%) and economic expenditure (+6.1%). 
These results were achieved through the functional and sectoral requalification and restructuring of 
expenditure which accompanied the reform process and which was consolidated through the efforts 
that are still ongoing on the part of the government, with a view to reorganisation of the budget 
according to the objectives and strategic programmes. GOBM focuses on strict coordination between 
the MDCI and the Ministry of Finance, on the one hand, and between the latter and the sectoral 
Figure 6: Administrative and development expenditure Figure 7: Wages and other expenditure 
Administrative expenditure (right axis) and 
development expenditure (left axis) - % of national 
budget 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
gestion développ.
 
Wages (right axis) and other expenditure (left axis) - % 
of administrative expenditure 
25
30
35
40
45
50
95 96 97 98 99 00
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
salaires autres dép
Source: Ministry of Finance Source: Ministry of Finance 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 51 
ministries, on the other hand. The coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the MDCI, 
through joint sectoral committees which examine the concordance between budget implementation 
and planned investments, seems to be well-consolidated. The coordination between the Ministry of 
Finance and the sectoral ministries is still being developed, particularly by using medium term 
expenditure frameworks (MTEF). 
 
The use of MTEFs is relatively recent in Tunisia36 and has not yet become widespread or uniform. 
The MTEF instrument involves approximately 50% of public expenditure. The Ministry of Finance 
(Budget Directorate) considers that the MTEF process requires further development and regrets not 
being involved in preparing the sectoral MTEFs until the final phase. This instrument has already 
helped to make the budgeting process more participative, but to date it seems to be used more to 
improve and rationalise the management of technical ministries than to guide public expenditure at 
sectoral level. 
 
The PEFA Report confirms the progress made in the GOBM process: ‘It is planned to develop a 
proper general MTEF with sectoral envelopes for the 2011-2013 period, firstly for the pilot ministries 
and then for all ministries. The general MTEF should also improve the inclusion in the budget of the 
country’s sectoral strategies and priorities, both in terms of investment expenditure and the 
corresponding recurring charges’ (PEFA Report, part 4, Institutional factors contributing to the 
planning and implementation of reforms - 2010). 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the above improvements (JC342)  
The changes identified reveal a public expenditure management policy that has pursued two main 
priorities: (i) reorganisation of the budget with a view to greater budgetary discipline and 
reinforcement of the State’s service functions, to the detriment of the functions of direct intervention 
in the economy (production, subsidies, etc.); and (ii) more strategic management of public 
expenditure through the adoption of a GOBM approach. 
 
The budget support programmes have directly targeted these two priorities: 
· As a whole, the SAFs have always paid particular attention to tax compliance and the 
reduction of state intervention in the economy. SAF I also expressly aimed to increase social 
expenditure, identifying the threshold below which this should not fall as 39% of total 
expenditure. In turn, SAF IV supported the adoption of GOBM and the introduction of the 
MTEF. 
· On the one hand, the SBS programmes have tried to help cover the additional financing 
needs linked to the implementation of the reform strategies in the higher education and 
vocational training sectors. On the other hand, they have firmly supported the introduction 
of the MTEF in sectoral programming and subsequently in the State’s budget process. 
 
As regards the BS contribution to covering social expenditure, quantitative comparisons can be made, 
which must, however, be viewed with caution, as indicated above in EQ 3.3.c. As a guide, the weight 
of the EC’s financial contribution can be calculated in terms of expenditure in the social sectors. In 
2005, for example, the EC’s average allocation was EUR 47 million (SAF and SBS). In the same year, 
the government increased social expenditure by approximately TND 633 million, which was 
equivalent – at the exchange rate at the time – to approximately EUR 393 million. Therefore, in 2005 
the financial contribution of the EC’s BS programmes corresponded to 12% of the government’s 
annual increase in social expenditure, or 1.5% of the total annual social expenditure, which was 
equivalent to TND 5.083 billion, or approximately EUR 3.156 billion. If we take account of the other 
                                                   
36 In the education sector, it was introduced as an experiment in Primary Education, with the support of the EC’s 
SBS programme, which laid down the prior condition of introducing three-year budget programming as from 2002. 
A proper MTEF was subsequently introduced in higher education, still within the EC’s SBS programme, and was 
then extended to secondary education and vocational training. 
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two co-financers of budget support, these percentages amount to over 30% of the additional social 
expenditure. 
 
Having said that, it should be repeated that the main effect of granting these funds, for the purposes 
of the SBS programme contribution to sound budget management, is not financial, as indicated by 
the relative weights mentioned. These funds have allowed the co-financers to create a forum for 
dialogue and negotiation – among other aspects – on the issues of improving public finance 
management, including reform of budget management. The dialogue and negotiation thus established 
have helped and supported the government by: i) identifying targeted measures (conditionalities) that 
have been jointly monitored; ii) providing TA (for GOBM and MTEF); and iii) providing technical 
support as needed, including the formulation of a specific budget support programme (PAGBO), 
which was launched in 2008. 
 
Furthermore, the indirect contribution of GBS to this sector is significant. The reorientation of public 
expenditure is a way to achieve high and competitive service standards, particularly in education and 
the knowledge society, which form part of the priorities of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
These priorities act as an important driving force (fuelled by GBS) in terms of the government’s 
determination. 
 
4.3.6. Governance and accountability in public finance management (EQ 3.5) 
Improvements in governance and accountability (JC351) 
In Tunisia, public access to the main budget information is possible due to various data being 
available from the Institut National de la Statistique, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of 
Tunisia and other institutions. Various reports and publications are available, both in paper format 
and on the Internet, such as: i) texts of finance laws and presentation notes; ii) annual reports on 
public finances and public debt; iii) annual reports from the Central Bank; iv) data on the 
development in allocations and budget expenditure; v) a summary of the annual reports of the Court 
of Auditors.  
 
With specific regard to the budget implementation results, the full report of the Court of Auditors is 
distributed only to members of Parliament and to a restricted list authorised by the President of the 
Republic. Its public dissemination (including access by partners and the EC) is limited to extracts in 
the official gazette. Furthermore, the year-end accounts allowing the Law regulating the annual 
budget to be prepared are produced more than a year later, which is not in accordance with best 
practices (PEFA Report, 2010). 
 
Improvement of Parliament’s role (JC352) 
As anticipated in EQ 3.2, the level of exhaustiveness of the information contained in budget 
documentation is high. Overall both the CFAA (2004) and the PEFA Report (2010) underline that 
‘the documents relating to the draft finance law and its various annexes are well-constructed, clear 
and rich in useful information. The general report attached to the draft law and the budget data 
report provide satisfactory information, with the budget presentation exhaustively covering all income 
and expenditure. No extra-budgetary funds have been listed’.  
 
With regard to the system of external supervision and verification, the CFAA and the PEFA Report 
confirm the existence of a well-developed public expenditure scrutiny and audit system, both a priori 
and a posteriori, which ensures a high degree of reliability of public expenditure and a high-quality 
external audit. Improvements were made over the 2006-2008 period. The main shortcoming 
continues to be the unwieldy nature of the procedures for scrutinising the commitment of 
expenditure and the management of public contracts, which can lead to delays in the implementation 
of investment expenditure. 
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As for the examination of the annual finance law by the legislature, the CFAA and the PEFA Report 
describe the procedure for the adoption of the budget by the Chamber of Deputies and indicate that 
the draft finance law results in a comprehensive examination in committee. This examination 
particularly involves written questions submitted to the government, hearings of ministers followed 
by the drafting of specific reports by ministry and specialised committee, and discussion in plenary 
with the government.  
 
As from 2005, the creation of a second Chamber has helped to further open up discussions, as the 
draft finance law is now submitted to both Chambers (Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of 
Councillors). Moreover, the introduction of GOBM should result in more effective scrutiny by 
members of Parliament.  
 
Finally, with regard to the examination of the external verification reports by the legislature, both the 
CFAA and the PEFA Report confirm that Parliament duly exercises effective and consistent scrutiny, 
which could, however, be improved in the future through the earlier submission of the law regulating 
the annual budget. Members of Parliament also scrutinise the budget implementation through the 
informal but genuine method of topical questions every 15 days, sectoral debates and other measures 
which generally encourage transparency of public management.  
 
In 2004 the CFAA concluded that ‘the Tunisian Chamber of Deputies is well-equipped and has the 
human and practical skills to develop its public finance scrutiny function’. This conclusion is 
supported by the evaluation made in the PEFA Report on the scrutiny functions exercised by 
Parliament over budget management. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the above improvements (JC353)  
Issues of budget management transparency do not directly appear in the SAFs. This is instead 
regarded as a prior condition, which must be periodically verified and renewed, but for which 
‘control’ measures do not need to be identified, as occurs in other areas. As a result, during the period 
in question, there were three occasions on which the BS partners looked at this issue and agreed that 
the essential transparency conditionalities were largely being met, although improvements were 
recommended. The first occasion was during the preparation of SAF I, for which the 1996 FA cited, 
as an eligibility criterion, the evaluations of the WB and IMF, among others, of public finance 
management. The second occasion was in 2004, during the drafting of the CFAA. The third was 
during the PEFA mission, which finally occurred in 2010, after having been scheduled much earlier. 
 
However, the issue of strategic consistency of budget management (GOBM) is at the centre of SBS 
with regard to reinforcing sectoral policies and is present in SAF IV with regard to national 
programming. This issue will be further developed following the introduction in 2008 of the new 
GBS – PAGBO – funded by the EC, which is aimed at improving the performance of the public 
finance management system and upgrading this in line with international standards and practices, 
particularly those of the OECD and IMF. 
 
As a result, in its various forms, the dialogue on budget management between the government and 
the BS partners, in terms of both accountability and strategic consistency, has been extended, despite 
the concerns expressed in previous evaluations about the absence of structured and continuous 
institutional dialogue on public finances. It should also be noted that the dialogue on these issues has 
been reserved solely for the BS partners. During the PEFA mission for example, the latter set up a 
‘contact group’, for which the focal point was the representative of the EU Delegation in Tunis, in 
order to collaborate with this mission. This confirms the role of BS as a way of creating advanced 
forums for dialogue. 
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4.3.7. Legality and gender equality in the economic context (EQ 3.6) 
Legality in the business world (JC361) 
Company law 
Company law is fairly extensive and important steps have been taken to improve regulation of the 
business environment, in order to boost the competitiveness of the Tunisian economy and encourage 
investment. These steps include:  
· reinforcement of business freedom: laws abolishing certain authorisations and revising administrative 
conditions required for certain commercial activities; increased protection for investors;  
· in the area of company law: promulgation and successive amendments of the Companies Code 
aimed at reinforcing the obligations of company managers and ensuring control and 
transparency of companies; improvement of the law on financial markets aimed at reinforcing 
the transparency of financial information;  
· corporate governance: series of measures reinforcing this in terms of company administration and 
the due diligence and loyalty obligations to which directors are subject; creation of 
committees to reinforce democracy within companies (2005);  
· intellectual and industrial property: although the creation of a Conseil National Anti-Contrefaçon 
(National Anti-Counterfeiting Council) and the introduction of an action plan and 
interministerial information system are planned in this respect, the effective implementation 
of legislation in this area remains a challenge; reinforcement of the fight against counterfeit or 
pirated goods, including at the borders, is essential37.  
· methods of dispute resolution: Tunisian law has for a long time allowed the creation of trade 
boards with special competence in business matters, to help parties reconcile their 
differences, and the appointment of justices of the peace, together with the possibility of 
dispute arbitration. 
 
Administrative justice 
Administrative justice has benefited from a series of reforms since 1996. Three laws of 3 June 1996 
covered its organisation, powers and rules of procedure, reinforcing the alignment of administrative 
justice with the international standards required, at least in terms of legislation. This progress in the 
efficiency of judicial administration has been recognised by external observers, including the 
European Union. However, some bottlenecks responsible for slowing down the justice system have 
not been removed and the executive’s influence over judicial bodies remains a sensitive issue and a 
challenge for the future38. The next series of administrative justice reforms should therefore be 
directed at ensuring the specialisation of members of the administrative court and reinforcement of 
the independence of administrative judges. 
 
Corruption 
In regulatory terms, Tunisia ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 
March 2008 and has a specialised unit called the ‘economic unit’ which aims to combat economic 
crimes, as well as other bodies which can be called in to investigate economic crimes (customs 
officers for customs offences, officials from the Conseil du Marché Financier for stock market 
offences, public contract committees, etc.). However, despite the fact that the ENP progress reports 
refer to Tunisia’s efforts to combat economic crimes (for example, the creation of units to combat 
money laundering), the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International 
highlights a lack of progress in terms of reducing perceived corruption over the 2001-2009 period. 
Yet Tunisia remains the most virtuous of the Southern Mediterranean countries, ranked in 65th place, 
compared to Morocco (89th), Algeria, Egypt (111th) and Libya (130th). 
 
                                                   
37 Tunisia progress report on Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008. Commission staff 
working document. 
38 Ibid.  
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Gender equality (JC362) 
The situation of women and the protection of their rights in Tunisia remain among the best in the 
Arab world. Although most of the achievements in this area date back to the early years of 
independence, since 1995 several legislative and institutional reforms have reinforced the role of 
women in the economy, facilitating their access to economic resources and reinforcing their position 
in the world of work. These reforms include: revision of the Labour Code in order to grant women 
legal protection against any form of professional discrimination; repeal of certain provisions of the 
Code on Obligations and Contracts, which diminished the position of women; and reinforcement of 
the Conseil National de la Femme (National Women’s Council). Particular attention has been paid to 
integrating women in the school system at all levels. Gender equality in education – largely achieved 
over the last 15 years – has been pursued through sectoral reforms implemented and supported by 
SBS funded by the EC. 
 
Contribution of BS programmes to the above improvements (JC363) 
The changes indicated above relate to the whole EU-Tunisia partnership and form part of the 
framework of shared standards and principles included within the AA and respective accompanying 
programmes, including BS. This is proven by the attention paid to these elements in the 
aforementioned ENP progress reports. Aside from their contribution to the partnership system as 
such, the BS programmes have made a limited direct contribution to these issues, in relation to some 
of the concrete measures in this modernisation process. In some areas, however, such as gender 
equality, Tunisia had adopted relatively advanced positions well before the signature of the AA, and 
what has been achieved since 1995 forms a continuation of this previous work. This is not the case 
with legality in the business world and administrative justice. These are two areas in which the AA has 
identified new standards to be achieved. 
 
In particular, in the negotiation of SAF I and II, many references were made to improving economic 
governance, which is also included in the measures considered in this report. SAF III and IV 
specifically focused on improving company law and, more generally, market transparency and the 
respective supervision mechanisms. In the area of education and vocational training, SBS has focused 
on reinforcing equal access to education and, in particular, to the labour market for women. These 
measures were the subject of dialogue and negotiations during the formulation phase, and their 
achievement has been largely verified, as is clear from the progress reports. 
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4.4. STEP 2 – LEVEL 4. QUESTIONS RELATING TO LEVELS 4 AND 5 OF THE 
INTERVENTION LOGIC: DEVELOPMENT RESULTS 
 
4.4.1. Performance of the Tunisian economy (EQ 4.1) 
Economic growth 
Between 1995 and 2008, Tunisia recorded average growth 
of 5% per year. This stable and relatively high trend is 
evidence of the economy’s strong resilience to exogenous 
shocks, due to appropriate policies and recourse to external 
financing, while retaining a controllable level of debt. 
Growth in Tunisia has been based on strong growth in 
manufacturing (particularly exporting), which in turn has 
led to a clear rise in the contribution of the service sector to 
added value. 
 
Structure of GDP and factor productivity: 
Although supply is driven by industry and services, demand 
is driven by household consumption and exports. Despite 
the strong growth in exports, the country has a quasi-
structural trade deficit. Public investment has been 
stationary, whereas there has been a clear increase in private 
investment to the detriment of household consumption in 
recent years. 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that, although the export 
sectors indicated, which are subject to tariff dismantling 
under the Association Agreement with the EU, contribute 
to total factor productivity (TFP), the latter is still below the 
average for the EU’s partner and competing countries. 
These productivity shortfalls are in all likelihood the cause 
of the limited number of jobs created by the growth levels 
achieved, in a context of a rapidly increasing working 
population. However, despite the vagaries of the 
international economic situation, Tunisia has managed to 
maintain a relatively stable level of job creation over the 
period (67 825 on average per year) and is in first place in 
the Maghreb region for productivity (see below). 
 
Business structure  
· The number of Tunisian industrial enterprises 
increased from 2 046 in 1995 to 5 541 in 2008. 
Small enterprises with fewer than 50 employees play a key role in the economy (around 60% 
of Tunisian businesses). The upgrading programme has helped to place businesses at the 
centre of the economy, which is evidenced not only by the above results but also by the 
constant increase in the number of approvals by the Bureau de Mise à Niveau (Upgrading 
Office)39. 
                                                   
39 Approved applications increased from 57 in 1996 to 3 045 in 2009, with an average annual growth rate of 
approximately 43%. Likewise, there has been constant growth in the total amount of approved investments, which 
increased from TND 433 million in 1997 to TND 5 048 million in 2009, with an annual growth rate of 
approximately 24%.   
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Table 6: Production indices (2000=100) 
 
Type of Industry 
Year 
2008/00 
Manufacturing 132.8 
1. Agri-Food Industries 125.1 
2. Construction Materials, Ceramics and 
Glass 
126.0 
3. Mechanical and Electrical Industries 237.5 
   Electronics 310.5 
   Electrical 303.3 
4. Chemical Industries 106.5 
5. Textiles, Clothing and Leather 104.1 
6. Other Manufacturing Industries 133.4 
Mining 88.5 
Energy 121.4 
Total index 129.1 
Source: INS - Tunisia 
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· Over the whole period, the weight of the textile and clothing sector remained significant in 
terms of the number of enterprises, which 
increased from 567 in 1995 (28% of the 
total) to 1 978 in 2008 (36% of the total). 
This sector is followed by agri-food 
industries, which also increased over the 
period in question. The importance of these 
sectors is just as significant in terms of 
employment (nearly 60% of industrial 
employment) and manufacturing production 
(nearly 50%), despite the fall in contribution 
with regard to the production of the textile 
and leather sectors. 
· Together with these traditional sectors, it is 
worth noting the growth in the electrical, 
electronic and household appliance sectors, 
which increased from 95 in 1995 to 333 in 
2008, with a marked contribution to exports 
(see Figure 9), which increased from 9% in 
1995 to 19% in 2006. 
 
Private investment 
Total investment has doubled in Tunisia, with an 
average annual increase of around 7.5% (in 
constant dinars) over the 1996-2008 period (Total 
investment in Figure 10). However, by percentage 
of GDP, the average level remained relatively 
stable, with some marked oscillations (Figure 10). 
The significant increase in private investment is a 
positive sign (Private investment in Figure 10). 
However, the performance of private investment 
barely compensated for the reduction in public 
investment (see EQ 3.4). Moreover, this 
performance was virtually solely due to the 
increase in FDI linked to privatisations. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of this growth 
occurred over 2006-2007, with specific 
investment in telecoms. 
 
The average investment rate has remained around 25% of GDP, below the level needed to guarantee 
growth rates able to significantly impact on unemployment. In Morocco, on the other hand, since 
1997 the investment rate has constantly improved from 21% to 33% of GDP. In Tunisia, the 
participation of the private sector in overall investment is still significantly below expectations. 
 
Financial sector 
The performance in terms of stability in the macroeconomic framework also reflects improvements 
in the consolidation of the banking sector and in the operation of the financial sector over the last 
15 years. However, the level of profitability in the banking sector remains low, due to the limited 
financial capacity of the banks. The Tunisian economy is mainly financed by the banking system, in 
which the public banks (STB, BNA, BH, BFPME and BTS) assume a preponderant role (50% of the 
market). The banks’ outstanding debt nearly tripled between 1995 and 2008, increasing from 
TND 11.3 billion to TND 32.8 billion, with the share of debt in the public sector falling from 12% to 
7% of the total and the share of debt for services and private individuals increasing from 42% to 
67%. Medium- and long-term debt increased from 42% to 50%. 
Figure 9: Industrial exports indices 
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Despite improvements in the performance indicators for the banking sector (net receipts from 
banking increased from TND 592.4 million in 1995 to TND 1 684 million in 2008; reduction in 
percentage of bad debt; increase in provisioning rate which remains weak but is increasing), efforts to 
rationalise the banking sector must be continued40. The level of non-performing loans is still high, 
which increases the cost of bank intermediation and reduces the rate of return on projects. Moreover, 
the property guarantees required by the banks pose financial risks, as they tend not to be liquid, they 
are difficult to recover (slow justice) and they are probably overvalued, which has restricted the 
capacity of the banks to finance private investment.  
 
The financing of private investment by the financial market is still limited and accounted for 8.2% of 
investments in 2008, with a very limited increase from 1995 (6%)41. Capitalisation of the Tunis stock 
market stands at 13% of GDP, whereas in Morocco it is 68%42. 
 
In the insurance sector, the results of the sectoral reforms are also limited, although the following can 
be noted: i) huge increase in the total amount of premiums (+161.4% between 1998 and 2008) and in 
the amount of premiums per inhabitant, which has nearly tripled; ii) slight increase in the penetration 
rate (turnover/GDP), which reached 1.9% in 2005-08 compared to 1.64% in 2001; iii) still difficult 
financial situation for insurance companies, with a net result in deficit by TND 29.9 million in 2004 
compared to TND 36.36 million in 2001, essentially due to poor performance in the automobile 
branch43. The insurance sector remains underdeveloped, even compared to the MENA (Middle 
East & North Africa) countries. According to studies conducted by Swiss Ré in 2004 and 2008, 
Tunisia is ranked in 62nd place for penetration rate, and in 70th place for density, compared to 
Libya (39th and 54th), Morocco (49th and 69th) and Jordan (56th and 71st). [Source: SIGMA study, 
Swiss Ré].   
 
Business environment 
The available data confirm that the impact of the reforms implemented by the government is 
generally encouraging. According to a survey on the business environment in Tunisia, conducted by 
the Institut Tunisien de la Compétitivité et des Etudes Quantitatives (ITCEQ) with the assistance of 
the World Bank in 2005, businesses have a positive view of the development in the business 
environment: 85% of those businesses questioned considered that administrative constraints on the 
business environment in Tunisia were limited or moderate in 2005, compared to 65% in 2002. 
 
This assessment is confirmed by Tunisia’s high ranking in international surveys on competitiveness 
and the ease of doing business: 
· The 2009-2010 Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum ranked the 
Tunisian economy in first place in the Maghreb region and in Africa, 6th in the Arab world 
and 40th globally, out of a total of 133 economies (see Figure 11 below). This is a good score, 
but it should be noted that this is not the best score in recent years. Aside from the annual 
ranking, the report’s analysis of competitiveness indicates that certain aspects are very 
advanced, whereas others are lagging behind (see Figure 11). The [in]efficiency of the labour 
market, the weakness of the banking sector, and the restricted nature of the domestic market 
are regarded as disadvantages, whereas the main competitive advantages are the quality of 
institutions and the level of basic social services and education. 
· The Doing Business 2010 report on the ease of doing business, jointly prepared by the World 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), highlights some different aspects. 
According to its ranking, Tunisia is 69th out of 183 countries on a global scale (see Figure 12 
                                                   
40 Annual reports of the BCT 1996-2008 and IMF Article IV reports. 
41  Data from the Conseil du Marché Financier, 2009. 
42 Peterson Institute for International Economics, Prospects for Greater Global and Regional Integration in the 
Maghreb, Washington DC, 2008. 
43 FTUSA annual reports, Progress reports of the Competitiveness Support Programme II, 2006. 
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below). In comparison to its 2009 and 2008 rankings, it has respectively moved up 4 and 
19 places. In the Arab world, it is in 7th place behind Saudi Arabia and other countries such 
as Qatar and Oman, but ahead of Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. According to these data 
(Figure 12), the inefficiency of the labour market and of the banking system are major 
disadvantages, which are only exceeded in this case by the burden of taxation. Given the 
relatively modest tax burden, the perception of those interviewed on this last point could 
have been aggravated by the previously mentioned competition problem in the informal 
sector. 
 
Figure 11: Competitiveness indices 2009-2010 Figure 12: Doing Business Indices 2010 
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Source: World Economic Forum, 2010 Source: Doing Business 2010, World Bank and International 
Finance Corporation 
 
ICT services 
The communication technology sector is one of the most dynamic, with one of the highest growth 
rates (15% in 2009). This sector has seen significant expansion. It currently contributes 10% of GDP, 
compared to just 2.5% in 2002, and 9% of job creation throughout the country. This technological 
level is confirmed by Tunisia’s latest ranking in the Global Information Technology 
Report 2008-2009. For the third year running, the country has been ranked first in the Maghreb and 
African regions and 38th globally out of a total of 134 countries. It has therefore overtaken several 
European countries such as Hungary (41st), Italy (45th), Greece (55th), Romania (58th) and Poland 
(69th). 
 
The creation of Tunisiana (in 2002) stimulated the market and ensured rapid expansion in telephony 
access: i) the number of mobile phone users reached 8.6 million in 2008; ii) the density of telephone 
lines increased from 17.6% in 2002 to 94% in 2008. The entry price (purchase of SIM card) fell from 
TND 150 (end of 2002) to TND 10 (Tunisie Télécom) and TND 5 (Tunisiana) in 2005. 
 
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009 (World Economic Forum) ranked Tunisia in 84th place out 
of 134 countries in terms of ICT infrastructure, well ahead of other countries in the sub-region. 
Among the African countries, only South Africa ranks higher. 
 
Transport (ports and national road network) 
At the end of 2008, the maritime infrastructure consisted of seven commercial ports and one oil 
terminal, equipped to allow the stopover and processing of car ferries, cruise liners, container ships, 
bulk carriers and oil tankers, and the movement of any type of goods. Since 1995 traffic at Tunisia’s 
commercial ports has recorded growth rates of 35.8% for vessels, 30.4% for goods, 306.8% for 
containers, 145.3% for passengers, 130.2% for cars and 693.7% for cruise passengers. Tunisia is 
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currently ranked 38th for the quality of port infrastructures, i.e. in first place among the four 
countries in the sub-region (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) and well ahead of Italy and Turkey. 
 
Energy costs 
In Tunisia, the contribution of the energy sector to GDP has fallen to 3.6%, with half for fuels and 
half for electricity. Total consumption is 7.37 thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe), with a deficit 
of 0.5 ktoe. In 1962 the State gave its monopoly over production, transport and distribution of 
electricity to STEG. In 1996 the sector was opened up to competition, with the entry of two new 
producers44. ‘The tariffs for almost all energy products are set by the State at all levels: selling prices 
to operators, operators’ margins and end prices. This method of price setting causes economic 
distortions ... in comparison to international prices and ... inter-product distortions’45. In 2005 the 
public subsidy for energy products was TND 1 030 million, i.e. 2.7% of GDP. In 2009 this increased 
to TND 1 600 million, i.e. 3.6% of GDP46. These figures show the weight of the energy sector in the 
Tunisian economy and its direct impact on the national budget, hence the need to speed up sectoral 
reforms. 
 
Foreign trade 
Contrary to initial fears, tariff dismantling has not had a negative effect on the country’s economy, 
but has in fact helped to increase its exports. Following an increase in the negative trade balance 
between Tunisia and the EU between 1995 and 2001, there has been a gradual rebalancing of trade 
with the EU and a significant contraction in the trade surplus in favour of the latter, as indicated by 
the trade balance graph. EU-Tunisia trade has more than quadrupled in nominal value (and more 
than doubled in real terms47) since the signature of the AA, increasing from TND 9 416.5 million in 
1995 to TND 25 122.2 million in 2006, and then to TND 34 360 million in 2008. The rate of 
coverage of Tunisian imports by exports has significantly improved, from 76.5% in 1995, to 91.6% in 
2006, and to 98.2% in 2008.  
 
                                                   
44 UNCTAD, Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts – Competition in the Energy Sector in Tunisia, 
07/2007. 
45  Ministry of Industry, Agence Nationale des énergies renouvelables (National Agency for Renewable Energies), 
Republic of Tunisia: ‘Etude d’impact des prix de l’énergie sur la demande’ (Study of the impact of energy prices on 
demand), 2000. 
46 The 2005 figure is given by UNCTAD, op. cit., and the 2005 and 2007 figures are indicated by Tafik Missaoui, 
‘Energie et changement climatique, le coût de l’action en Tunisie’ (Energy and climate change, the cost of action in 
Tunisia), 2009. 
47 The GDP deflator in TND in 2008 was 150/100 compared to 1995 (WB, World Development Indicators - WDI). 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 61 
Figure 13: Trade Balance, Tunisia-EU, TND 
million 
Figure 14: Tunisian imports and exports 
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Tariff dismantling has speeded up the country’s integration in the global market, driven by its 
integration in the European market: in 2001, 80% of Tunisia’s exports went to the EU and the EU 
provided 71% of Tunisia’s imports. These percentages fell slightly but remained high in 2006 and 
2008: respectively 77.2% and 72% of Tunisian exports went to the EU and the EU provided 66.5% 
and 57.3% of Tunisia’s imports. Global international trade (imports + exports) has increased more 
rapidly (see M+X graph above). The significant geographical concentration of Tunisia’s exports has 
provided an opportunity and encouraged their rapid growth, but could now pose a risk, as was seen 
during the economic crisis in Europe, which was felt severely from the last quarter of 2008. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that extra-EU trade is increasing more rapidly than trade with the EU is 
sometimes regarded as a sign of weakness under Euro-Mediterranean integration assumptions48. In 
the case of Tunisia, it seems, however, that the competitive capacities acquired under the AA and 
FTA with the EU have increased the overall competitiveness of the economy, with subsequent 
effects on trade with the rest of the world. 
 
Table 7: Foreign trade openness [(M+X)/2/GDP, in current USD] 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
TUN 46% 50% 47% 46% 48% 
JOR 55% 55% 57% 58% 67% 
EGY 20% 20% 20% 23% 29% 
MOR 31% 31% 31% 30% 32% 
AGADIR GROUP 27% 28% 29% 31% 35% 
EU 36% 36% 35% 34% 35% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the foreign trade openness ((M+X)/2/GDP49) of the four 
Member States of the Agadir Agreement (Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) increased between 
2000 and 2004, from 27% to 35%. Among these four countries, Tunisia recorded significantly higher 
foreign trade openness, both with regard to the average of the Mediterranean partner countries (over 
                                                   
48 CASE, CSER, CEPS, Economic Integration in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, 2009. 
49 Value of Exports + Value of Imports, divided by two, divided by the value of GDP. 
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10% difference) and with regard to the average of the Member States of the European Union (again 
over 10% difference50). 
 
The structure of exports has remained more or less stable, with a clear preponderance of exports in 
the non-food manufacturing sector (just under 70%, although this has fallen since 2002), and a 
percentage always below 10% for the three sectors of agriculture and fisheries, agri-food and mining. 
Finally, the energy sector has seen gradual growth since 2001, increasing from 9.4% of total exports 
in 2002, to 12.9% in 2005 and 17.3% in 2008. The same trend can be seen, with a few minor 
differences, in imports. 
 
Sub-regional integration 
In this area, the figures are quite disappointing. Over the last decade, the Agadir Agreement countries 
and the other Southern Mediterranean countries have seen economic growth rates higher than the 
European averages (but lower and/or less stable than Tunisia’s). In terms of trade, their exports and 
imports have increased by more than 10% per year, and trade with the EU accounts for nearly 50% 
of exports and 45% of imports. However, intra-regional trade between the Agadir Agreement 
countries remains limited, at around 15% of total trade51. The barriers to intra-regional trade are the 
different regulations and standards, the difficulty of implementing complex agreements such as those 
on certification of origin and quality, and limited interconnection of infrastructures. 
It would be useful to look at the conditions for accelerating intra-regional processes, possibly in the 
context of the new policies of the EU and, in particular, of the Union for the Mediterranean. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
In general the Tunisian economy has made some very important changes in the period in question. 
Its exporting industry has become more competitive, providing the majority of industrial employment 
and supporting overall growth. This performance is recognised by the main international partners52. 
The industrial performance has brought about modernisation in the whole country, putting pressure 
on services and non-exporting productive sectors, which have reacted differently, sometimes falling 
into line with the competitive growth process (e.g. tourism) and sometimes not being able to do so. 
 
As a result, together with the achievements, certain weaknesses have appeared: investment remains 
below the targets set and is relatively stagnant in terms of percentage of GDP; the non-exporting 
sectors are still constrained, which is creating inefficiencies in the domestic market; and the service 
sectors, particularly financial services, are not wholly meeting the requirements of a modern economy. 
This is resulting in limited growth in certain sectors, which is leading to a supply of jobs clearly below 
demand, particularly for young people. The unemployment rate fell from 16% in 1997-99 to 14% in 
2007 (according to ILO-KILM), and youth unemployment is around 30%, despite major advances in 
levels of education. 
 
The AA with the EU has provided a secure framework for trade openness and economic integration 
over these 15 years, but the European context is marked by limited growth rates and is not creating 
the driving effect from which some small and dynamic countries in the Asian region are benefiting. In 
order to achieve higher growth rates, Tunisia should firstly adopt even more radical transformation 
policies at the economic and institutional levels53. Secondly, it should negotiate a more complex and 
advanced partnership framework with Europe, including services and other areas currently excluded 
from the AA54. 
                                                   
50 WB - WDI. 
51 UNECE, Annual report 2009. 
52 WB, Tunisia’s Global Integration: second generation of reforms to boost growth and employment, 2008, and EC, 
Tunisia progress report on Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007.  
53 WD, Global Integration ..., op. cit. 
54 These negotiations on the ‘advanced status’ of association are already ongoing. 
Evaluation of budget support operations - Studies on cooperation between the EC and Tunisia 
DRN 
Final Report March 2011 63 
4.4.2. Growth in personal income and poverty reduction (EQ 4.3)    
Personal income has increased55 (JC431) 
 
Thanks to the good performance of the Tunisian 
economy: 
· GDP increased in real terms at an average rate 
of 4.95% per year between 1996 and 2008, 
compared to an average rate of 3.9% over the 
1986-1997 period;  
· GDP per capita increased at an average rate of 
3.85% per year between 1996 and 2008, 
compared to an average increase per year of 
1.8% between 1987 and 1996;  
· GDP per capita in 2008 was 1.6 times that in 
199656. 
 
 
This progress is all the more remarkable when it is borne in mind that, during this period of growth, 
there were four years of drought (1998-2001) and the attacks on 11 September 2001, which caused 
economic growth to shrink and tourism revenues to fall. 
Total consumption nearly doubled between 1996 and 2008 (+182%), remaining in the range of 75.9-
78.5% of GDP. Household consumption increased by the GDP percentage (see Figure 16). 
 
INS surveys on ‘household budgets, 
consumption and standards of living’ (the last 
survey was conducted in 2005 and published in 
2007) highlight that the average annual 
expenditure per household increased 
considerably from 1975: the value in 2005 was 
approximately eight times the 1975 value, 
whereas the average annual rate of growth in 
household expenditure over the 1995-2005 
period was 5.34%, higher than the GDP per 
inhabitant growth rate.  
 
 
                                                   
55 The figures used come from the following three sources: World Bank - WDI, Institut National de la Statistique, 
and Ministry of Development and International Cooperation.  
56 Due to a data comparability issue, the GDP per capita and not the GNP has been used. 
Figure 15: GDP and GDP per capita, 1987-2008 
 
Source: World Bank - WDI 
Figure 16: Household final consumption, 1987-2008 
 
Source: World Bank - WDI 
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The income of the poor has increased57 
(JC432) 
The national poverty rate has fallen 
continually over the last 30 years, from 
22% in 1975 to 6.2% in 1995, and to 3.8% 
in 2005 (see Figure 17)58.   
 
At regional level, the available data (INS 
survey, 2005) indicate that the Centre-
West is the region most affected by 
poverty, with a rate of nearly 13%, which 
is three times higher than the national 
average. By contrast, regions such as the 
Centre-East and Greater Tunis have more 
moderate poverty levels, below 1.5%.  
Income disparities have reduced (JC433) 
As shown by Figure 19, the level of inequality in Tunisia can be regarded as average for those 
countries experiencing a comparable development phase. The GINI coefficient – a number varying 
from 0 to 1, where 0 means absolute equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 means total 
inequality (one person has all the income) – following a significant fall during the 1980-1990 period, 
went up slightly during the following period. It was slightly lower than in Morocco in 2007 (0.41), but 
higher than that of Jordan and Egypt. According to the UNDP Human Development Report 
2007/200859, it has apparently risen to 0.398. 
 
                                                   
57 INS survey on ‘household budgets, consumption and standards of living 2005’, and the report based on this 
survey, published in 2007.  
58 The poverty data are based on the aforementioned survey by the Institut National de la Statistique. This survey 
was conducted with the assistance of the United Nations and other international bodies. The method adopted by the 
INS identifies a national poverty line, measured using an essential basket of foodstuffs and non-foodstuffs. In 2005 
this line was around TND 489 (current TND) for the large towns and TND 378 (current TND) for the countryside 
(see also UNDP, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Tunisia, 2004). The reliability of the INS survey data, although 
used by all international bodies, is currently in question. 
58 The source of the GDP data is the World Bank (WDI). Due to a data comparability issue, the GDP per capita and 
not the GNP has been used. 
59 http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Complete.pdf, page 297. 
Figure 17: Development of poverty rate 
 
Figure 18: Development of poverty rate by environment 
Source: INS survey on ‘household budgets, consumption and standards of living 2005’, published in 2007, and other INS data 
Figure 19: GINI coefficient 
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In terms of the poverty rate, it can be seen that, between 1975 and 2000, the urban environment was 
most affected by this phenomenon (see Figure 18). However, the data for 2005 show a reversal in the 
situation: for the first time in 20 years, the rural environment had a poverty rate (7.1%) higher than 
that of the urban environment (1.9%), with the rural poverty rate doubling between 2000 and 2005 
(see Figures 20 and 21). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Poor population Figure 21: Total/poor population 
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The various dimensions of poverty have been tackled and the HDI has improved  
 
The reduction in poverty in terms 
of income has been accompanied 
by an overall improvement in the 
population’s living conditions, as 
shown by the human development 
indicators, which form the human 
development index produced by 
the United Nations. These include 
health, education and purchasing 
power indicators for the 
population. 
 
The result published by the last UN 
report shows that, after limited 
growth in the 1990s, the HDI has 
climbed rapidly over the last decade 
and is now much closer to the most 
virtuous groups of countries (see 
Figure 22). 
 
4.4.3. Changes in the level of access to education and employment (EQ 4.2) 
Improvement of vocational training access and openings (JC421) 
Access to vocational training has improved considerably over the reference period (1996-2008). ‘The 
number of apprentices enrolled at vocational training centres answerable to the MEF has increased 
from under 40 000 to nearly 103 500. This change has been accompanied by a restructuring of 
training, which is aimed more at training leading to qualifications’60. As for continuing training in 
support of businesses, despite an increase in their number, beneficiary businesses have participated in 
a rather irregular manner over the years, with small businesses having benefited less from this 
opportunity and job-seekers having been inadequately informed. 
 
Improvement of secondary and tertiary education access and openings (JC422) 
Higher education 
Between 2000 and 2008 the numbers in higher education increased by around 70%, corresponding to 
an annual rate of 8.5%. The growth rate was much higher in the first half of the period, and then 
slowed in the second half. Only the increase in the number of female students (11% in total) and 
grant holders (13%) remained higher in the second half of the period. The good growth result was 
particularly due to public higher education, as the participation of the private sector remained modest 
and below the Plan’s targets (4 000 in 2006 and 11 000 in 2007, compared to a target of 20 000 in 
2006). 
                                                   
60 Progress report on the SBS programme for VT, June 2009.  
Figure 22: HDI, Tunisia, 1980-2005 
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The increase in numbers was matched by an 
increase in graduates, with a 180% rise between 
2000 and 2008, thereby achieving the desire to 
improve the internal efficiency of the system. This 
was particularly linked to the introduction of short 
courses (2 or 3 years of higher education), the 
number of which has constantly grown and which 
are increasingly favoured by students. There has 
also been growth, albeit more modest, in 
engineering and other courses. 
 
In terms of the choice of courses, based on 
graduate data for 2006-2007, graduates specialising 
in IT and engineering accounted for over 22% of 
all graduates. However, these courses are still 
mainly taken by male students, whereas female 
students focus on traditional courses with low 
employability or which are oversubscribed (Arts 
and Human Sciences, Languages, Management, Law). 
 
Although internal efficiency61 seems to have been achieved, with, however, a 
strong gender bias with regard to the choice of courses, in terms of external 
efficiency, young graduates are finding it very difficult to get a job. The net 
number of jobs created for young higher education graduates reached 179 200 
during the 2001-2007 period, i.e. an average of 26 000 jobs per year (according 
to the Ministry of Employment, 2008), compared to an annual average of 
approximately 42 000 graduates  
for all specialties combined. According to the results of a survey on population 
and employment carried out in 2007, there has been an increase in absolute 
and relative terms in the number of unemployed young university graduates 
and in the time taken to find their first job. Higher education graduates aged 
between 23 and 29 years accounted for 10.9% of all the unemployed in 2007, 
compared to 9.6% in 2006 and 8.4% in 2005. The rise in unemployment of 
higher education graduates is a social concern for the country, although the coverage of additional 
demand for employment remains fairly stable (see Table 9), and both youth unemployment62 and 
total unemployment do not seem to be increasing. 
 
Secondary education 
In terms of secondary education, the numbers increased until 2005 (see Table EQ 4.2-3 in the 
evaluation matrix), but are currently falling, in line with the demographic curve. In 2008 there were 
475 483 graduates (compared to 492 733 in 2003), of which 58% were female. Despite the reduction 
in the dropout rate, internal efficiency in secondary education is still a challenge: 
· the number of students having to repeat years has increased over time despite the reform 
which aimed to improve internal efficiency; 
· at Baccalaureate level, there has been a fall in the percentage of admissions, which stood at 
61% in the fourth year in 2008, compared to 67% in 2003-2004; 
                                                   
61 ‘Internal efficiency’ is defined as the achievement of internal targets (e.g. level of knowledge acquired/success rate) 
and ‘external efficiency’ as the achievement of external targets (e.g. rate of integration in the labour market). 
62 According to the ILO KILM data, youth unemployment (15-24 years) was 31.9% in 1997 and 30.7% in 2007, 
despite the significant increase in enrolment in education of this age group. See also the aforementioned data from 
the Ministry of Employment. 
 
Table  8: Enrolment rate in higher education 
1966 1984 1997 2002 2004 
2.1% 5.7% 15.5% 26.4% 33.3% 
Source: UNICEF 
Table 9: Coverage of additional demand for 
employment 
1982-1986 1997-2001 2002-2006 
61.7% 92% 92.1% 
Source: MDCI 
Table 10: Enrolment rate in the second stage of 
primary education and in secondary education 
1975 1980 1994 2001 2002 
21% 32.2% 53.3% 73.7% 75.7% 
Source: UNICEF 
Table 11: 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
1997 15.9 
1999 16.0 
2000 15.7 
2001 15.1 
2002 15.3 
2003 14.5 
2004 14.2 
2005 14.2 
Source: ILO KILM 
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· the success percentage is on average low: 67% in 2008, which is, however, higher than in 
2001 when it was only 57%, but for Mathematics and Experimental Science courses there is a 
high rate of success (80%) and there has been considerable improvement since 2001.  
 
As for the distribution of admissions and graduates by course, it is clear that Arts courses are still 
preponderant, although Economy/Management and Technical courses have seen a remarkable 
increase in the number of graduates [Table EQ 4.2-8 in the evaluation matrix]. 
 
In terms of external efficiency, the labour market statistics show a moderately positive situation, 
which is clearly better than for university graduates: an increase in the number of secondary education 
graduates in employment of around 4 percentage points, from 32% in 2000 to 36.1% in 2007 (source: 
Ministry of Employment, 2008), corresponding to an annual growth of around 4.6%. This is 
accompanied by an annual increase in the unemployed working population with a secondary 
education which is low (1.8%) and considerably lower than for the population with a higher 
education. However, it is worth noting that the working population with a secondary education is the 
second largest group by weight in the total working population, and that in 2007 the number of 
unemployed in this group accounted for 40% of the total. 
 
Growth in employment and slowdown in emigration (JC423) 
The coverage of additional demand for employment has continued to increase from one Plan to the 
next, although this fell significantly between the 9th Plan (1997-2001) and the 10th Plan (2002-2006) 
(see Table EQ 4.2-14 in the evaluation matrix). However, the creation of new jobs has been unable to 
fully meet the additional demand, which was between 55 000 and 85 000 per year over the 1996-2008 
period.  
 
When we compare this to the structure of the working population, we can see which categories are 
most affected. Since 2000 there has been a change in the composition of the working population: the 
weight of the population who are illiterate and/or educated to primary level is reducing in favour of 
the population educated to secondary and higher level. Putting aside the unemployment of young 
graduates, in absolute terms the unemployment problem is more of a concern for those groups with a 
secondary and primary education, who accounted for 75% of the unemployed in 2007. In terms of 
age, it is clear that unemployment is mainly a problem for the young population, who have an 
unemployment rate significantly higher than the national average (Table EQ 4.2-19 in the evaluation 
matrix), up to 32.4% in 2008 for young people between 15 and 19 years of age, 30.9% for those 
between 20 and 24, and 25.2% for those between 25 and 29 (according to the Ministry of 
Employment)63. 
 
As regards emigration, the figures indicate a constant increase in emigrants, the numbers of whom 
have nearly tripled over the last 20 years, although the rate of growth has fallen significantly in the last 
decade. Emigration plays an important role – although less so than in other countries in the region – 
by absorbing the unemployed labour force, as seems to be indicated by the fact that 46% of 
emigrants are young people and women, another category with a growing unemployment rate, as 
opposed to the slightly decreasing overall rate. However, it should be noted that, in 2008, 10% of 
Tunisians having emigrated were executives, businessmen and traders according to the website of the 
Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger – OTE (Office for Tunisians Abroad), but also doctors, nurses and 
other graduates. The net migration rate64 for Tunisia (0.39 emigrants per thousand inhabitants in 
2010) is lower than that for Morocco (2.62), Egypt (0.8) and even Algeria (0.79). It is also important 
to note that, over the 1995-2010 period, Tunisia saw its net migration rate fall by 65%, whereas this 
drop was only 15% for Morocco and 35% for Egypt, and the rate was virtually unchanged for 
Algeria. 
                                                   
63 According to ILO statistics, 30.7% of those aged 15-24 years were unemployed in 2005. 
64 Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospect 2008. The net migration rate is 
equivalent to the annual net migratory balance, per thousand inhabitants. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the country has achieved significant results in terms of increasing the 
level of enrolment in education and the coverage of demand for employment, and has controlled 
emigration to a certain extent65. However, the levels of quality and employability achieved by the 
education system are still below the standards and classifications required by the market. 
Furthermore, the creation of new jobs for young graduates does not depend solely (or even 
principally) on the quality of the education offer, but is strictly linked to economic dynamics, 
particularly subsequent advances in the level of competitiveness, the openness of the domestic market 
and the stimulation of services, and also more clear-sighted and cooperative management of 
migration in the Euro-Mediterranean context. 
 
4.4.4. Changes in the main cross-cutting issues affected by BS, in democratic 
accountability in the business world, in equal opportunities, and in 
environmental protection (EQ 4.4) 
Government accountability (JC441) 
Since independence, government accountability towards the bodies responsible for constitutional 
scrutiny and public opinion has been regarded by the Tunisian State as an important achievement on 
the road to the country’s democratic construction and modernisation. In practical terms, however, 
several areas in which improvements should have been made are evident, such as red tape in the 
business world, as reported in the surveys of the World Economic Forum (WEF) 2009-201066. The 
businesspeople interviewed for the WEF and Doing Business surveys are also concerned about 
administrative justice, which, despite reforms undertaken since 1996, still causes bottlenecks 
responsible for slowing down proceedings. Likewise, the executive’s influence over judicial bodies 
remains a sensitive issue and a challenge for the future67. Finally, as mentioned above, the Corruption 
Perception Index produced by Transparency International, while keeping the country in first place in 
the region, has deteriorated over the 2001-2009 period: the country’s position has moved from 31/91 
to 65/180 and its score from 5.3 to 4.2. 
 
Equal opportunities (JC442) 
Over the last decade, economic opportunities for women have increased, particularly due to an 
improvement in their level of education and the country’s economic openness. The activity rate for 
women increased from 23% in 2001 to 25% in 2006, and is over 33% for the age ranges up to 
29 years. The proportion of women in the wage-earning population increased from 25% in 2001 to 
26.2% in 2006. In 2008 there were over 18 000 female business leaders, compared to 10 000 in 2004 
(according to the CNFCE – Chambre Nationale des Femmes Chefs d’Entreprise (National Chamber 
of Women Business Leaders)). 
 
The same is true with regard to women’s integration in civil and public life. Their presence in 
positions of responsibility and decision-making has increased and their participation has been 
reinforced in all areas. The percentage of women present in the Chamber of Deputies increased from 
7% in 1997 to 22.7% in 2007. In 2007 women accounted for 27.4% of the members of municipal 
councils, compared to 16.6% in 1995, with 32% on regional councils and 25% in the Constitutional 
Council. Likewise, women accounted for 15% of all the members of government in 2006, compared 
to 13.6% in 200168. 
 
                                                   
65 See note above. 
66 Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, Tunisia Country Profile, page 1. 
67 ENP report, op. cit. 
68 Ibid. 
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Women are also very well represented in education. In secondary education, the proportion in 
relation to the total school population increased to 53.3% in 2006-2007. In higher education, the 
number of female students reached a proportion of 59% in 2004-200569.  
 
Women are also well integrated in the professional world. They now account for 43% of workers in 
manufacturing, 32% in agriculture and fisheries, 34% of journalists (compared to 22% in 1994), 29% 
of judges, 31% of lawyers, 60% of doctors, 72% of pharmacists, 52% of primary education teachers, 
48% of secondary school teachers and 40% of university professors70. It should be noted that the 
progress made in terms of the position of Tunisian women in society does not represent a real change 
compared to previous trends, but is more a continuation of the trend. 
 
Progress in environmental protection (JC443) 
This is an area in which the BS programmes have not identified any specific development objectives, 
beyond general support for good governance and strategic management of public expenditure. In this 
respect, it is important to note that, in addition to the economic and social results (and problems) 
mentioned so far, during the decade in question there have also been important changes in the area of 
environmental management. 
 
The public sanitation network has increased from less than a few thousand kilometres at the 
beginning of the 1980s to tens of thousands of kilometres. Its capacity has more than doubled in the 
last 15 years. As regards solid waste, enormous progress has been made, with a very high level of 
coverage (around 95%) having been achieved. The solid waste management projects funded by the 
EIB have specifically helped with these objectives. 
 
Pressure on water is increasing, particularly for drinking water and industrial water, but this should 
remain under control in a long-term perspective. At the same time, since the creation of the Office 
National de l'Assainissement in 1974, the rate of sewage treatment has constantly increased. This rate 
increased from 32% in 1974 to 97% in 2002. 
 
In addition to this progress in managing the 
consequences of urbanisation processes in particular, 
Tunisia must tackle the problems of industrial pollution 
and greenhouse gas (GG) emissions in general, which are 
currently rapidly increasing and represent the major 
challenge for current and future years. 
 
The reinforcement of monitoring systems, with the creation of the Observatoire Tunisien de 
l'Environnement et du Développement Durable (OTED), and the publication of the Report on 
sustainable development indicators initiated in 2003 have an important role to play in the 
achievement and sustainability of the progress made. 
                                                   
69 Conseil économique et social (Economic and Social Council): www.ces.org.tn. 
70 Source: Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Resolution A/RES/60/251, Republic of Tunisia, 
Tunisia Report. 
Table 12: Greenhouse gas emissions (GG, 
Tunisia, 1994-2010) 
 
 
Source: MEAT 
 
1994 1997 2001 2010
2,66 2,7 2,9 4
Emissions de GES 
Unité: Tonnes équivalent CO2/habitant
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4.5. STEP 2 – LEVEL 5. QUESTIONS RELATING TO LEVELS 4 AND 5 OF THE 
INTERVENTION LOGIC: DETERMINING FACTORS OF CHANGE 
 
4.5.1. Approach to the EQs for STEP 2 – Level 5 
This part of the evaluation must show which factors are at the root of the country’s performance 
(positive and/or negative) with regard to the objectives set by the budget support. This performance 
has been illustrated in the previous chapters, particularly with regard to economic growth and 
competitive integration in international markets, and improvement of the living conditions of the 
population, particularly the poorest. 
 
These questions were tackled using two different and complementary methods: 
· A historical and political analysis, involving a selected group of independent Tunisian 
resource people, including academics and businesspeople. This analysis was begun at the start 
of the evaluation work and its results have been reviewed throughout the evaluation 
(approximately eighteen months). This approach aims to identify the main political and 
economic choices of Tunisian governments and the various phases of the country’s economic 
and social development over the previous decades71. 
· A statistical analysis consisting of several methods, aimed at identifying the socioeconomic, 
political and institutional variables that most closely correlate to the development results. 
 
These two integrated approaches have produced overall results for economic growth, on the one 
hand, and human development, on the other hand. The answers to each of the EQs asked are linked 
to these overall results. 
 
4.5.2. Main political, economic and social stages in Tunisia since independence 
This overview serves to identify a series of factors that may have influenced Tunisia’s economic and 
social performance over the period in question. These factors, most of which predate the 
programmes covered by this evaluation, have helped to define their context. 
 
On gaining its independence in 1956, Tunisia, which has a semi-arid climate, had few natural 
resources and its economy was essentially based on subsistence agriculture and mineral exploration. 
However, the government embarked on a proactive policy of accelerated development, with the main 
aim being to pull the country and its population up to a level comparable with certain European 
countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. The last half-century has been marked by 
four main stages of development: 
 
1956 – 1969 
Period of national construction: three emblematic initiatives: 
· In 1956, the Law which granted Tunisian women rights and a freedom that were unique in 
the Arab world. 
· In 1958, creation of the Banque Centrale de Tunisie (Central Bank of Tunisia) and a national 
currency: the dinar. 
· Economy: cooperative system in agriculture and trade, and regional state-controlled industrial 
centres, integrating both heavy industry and light industry. 
 
                                                   
71 The ‘drivers of change’ method was used, but in a more simplified manner. For a brief illustration of this method, 
see DFID, Drivers of Change Public Information Note, September 2004. See also ODI, Drivers of Change and 
Development in Malawi, 2006. 
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1970 – 1986 
Initial opening up of the economy to a degree, without state control being relaxed. Emblematic 
measures: 
· API: Agence de Promotion des Investissements (Investment Promotion Agency), which 
subsequently became the Agence de Promotion de l’Industrie (Industrial Promotion Agency). 
· April 1972: Law granting important competitive advantages to wholly exporting companies. 
· Collective agreements to govern relations between employers and employees. 
 
The profits from exports, domestic market protection and a favourable oil situation (at the time the 
country was a net oil exporter) clearly improved the standard of living. However, the end of this 
favourable oil situation and inefficiencies in the system led to a financial, economic and social crisis, 
resulting in the bloody events that profoundly destabilised the country (1978, 1980 and 1984) and the 
appearance of extremist movements. 
 
1987 – 1994 
Macroeconomic stabilisation (SAP). Emblematic changes: 
· Control of inflation, which was brought down from 7.1% in 1986 to 2.2% in 1995. 
· Gradual liberalisation of prices and investments. 
· Devaluation and convertibility of the dinar. 
· Growth in exports of textiles and mechanical goods under the offshore arrangements. 
· Introduction of VAT and the Investment Code.  
· Reform of public enterprises and privatisation of the stock market. 
· Reinforced supervision of the Central Bank and creation of the Banques d’Affaires (business 
banks). 
 
Although stabilised, the country was not achieving high growth rates, the human development 
indicators were not improving and the reforms were not managing to sustainably boost the economy. 
The country and its partners identified the need for a new leap forward in terms of economic and 
social reforms. 
 
From 1995 
Based on this understanding and given the opportunities offered by the Barcelona Process launched 
by the EU, Tunisia decided to continue on its course towards an open economy, supported by the 
positive prospect of Euro-Mediterranean integration. In 1995 Tunisia was the first country to sign the 
Association Agreement with the EU and began the courageous and consistent process of social and 
economic reform assessed in this evaluation. 
 
Recurring factors in Tunisian development since independence 
Among the many factors that may have influenced the country’s socioeconomic development from 
its independence until today, the evaluation has highlighted certain recurring factors, which make the 
country stand out in relation to other countries and which are to a certain extent linked to the specific 
situation of a country that is not particularly rich in raw materials and whose population is relatively 
small, such as: 
· the innovating role of the government, which prefers to seek out innovative prospects rather 
than maintain the status quo; 
· the importance afforded to exports, which have enjoyed preferential status since the 1972 
law, and also the importance afforded to manufacturing, since the beginning of 
industrialisation, which has encouraged the creation of capacity, from which the export 
industry has benefited; 
· the government’s attention to opening up the country to international dialogue and 
partnership, which initially manifested itself in the search for sociocultural reference models 
not limited to the national tradition or regional dimension, and which then took concrete 
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form in the long partnership with the Bretton Woods institutions (25 years) and the EU, 
having led to the adoption by Tunisia of the principles and standards of public finance and 
market management recognised by these partners; 
· finally, the negative side of these development factors, which is the continuation of certain 
inefficiencies due to the widespread and deep-rooted presence of the State in the economy. 
 
4.5.3. Statistical analysis 
Analyses carried out 
This exercise involved three integrated analyses72: 
· A cluster study (group analysis) covering six countries in the region (Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) analysed, for each country, the correlation between 
54 macroeconomic, agricultural, energy and demographic variables, and two dependent 
variables (the growth rate of GDP per capita and the United Nations Human Development 
Index). 
· The analysis of the determining factors of the growth dynamic in Tunisia regressed the two 
aforementioned dependent variables using six variables (two accumulation, two economic 
policy, one instrumental and one economic reform). 
· The analysis of the impact of reforms and structural changes at regional level: a dynamic 
panel data analysis for five countries (the same as the cluster sample, except for Syria, which 
was excluded due to a data problem). 
 
Cluster analysis 
For each country, this analysis, covering the 1990-2005 period, produced two groups of variables, 
each based around one of the two dependent variables chosen (growth rate of GDP per capita and 
HDI). Each group contained the variables having mainly contributed to determining the dependent 
variable in question. Within each group, the distance between the dependent variable and the other 
variables was an indicator of the closeness of the correlation. 
 
On the one hand, the cluster analysis highlighted how the growth dynamics (GDP per capita and 
human development) had followed common trajectories in the countries selected. The determining 
factors of change seemed to be limited to the macroeconomic adjustment and stabilisation policies 
and to the trade integration dynamics, particularly with regard to the European Union countries, and 
specifically the liberalisation mechanisms implemented at foreign trade level following the association 
agreements with the EU. 
 
On the other hand, within this general cartography, there were differentiations and characteristics 
specific to each country or group of countries. Tunisia and Morocco (and to a lesser extent Jordan 
and Syria) followed comparable specialisation paths: they acquired comparative advantages, 
particularly in manufacturing sectors, which led to the FDI flows that subsequently developed. As a 
result, these countries saw their export trade structures diversify and they moved away from more 
traditional activities such as ‘textiles and clothing’. Egypt developed growth schemes based on net 
imports fed by domestic demand. In Algeria, state revenues fluctuated with international oil prices, 
affecting the stability of the financial system controlled by the State, with negative effects on growth 
in the private sector. 
 
 
 
                                                   
72 These analyses are presented in an annex, with a description of the procedures and formulas used, including the 
various data reliability tests, particularly the LMA and LM2 tests on the absence of autocorrelations. In the panel data 
analysis, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) was used, together with the application of the Sargan test, 
among others, to eliminate the country-specific effects highlighted by the cluster analysis. 
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Figure 23: Tunisian clusters 
 
 
With regard to the countries in the first group, the analysis also revealed significant differences, 
particularly between Tunisia and Morocco. The factors more specifically correlated with economic 
growth in Tunisia were exports, particularly manufacturing exports, in addition to macroeconomic 
stability variables. In Morocco, the role of agriculture as a determining factor of growth was very 
important, together with exports, stability and demographic factors. As for HDI, in Tunisia the added 
value of the agricultural sector was as important as that of the manufacturing sector. Public 
expenditure and capital formation also had a significant impact. In Morocco, the variables most 
closely correlated with HDI were imports and exports, and demographic and macroeconomic 
variables. 
 
Regression in order to identify the determining factors in Tunisia 
The explanatory variables taken into account were: GFCF (gross fixed capital formation)/GDP, FDI 
(foreign direct investment)/GDP, QM (quasi-money)/GDP, X (exports)/GDP, S (savings)/GDP, 
and Chinn Index73. The regression used two models: one to explain growth (growth of GDP per 
capita), and the other to explain HDI. 
 
In the first model, the net foreign direct investment (FDI/GDP), exports (E/GDP) and financial 
development (QM/GDP) seemed to have contributed the most to Tunisia’s economic growth. 
However, the proportion of gross fixed capital formation in GDP (GFCF/GDP) contributed only 
slightly to growth. The same was true for domestic savings (S/GDP). This could be due to how 
savings are invested and made profitable. A negative and statistically insignificant sign would indicate 
                                                   
73 Measurement of the financial openness of a country. This variable measures the degree of liberalisation of the 
capital account or the degree of relaxation of exchange constraints and the freedom of capital movements. It is 
therefore generally regarded as a good representation of the degree of reform and macroeconomic performance of a 
country, insofar as the removal of all obstacles and barriers to trade and financial integration is interpreted by 
international operators as an improvement in the regulatory, business and investment environments. The database 
provided by Chinn and Ito covers the 1970-2007 period. 
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a non-optimal level of savings (difference between effective and potential savings) and in all 
likelihood a lack of investment opportunities for a risk-averse operator. 
 
In the second model (HDI), the significant factors were the same, but with different weights. The 
importance of capital flows from abroad and export income remained decisive. 
 
In both models, the macroeconomic reform variable clearly appeared to be important and statistically 
significant. 
 
Panel data analysis of economic reforms at regional level 
The vector of annual growth rates of GDP per capita for the five countries selected was regressed (as 
a dependent variable) in relation to the economic and institutional reforms formalised by two vectors 
of quantitative and, in particular, qualitative determining factors. All the variables came from 
composite indices and/or databases recognised internationally (see Annex 16). 
 
The vector of quantitative determining factors included, for each country, the following independent 
variables: 
· degree of trade openness (OUVC); 
· inflation (INF); 
· nominal exchange rate volatility (NEXVOL); 
· current account balance (CAB).  
 
The vector of qualitative determining factors (institutional) included, for each country, the following 
independent variables: 
· country risk (CR), composed of three risk scores (political, economic and financial); 
· quality of institutions (QINST); 
· government stability (STABGOV); 
· degree of liberalisation of the capital account (KOP), i.e. the aforementioned Chinn and Ito 
variable. 
With regard to the importance of the quantitative determining factors, the analysis particularly 
underlined the positive impact of trade openness, and of macroeconomic performance in terms of 
controlling inflationary pressures, current deficits and exchange rate stability in the growth dynamics 
of the MEDA countries analysed. 
 
The analysis of qualitative variables highlighted the cumulative effect, on the quality of growth, of the 
reforms undertaken since the conclusion of association agreements with the EU. In this respect, in 
addition to the reduction in country risks, the analyses clearly showed that consequent improvements 
in the quality of institutions, government stability and positive perception of business environments 
(approximated by KOP) significantly helped to improve the growth profiles in these countries. In the 
main, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership linked with the association agreements with the EU and 
the economic and financial cooperation that followed with the MEDA countries selected clearly 
accelerated the economic and institutional changes and therefore improved economic growth. 
 
Conclusions of the statistical analyses 
Without these statistical analyses being regarded as absolutely conclusive, it should be noted that they 
do indicate certain definite and convergent points on the determining factors of economic growth 
and human development: 
· In the last 15 years, all the policies on trade openness, upgrading of domestic markets and 
macroeconomic reform, together with the association agreements with the EU, have formed 
the factor most closely linked with growth and human development in the countries in the 
region having signed these agreements. Where they have been consistently pursued, these 
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policies have helped to reduce country risks, improve the institutional framework and 
generally increase attractiveness to foreign investment. 
· In the case of Tunisia, the development of manufacturing exports, which started due to the 
government’s highly proactive policies at the beginning of the 1970s, clearly indicates the 
growth and development models pursued. Furthermore, the policies on public expenditure 
and attention to agricultural incomes are very important for improving the HDI. 
· In all the analyses, the macroeconomic stabilisation policies, such as those pursued by the 
Tunisian government continuously for nearly 25 years, seem to be closely linked with growth 
and human development. The mobilisation of domestic savings and investment, on the other 
hand, still seem to be a weakness in the Tunisian context, compared to a country like 
Morocco. 
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4.6. STEP 3 – LINKS BETWEEN BUDGET SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT RESULTS 
4.6.1. Role of political and institutional reforms in relation to growth factors 
Reminder of the conclusions of STEP 2 – Level 5 
According to the analyses briefly presented in Level 5 above, the largely positive development results 
examined in Level 4 were heavily influenced by a relatively small number of factors, summarised in 
the following Table 13. 
 
Historical analysis Statistical analysis 
1. Innovating role of governments 5. Policies of openness and partnership 
2. Proactive decision in favour of exports from 1972 6. Strategies focused on exports 
3. International dialogue and partnerships having 
focused on decisive strategic choices (stabilisation 
and integration) 
7. Economic stabilisation (with Bretton Woods) 
8. Association Agreement with EU and linked reforms 
4. Inefficiencies due to the widespread presence of the 
State in the economy 
9. Inefficiencies in terms of domestic savings and 
investment 
 
These analyses indicate as follows: 
· The country has historically tended to seize opportunities (factor 1 in the table) offered by the 
international environment, in which, since independence, it has been seeking to integrate and 
reinforce its position as a small dynamic country through solid relations (factors 3 and 5). 
· In this context, the country made a structural choice in 1972 (factor 2) in favour of 
developing manufacturing exports, which it has pursued in a proactive manner from the start, 
subsequently integrating this within a consistent series of economic policies. The good 
performance of the export sector is one of the elements that most characterises the country’s 
positive development results. 
· In order to ensure the sustainability of this trade openness strategy, the country has been 
committed, since 1985, to a long-term macroeconomic stabilisation operation (factor 7), by 
establishing a firm partnership with the World Bank and the IMF (factors 3 and 5). The 
macroeconomic stabilisation and resulting competitiveness are firmly linked with the 
country’s good performance. 
· At the beginning of the 1990s, the country felt the need to move beyond (factor 1) the good 
performance of the export sector within a still mainly closed economic framework, and to 
restructure the whole national economy, therefore moving on from the dualism between local 
market and external market, and instead ensuring genuine sustainability of the process carried 
out. The global partnership (factor 3) – economic, institutional and cultural – with the EU 
(factor 8), which was launched by the Barcelona Process, offered the country a new 
framework of opportunities, in which these changes were possible due to the availability of 
political reference points and the necessary support. The reforms linked with the Association 
Agreement with the EU are the factor most closely associated with the economic growth and 
human development recorded in the last 15 years. 
· In this process, there are still changes and progress to be made, particularly with regard to 
factors 4 and 9, which partly represent intrinsic weaknesses in the strategies adopted but 
which could be resolved through greater integration, which would subsequently overcome 
the differences between the national market and the external market. Such integration is not 
dependent solely on Tunisia, as it also requires determination on the part of the European 
partner, even if the Tunisian determination is a key element. 
 
Table 13: Determining factors of economic and social growth, according to the type of analysis made and 
the correspondence between the two analyses 
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Government policies between 1995 and 2008 that have supported these factors 
Some of these factors coincide with the economic and institutional reform policies adopted by the 
government during the 1995-2008 period covered by the evaluation. Others, which are more 
long-standing, have become apparent within these policies in a relationship of reciprocal 
reinforcement. All these factors have a strict relationship with the policies implemented by the 
government during the period in question. In reality, all these factors are affected by the new 
Euro-Mediterranean integration opportunity and by the policies implemented by the government to 
seize this opportunity at the highest level: 
· In many cases, the government’s policies are stimulating and revitalising growth factors that 
are already deeply rooted in Tunisia’s recent history, by redefining a framework in which they 
can function on more effective and sustainable bases. 
· In other cases, they are defining new challenges, based on the opportunities created, as is the 
case with upgrading the industrial system, the financial system, the education system, etc. 
 
The following table sets out this relationship between the determining factors and the policies 
implemented by the government. The determining factors resulting from the two analyses are 
presented in the first column of the table. The second column sets out the linked policies during the 
period in question. The third column briefly indicates the type and intensity of this relationship. 
 
Determining factor Policies 1995-2008 Type of relationship 
1. Innovating role of 
governments and propensity 
for international 
dialogue/partnership 
Decision to commit to the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, 1st 
signatory of an AA with the EU 
Correspondence between a national 
historical tendency and an opportunity 
offered by the EU 
2. Strategies focused on exports Tariff dismantling and tax reform policy in the context of the AA 
Extension of a consolidated national 
strategy to a new sustainable context 
3. Macroeconomic stability 
Continuation and reinforcement, 
throughout the period, of the 
stabilisation policies conducted 
between 1986 and 1995 
Transformation of financial and 
budgetary restraint policies into 
international competitiveness policies 
creating resources (FDI, export growth, 
etc.) 
4. Association Agreement with 
the EU and linked reforms 
New policies on integration and 
upgrading in various sectors – 
economic, social, financial and 
cultural – in accordance with the AA 
General restructuring of the economy 
and modernisation of society, with a 
view to sustainable integration in the 
Euro-Mediterranean context 
 
Table 14: Relationships between the political and institutional reforms implemented in the 1995-2008 period 
and the determining factors identified 
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4.6.2. Role of budget support in relation to the political and institutional reforms in 
question 
Reminder of the conclusions of STEP 1 – Level 3 
The following table summarises the conclusions of STEP 1 – Level 3, which explains the influence of 
BS on the government’s policies. The Level 1 and 2 analyses serve to explain the effects of Level 3, 
and are not therefore mentioned in this presentation. 
 
Table 15 : Summary table of STEP 1 / Level 3 - Contribution of BS from the EC and other donors to the effective 
implementation of economic and social reforms over the 1995-2008 period 
Government’s 
achievements 
Contribution of BS programmes 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation: 
· Requalification of tax 
policies 
· Improvement of public 
finance management 
a) By supporting the main economic reforms needed to achieve the AA, GBS reinforced 
credibility and assisted the government’s risk-taking in the reform process. 
b) Creating a forum for dialogue and targeting conditionalities helped to develop and monitor 
the reforms envisaged, particularly tax reform and VAT. 
c) In line with the dialogue, targeted technical support helped to reinforce the macroeconomic 
forecasting and integrated debt management capacities and to introduce the MTEF. 
d) The financial contribution of all BS – approximately 0.5% of GDP and 1.5% of social 
expenditure – helped the government to more flexibly manage the budgetary constraints, but 
particularly allowed the creation of the forum for close and continuous dialogue on the main 
economic reforms. Donors not having participated in GBS were de facto excluded from this 
dialogue. 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: average-high in cooperation with other co-financers. 
Tariff dismantling and 
stimulation of foreign 
trade 
a) GBS is a sign of the close relationship between the EC and the government in the design and 
implementation of the main economic reforms envisaged by the AA. This relationship is 
particularly important with regard to tariff dismantling, as it serves to reassure the 
government on the risks and counterparts to liberalisation. 
b) The dialogue, conditionalities and targeted studies in particular helped with the reform and 
restructuring of customs, and with the planning and monitoring of trade and domestic market 
liberalisation (launch and implementation of the competition action plan and the Conseil de la 
Concurrence (Competition Council)). 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: high in cooperation with other co-financers. 
Reinforcement and 
stimulation of the private 
sector and rationalisation 
of the financial sector 
a) GBS provides tangible evidence that the government has not been left alone to design and 
implement the economic modernisation, privatisation and upgrading processes necessitated 
by the AA and Euro-Mediterranean integration. 
b) The dialogue, conditionalities and targeted studies made significant contributions: to the 
dismantling of import monopolies, to the relaxation of administrative authorisations for 
companies, and to the improvement of company law. They also made decisive contributions: 
to the restructuring and rationalisation of the financial sector, to privatisations, and to the 
liberalisation and privatisation of ICT (including GSM). 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: very high in cooperation with other co-financers, particularly in the 
financial sector, and average for the business environment. 
Upgrading of the 
education system and 
improvement of the 
employability of young 
people 
a) SBS has supported one of the key sectoral reforms stipulated by the AA, thus contributing to 
its credibility. This support does not cover the whole reform process, as in the case of GBS 
for the main economic reforms. This is due to the fragmentation and separation of the 
support provided by the various partners. 
b) The dialogue and conditionalities helped to improve the quality and equity of the offer in 
secondary and higher education (increased offer, better correspondence between the 
educational offer and demand for employment, better territorial distribution of the offer). 
c) The dialogue and conditionalities also helped with achieving the important development 
results, in terms of gender equality in the system, educational success rate, and improvement 
of employability. 
d) The TA linked with SBS specifically and very significantly helped with the introduction of the 
MTEF in the management of the sectoral budget. This achievement represented important 
progress in terms of overall management of public expenditure according to the priorities 
established by the development policies. 
e) The funds granted by SBS specifically encouraged the government to commit to the sectoral 
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reforms. As an example (but to be viewed with the necessary caution due to the fungibility of 
the BS financial component), in higher education and VT, the EC’s funds corresponded to 
75% and 60% of the additional needs. 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: high for sectoral budget management and average in general. 
Improvement of strategic 
public finance 
management 
a) In relation to budget management, GBS and SBS aim not only to ensure stability, but also the 
strategic requalification of public expenditure. 
b) From SAF I, the dialogue and conditionalities helped to increase social expenditure. From 
SAF IV, they helped to introduce goal-oriented budget management, which has continued 
with PAGBO. 
c) The education SBS helped with introducing the MTEF at sectoral level and with covering the 
financial needs of the sectoral reform. 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: high in cooperation with other co-financers and – in terms of the 
EC – specific contribution to the MTEF/education and in general to GOBM. 
Improvement of 
transparency and 
accountability in public 
finance management 
a) By supporting the main economic and social reforms needed to implement the AA, BS 
confirmed that the Tunisian government’s budget management met high standards of 
transparency and aimed to maintain these levels over time. 
b) The dialogue allowed the initial conditionalities to be confirmed as correct and ensured that 
periodic general assessments were made, such as the CFAA (by the WB) and the PEFA 
Report (joint). 
c) The dialogue and conditionalities, through support for GOBM, helped to improve 
transparency and accountability. 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: average, because the initial conditions were regarded as positive. 
Progress in cross-cutting 
issues such as gender 
equality, justice and 
environment 
a) By supporting the main economic and social reforms, BS helped to ensure a range of progress 
in cross-cutting areas, both in terms of the government’s achievements and the development 
results. 
b) GBS helped (particularly under SAF I and II) to improve economic governance and (under 
SAF III and IV) to improve company law, market transparency and supervision mechanisms. 
c) SBS helped to reinforce equal access to education and the labour market for women. 
DIRECT CONTRIBUTION: average, because the BS contributions relate to specific sub-sectors, 
whereas the AA uses other instruments for more targeted operations. 
 
The table shows the strict relationship and important direct contributions of the BS programmes to 
the effective implementation of the government’s policies, which in turn enabled the country’s 
economic and social performance over the period in question. 
 
Position of budget support in the context of the Association Agreement  
It is clear from the analysis that BS has done an excellent job in supporting the government’s policies 
and that the latter have contributed decisively to achieving the development results that the MEDA 
and ENP programmes aimed to support through budget support. 
 
However, the analysis also shows us that this virtuous circle has been assured in a specific context 
that has enabled the Tunisian government to successfully commit to a relatively radical process of 
economic and social transformation in the country. This context is the Association Agreement with 
the EU, which creates a new opportunity for development, i.e.: (a) access to a very rich and 
diversified market; (b) possibility of acquiring productive, institutional and cultural standards for 
competitive integration in this market; and (c) technical, financial and partnership support, to assist 
the necessary transition processes. 
 
The three-step analysis can therefore be regarded as complete. Figure 24 shows the position of 
budget support in this context.  
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Figure 24: BS in the context of the AA 
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5. OVERALL EVALUATION 
Due to the methodology adopted, the evaluation generally highlighted the important contribution of 
the EC’s budget support to achieving the development results recorded by the country over the 
period in question. 
The operations evaluated were deemed: 
· relevant in relation to the country’s needs and the partnership framework established between 
the country and the European Union; 
· effective in terms of supporting the implementation of a complex and in-depth reform 
process in the economic and social areas, which contributed to good development results, 
although significant weaknesses were apparent and need resolving; 
· efficient because they involved limited implementation costs and a timetable more in line with 
the commitments compared to other analogous operations; 
· able to make a significant contribution to the medium-term development impacts; 
· sustainable over the long term, provided that the partnership framework between Tunisia and 
the EU is further reinforced and that lessons learnt from the experience are taken into 
account; 
· able to express the added value of the EU, which has been able to offer Tunisia a 
comprehensive and attractive global partnership prospect, supported by cooperation 
programmes which are significant due to their dimension and ambition; 
· fairly effective in terms of coordination with the main development banks (GBS), but less so 
in terms of coordination and complementarity with the Member States (lack of joint 
programmes over the period in question, for example in education). 
 
Budget support provided a framework for dialogue, technical support and financial support, which 
reinforced the implementation of the government’s strategies. By making use of the framework of 
opportunities offered by the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement, these strategies enabled major 
economic and social reforms to be achieved, which have formed the foundations of the success in 
terms of the economic growth and social well-being recorded by the country. 
The evaluation revealed a very strong link between the reforms implemented by the government, to 
which BS contributed, and the development results achieved by the country (STEP 2). Furthermore, 
it highlighted the important link between budget support and the quality of the reforms in question 
(STEP 1). It was therefore possible to show a significant link between the budget support and 
development results (STEP 3). 
Obviously, together with the successes, the evaluation (both STEP 1 and STEP 2) highlighted the 
weaknesses of the results achieved. In particular, inefficiencies remain in the economic area, which 
are keeping the country’s growth below the levels needed to fully respond to the high demand for 
employment, especially among young people. In the area of education and vocational training, the 
poor quality of education and the limited connections with private enterprises are further limiting the 
impact of the reforms on the employability of young people. The centralised management of the 
economy and the limited progress made in terms of governance are having a negative impact on the 
distribution of incomes and on fair access to resources. 
The reform processes were launched in technically complex and delicate areas, with regard to the 
interests at stake, therefore need to continue. These challenges will be at the centre of the future 
cooperation between Tunisia and the EU, because the European partner can help, as it did in 1995, to 
open up new integration prospects, through which Tunisia can find the necessary support and 
motivation. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this evaluation report are split into three parts: 
- The first part sets out the conclusions on the strategic dimension of budget support. 
- The second part presents the conclusions on the technical and institutional set-up of budget 
support programmes. 
- The third part gives the conclusions on the country’s performance and the specific impact of 
budget support.  
 
The conclusions refer to the analysis contained and developed in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). 
The evaluation questions on which each conclusion is based are indicated by their numbers.  
 
6.1. CONCLUSIONS ON THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF BUDGET SUPPORT 
 
6.1.1. The EU-Tunisia global partnership has been the driving force in the 
cooperation’s success. 
C1.1: The EU-Tunisia partnership framework, established with the Association Agreement signed in 
1995, has created new development opportunities for the country, mainly due to new international 
openings and access to capital, technologies and know-how offered by the Euro-Mediterranean 
integration. These opportunities have enabled the government to pursue and reinforce its 
determination in the economic and social reform process. They have also provided international 
technical and financial cooperation, particularly the EC, with a very specific framework of strategic 
consistency and appropriation on the part of the Tunisian institutions, which has been the main 
factor in its success. (EQ 1.2, 4.1 and 4.2) 
 
6.1.2. The determination and experience of the Tunisian institutions are at the root 
of the success of the reform process supported by BS. 
C1.2: Tunisia’s achievements in terms of growth, poverty eradication and international integration are 
indisputable. Their roots lie in a history of good economic and social governance. In particular, the 
propensity for basing the country’s future on solid international ties and reference models, which are 
not limited to the region, is a characteristic of the country, at least since independence. The decision 
to proactively target exports is long-standing (1972). In addition, the decision to ensure a stable 
macroeconomic framework dates from 10 years before the AA, which in turn has created a 
framework of opportunities in which these endogenous tendencies have been able to expand in a 
constructive and successful manner. (EQ 1.2, 4.1 and 4.2) 
 
6.1.3. GBS has been the most appropriate instrument to support the main economic 
reforms. 
C1.3: As the objectives of the main economic reforms (economic stability and governance, foreign 
trade, competition and upgrading of the domestic market) were identified and agreed in the 
Association Agreement, GBS has proved to be a flexible and solid support instrument in the 
formulation and implementation of these reforms. Experience has shown that no other aid 
instrument would have allowed such proximity between the government and its international 
partners. Through this role, GBS has reinforced the practical dimension and credibility of the AA. In 
particular, it has enabled: 
 
a. Close alignment between the donors involved (EC, WB and AfDB) and harmonisation 
of their dialogue and monitoring procedures. 
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b. Creation of a forum for dialogue for joint monitoring of the implementation of reforms 
and for managing the conditionalities. 
c. Joint management with the government of qualified TA inputs, which have helped – 
through several studies and technical analyses – to identify crucial elements to be 
included in the reforms, to solve problems encountered during the process and to jointly 
assess the achievements. 
d. An injection of funds into the national budget amounting to approximately 1.4% of 
public expenditure over the 1996-2008 period, all amounts of budget support 
combined74. In addition to ensuring a minimum level of budget flexibility, this financial 
contribution provided the government with a sign of trust and encouragement prior to 
the creation of the aforementioned forum for dialogue. (EQ 1.1, 2.1 and 2.3) 
 
6.1.4. SBS has been useful in supporting reform in the education sector, but the 
sector approach has been limited. 
C1.4: The upgrading of the education system and its link with the labour market form part of the AA 
dimensions. The EC’s SBS has helped with the implementation of reforms at various levels of the 
education system, by combining several forms of support: 
 
a. A financial contribution, limited in terms of percentage of overall public expenditure, but 
significant in terms of covering the additional costs of the concerned reforms. This 
contribution has in particular reinforced the intra-governmental negotiation capacities of 
the sectoral ministries. 
b. The creation of a forum for dialogue based on the monitoring of the main results 
targeted by the reforms. 
c. Joint management with the government of qualified TA inputs, particularly in the area of 
goal-oriented budget management and introduction of an MTEF. 
 
Certain factors have, however, somewhat limited the strategic scope and effectiveness of the support 
provided. In particular, policy dialogue and TA – focused on the monitoring of the conditionality 
matrices and on budget management problems – were not used to support the main strategic choices 
of the reforms and the overall quality of their implementation. The dialogue with the various donors 
has been fragmented, unlike the dialogue within GBS. At institutional level, the dialogue was 
managed by the MDCI, whereas the sectoral ministries were in charge of the reforms. (EQ 1.1, 2.1 
and 2.3) 
 
6.1.5. BS has contributed to the effectiveness of the dialogue framework between 
Tunisia and the EU. 
C1.5: The partnership framework established by the AA includes the EU-Tunisia Council of 
Ministers, the Association Committee and the sectoral sub-committees of the ENP. In the case of 
budget support – and only in this case – the technical and financial cooperation between the 
government and its partners involves joint sessions of dialogue and monitoring of the 
implementation of the main reforms agreed within the AA. 
 
Different levels of the partnership framework involve different levels of dialogue: high-level political 
dialogue, dialogue on economic and sectoral policies (in the sub-committees), and dialogue on the 
practical processes75 for implementing the reforms. 
 
                                                   
74 Including GBS from the EC, WB and AfDB, and SBS from the EC. 
75 On the choices with regard to the formulation of technical and financial cooperation programmes and negotiations 
on conditions. 
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The different levels of dialogue feed into each other. On the one hand, the general and sector 
dialogue ensures a close link between each programme and the development, poverty reduction and 
Euro-Mediterranean integration results targeted by the AA. On the other hand, the close monitoring 
of the reform processes associated with BS programmes feeds the dialogue in the sub-committees, 
contributing in particular to the assessment of reforms. 
 
The institutionalisation of the dialogue processes at the level of individual programmes still has its 
weaknesses, as structured meetings are currently envisaged only in relation to the 
formulation/negotiation phase and to the monitoring missions, although a practice of constant 
contacts between partners offsets this weakness. 
 
Without BS, and particularly GBS (or a comparable instrument replacing this), the EC would not 
have sat at the negotiating and monitoring tables with regard to the main reforms, and could not have 
ensured feedback and consistency between the political dialogue and the policy dialogue linked to the 
implementation of the economic and social reforms. (EQ 1.1 and 2.2) 
 
6.2. CONCLUSIONS ON THE TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF BUDGET 
SUPPORT 
6.2.1. The budget support instrument has been well adapted to the context. 
C2.1: Despite some criticisms, which did not take sufficient account of the specific context in which 
BS programmes operated76, the evaluation found that these programmes had met the conditionalities 
laid down, particularly in the following areas: 
a. Financial management risk. Although an in-depth prior assessment of the public finance 
dynamics was not carried out, the EC’s officials were able to rely on the assessments 
carried out by the WB and IMF, which, at the time, confirmed a high level of reliability 
and capacity on the part of the government after eight years of structural adjustment, 
and in particular constant commitment to improving the effectiveness and accountability 
of financial management. These assessments were confirmed in 2004 and again in 2010 
by systematic reviews of public finances, carried out on the occasion of the CFAA and 
PEFA Report. 
b. Public finance conditionalities. The limited focus of the BS conditionalities on public finance 
issues (aside from GOBM in SAF IV and in the SBS programmes) in comparison to the 
emphasis placed on structural reform issues (competitiveness of the markets) is justified 
by the relatively advanced level of public finance management in Tunisia, as confirmed 
by the two reviews mentioned in the previous point. 
c. Process indicators versus performance indicators. The nature of the indicators used in the BS 
matrices, particularly those of the GBS programmes, reflect the concern of the partners 
with regard to establishing a road map for monitoring the reforms and ‘pinpointing’ 
certain crucial actions aimed at introducing changes. This, however, has not deflected the 
partners’ attention from the development results, as these are at the centre of the 
partnership system of which BS forms part and are systematically monitored using 
relevant instruments. (EQ 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2) 
 
6.2.2. There has been good complementarity between GBS and the sectoral projects 
funded by the EC, despite a still limited sector approach.  
C2.2: A cluster approach to programming between GBS, in particular, and the EC’s other 
programmes can be seen through the CSP and project documents. The EC’s programming 
documents reveal a fairly clear framework of sectoral strategies rooted in the main dimensions of the 
                                                   
76 See, for example, the assessment of budget support operations within the evaluation of the MEDA programme. 
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AA. In the three macro-sectors of ‘macroeconomic management and economic reforms’, ‘business 
environment and private sector development’ and ‘human resource development and social 
protection’, the EC has funded 31 operations totalling approximately EUR 824 million, i.e. 83.5% of 
the total amount allocated in the evaluation period. 
 
Mechanisms for operational coordination between these programmes are not envisaged, although a 
certain degree of coordination is ensured at three levels, namely: strategic consistency of the various 
actions; the EC’s operational management; and the government’s appropriation and political and 
institutional coordination. However, this does not result in an approach allowing the main donors to 
engage in genuine sectoral discussions and monitoring77. 
 
The strategic cluster approach is appreciated by the BS partners, as it allows BS to be integrated with 
other forms of specific support. In particular, BS has proven appropriate for supporting complex 
reform processes, by establishing a dialogue on policies and on the necessary measures and by setting 
up flexible TA to help the other party pursue its own orientations. TA and/or equipment projects are 
also appropriate for providing very specialised technical support and/or instruments (tangible or 
intangible), for which the requirements, and the operational and institutional framework are clear. 
(EQ 2.3) 
 
6.2.3. Limited use was made of TA in the BS programmes funded by the EC, 
although improvements and innovative approaches were recorded towards the 
end of the period. 
C2.3: In GBS (SAFs), technical assistance was delegated to the development banks, particularly the 
World Bank, which conducted important studies that contributed to the targeting of reform 
strategies78. Other contributions came from studies and programmes funded by the EC, but outside 
the SAFs. Given the joint nature of the GBS analysed, this characteristic has not limited the 
contribution of the EC, which has participated fully in the formulation and implementation phases of 
the various programmes. In the most recent GBS, which are not covered by the evaluation, such as 
the PAGBO, the EC has included important TA components in the programmes. 
 
In SBS, technical assistance has been well-integrated within the programmes and has helped to 
identify certain reform paths, particularly in the area of budget management. The TA in SBS has not, 
however, been flexibly used to improve the process and targeting of reforms. This has stemmed from 
a weak sector approach on the part of the government. 
 
Innovative TA. TA is increasingly the subject of joint discussions and research on the part of the 
government and the EC. Practice has shown that TA can be provided through two different forms: 
a. Highly specialised TA supports the private sector and government when dealing with 
advanced technical issues (legislation, standardisation, analytical and management 
systems, etc.), normally through projects or mechanisms for access to specialised TA. 
b. High-level but more interinstitutional TA (peer-to-peer) is increasingly demanded by 
governments in order to acquire best practices and institutional know-how 
supporting them in their reform processes. This type of TA combines well with BS 
and/or is accessible via specific facilities and twinning projects.  
(EQ 1.1 and 1.4) 
 
                                                   
77 The sector approach is not limited to designing and implementing programme clusters ensuring a certain synergy. 
It includes coordinated and harmonised participation by the various international partners and joint strategic 
management of the various programmes in complex intervention sectors. 
78 World Bank and AfDB studies mentioned in Level 2 (EQ 2.2) above. 
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6.2.4. The use of other inputs (funds, dialogue and conditionalities, harmonisation 
and alignment) and the duration of programmes have been adequate, with 
weaknesses in terms of dialogue and harmonisation within SBS. 
The funds have played the role required of them, ensuring a minimum level of budget flexibility and 
allowing the creation of a forum for close dialogue, in the case of GBS, on the main economic 
reforms (see C1.3). The alignment with government systems has been very good in all BS 
programmes. Dialogue has reached high levels in GBS (see C1.3 and C1.5), whereas in SBS 
programmes it has been limited to the formulation and monitoring phases, mainly due to the 
government’s limited sector approach (see C1.4). Harmonisation with other international partners has 
been very good in GBS, but very poor in SBS (C1.3, C1.4 and C1.5). 
 
The duration of programmes, which is limited to two years, should be regarded as a factor of 
flexibility rather than uncertainty, due to the existing partnership framework, which ensures the 
continuity of strategic cooperation actions. 
 
6.3. CONCLUSIONS ON THE SPECIFIC IMPACT OF BUDGET SUPPORT IN RELATION TO THE 
COUNTRY’S PERFORMANCE 
6.3.1. Management of macroeconomic stability and public finances: GBS has helped 
Tunisia to combine stability with growth. 
C3.1: The EU-Tunisia global partnership framework, established with the signature of the AA in 
1995, has created favourable conditions for the success of the Tunisian strategy of competitive 
integration in international markets, thus allowing the government to combine stability with growth. 
In turn, the Structural Adjustment Facilities, with similar support from the WB and AfDB, have 
contributed to Tunisia’s good performance by creating a forum for dialogue, ensuring joint 
monitoring of selected indicators, high-quality technical support, and granting a limited amount of 
funds, which has enabled additional flexibility in budget management. Throughout the period in 
question, Tunisia has controlled its inflation rate, contained its budget deficit and reduced external 
debt by improving its strategic management. The GDP growth rate has been clearly higher than in 
the previous decade. (EQ 3.1 and 3.2) 
 
6.3.2. Reform of the business environment: GBS has helped to significantly boost 
the private sector over the 1996-2008 period. Strengths and weaknesses of the 
results. 
C3.2: The AA has enabled Tunisian businesses to explore the prospect of competitive access to 
European and world markets. GBS has helped to rationalise the national financial sector and to open 
up the domestic market, and has contributed to the disengagement of the State from the economy. 
Several projects supplementing GBS have helped to upgrade businesses and infrastructures and 
standardise the market. The years 1995-2008 were marked by a positive domestic dynamic and 
extensive opening up of the Tunisian economy. The achievements in this area are very important 
because they have significantly transformed the Tunisian economy, by having a major impact on the 
private sector dynamic and the modernisation of the country. However, they are not sufficient, 
particularly with regard to competition in the domestic market, the capacity and openness of financial 
services, the competitiveness of infrastructures, economic services and agriculture, and so on. At the 
moment, due to persistent weaknesses, the level of investment is not sufficient to generate the growth 
rates that would allow the supply of jobs to match demand, with total unemployment being around 
14% and youth unemployment being around 30%. (EQ 3.3.b and 4.1) 
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6.3.3. Liberalisation of foreign trade: GBS has helped to implement tax reform, 
achieve tariff dismantling, and has therefore contributed to the positive results in 
foreign trade. 
C3.3: The AA has created a realistic and negotiated prospect of Euro-Mediterranean integration and 
has helped the government to define the road map for the reform of international trade, including the 
competitive improvement of the domestic market. The government has completed tariff dismantling 
three years before the deadlines set. GBS, together with other specific programmes, has contributed 
to the government’s efforts, particularly in the area of tax reform, in order to offset the losses of 
customs revenue, introduction of VAT, simplification of procedures and increased fluidity of 
customs. (EQ 3.3.a and 3.1) 
 
6.3.4. Reforms of secondary and higher education and vocational training. SBS has 
contributed to the significant achievements made within these reforms. The 
results are encouraging but still limited, particularly in employment. 
C3.4: The government has firmly committed to the reform of education and vocational training, and 
the EC, by funding various SBS programmes, has chosen this as a priority sector given its impact on 
employment, competitiveness and integration. The results of these efforts are modest. The political 
process in the sector has clearly improved, with institutional reorganisation, introduction of the 
MTEF, better intra-sectoral coordination and adoption of results monitoring systems. In terms of the 
quantitative increase and territorial equity of the offer, important progress has been made in 
secondary education and higher education, but less so in vocational training. In terms of access and 
gender equality, important progress has been made at all levels. However, the quality of education 
remains poor. The link between vocational training and industry has not been consolidated. Job 
openings remain limited: unemployed graduates are increasing in absolute terms, even though their 
proportion within the total number of unemployed is falling. SBS funded by the EC has specifically 
contributed to the results mentioned, particularly with regard to the strategic management of the 
sector, including improving the budget process by introducing the MTEF, and identifying and 
monitoring performance indicators. The limited impact of the education and VET reforms on youth 
employment is causing major concern. Although job creation particularly depends on the other 
factors indicated above (investment and competitiveness of the markets), education and VET play an 
important role in increasing youth employability. (EQ 3.3.c and 4.2) 
 
6.3.5. GBS has specifically helped to improve economic governance and legality in 
the business world; however, despite progress in both areas, more needs to be 
achieved. 
C3.5: Progress has been made and recognised by the PEFA mission (2010) in terms of reinforcing 
transparency and accountability in public finance management. As for gender equality in the business 
and working world, Tunisia has a tradition of excellence in the Arab world, which is confirmed by the 
data for the period in question. As regards legality in the business world, legislative and institutional 
progress has been recognised by external observers, including the EU. GBS has specifically 
contributed to improving economic governance (SAF I and II) and company law (SAF III and IV). 
Administrative justice is still, however, slow and the executive’s influence over judicial bodies remains 
a sensitive issue and a challenge for the future (ENP Progress Report, 2008). Furthermore, the 
perception of corruption did not change between 2001 and 2009, although Tunisia has the best 
Transparency International index in the region. The EC’s attention is firmly focused on these areas, 
as shown by the ENP progress reports. (EQ 3.5, 3.6 and 4.4) 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The evaluation conclusions prompt a number of recommendations, which are set out in this chapter. 
In line with the structure used in the previous chapter: 
- The first part sets out the recommendations on the strategic dimension of budget support. 
- The second part covers the technical and institutional set-up of budget support. 
- The third part presents the recommendations on the main sectoral challenges as well as the 
opportunities offered by budget support. 
 
7.1. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF BUDGET SUPPORT 
7.1.1. Extend the EU-Tunisia partnership to make a new strategic leap forward in 
terms of cooperation. (C1.1, C1.2) 
R1.1: Extending the partnership framework would provide an opportunity to stimulate the technical 
and financial cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. This ‘advanced status’ could involve new 
integration targets, for example in the area of services and agriculture, and reinforce political and 
institutional cooperation. This reinforced framework could help the government to embark on 
subsequent transformations in order to increase the country’s openness and competitiveness. In this 
context, new areas for cooperation could be established. 
 
7.1.2. Use BS to stimulate and/or complete the main reforms in a new EU-Tunisia 
partnership framework. (C1.3, C1.4, C1.5) 
R1.2: In this new context, the use of budget support could help to establish technical and financial 
partnerships – between Tunisia, the EU and other main partners – in certain key areas of the 
Tunisian economy and society, in order to stimulate and/or complete the implementation of reforms. 
 
Experience has shown that BS is the only instrument capable of sustaining such a partnership – 
particularly where it is harmonised with the other main partners – because it is based on a shared 
strategic process, on a structure of dialogue and on mutual responsibility for the results. This is all the 
more important because the reforms to be launched and/or completed are more complex than in the 
past: the paths to be taken are not always obvious and some would touch upon consolidated 
positions. 
 
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF BUDGET 
SUPPORT 
7.2.1. Ensure the targeting of BS programmes in relation to the context and a 
strategic and flexible partnership in relation to the reforms in question. (C2.1) 
R2.1: It is important that BS programmes are prepared through studies and consultations conducted 
with government officials on the specific needs of the sectors involved. It is also important that their 
inputs can be used to fine-tune and not just to monitor the implementation of reforms. This could 
also involve the need to update the matrices of conditionalities during programme implementation. 
This approach requires the flexible definition of TA inputs and – whenever possible – the use of 
interinstitutional TA, through a peer institution, in order to convey the content of experience in the 
transfer of knowledge. 
 
Experience has shown that in Tunisia assessments of the risks linked with public finance management 
are important, but relatively easy, and that the matrices of conditionalities must include indicators 
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viewed as particularly significant for the implementation of reforms, in addition to well-targeted and 
realistic performance indicators. 
 
7.2.2. Continue to combine different instruments in priority macro-sectors (BS, 
technical assistance and equipment projects) by reinforcing coordination and 
the sector approach. (C2.2) 
R2.2: The best practice of developing clusters of programmes in the various macro-sectors must be 
continued, ensuring a high level of complementarity between budget support and other projects. In 
particular, the use of BS to carry out programmes mainly based on the supply of specialised technical 
inputs – such as the support project for industrial modernisation – would be ineffective. BS should be 
reserved for supporting reforms, where dialogue and trust between the partners and flexibility in 
implementation are a condition of success. 
 
To ensure complementarity between the various actions, the government must reinforce its sector 
approach (see the specific recommendation). To avoid ineffective and external (top-down) forms of 
technical assistance, interinstitutional forms of TA (peer-to-peer) should be increasingly used, as 
explained in the specific recommendation. The duration of BS programmes depends on the 
partnership framework. If this framework is strong, as it has been in the SAFs, a relatively short 
duration represents an element of flexibility. 
 
7.2.3. Reinforce the government’s sector approach by ensuring explicit coordination 
and strategic dialogue open to the main international partners in the relevant 
sectors. (C1.4, C2.2) 
R2.3: The concerned government institutions, assisted by the MDCI, should reinforce their explicit 
capacity for coordinating the various support programmes and create sectoral dialogue forums on the 
reforms supported. This would avoid any overlap or separation and would also help to better manage 
and target the technical inputs provided by the various partners. 
 
Currently, the sectoral guidance of reforms is ensured by the government. However, this does not 
amount to a sector approach, where the content and implementation of reforms are discussed 
between the government and its closest partners to ensure better coordination and exchange of 
experiences on the content of reforms. This approach partly exists in the management of GBS, 
probably due to the action of the MDCI. The latter could share this approach with and apply it to the 
other ministerial departments. Negotiating SBS programmes could facilitate the implementation of 
such an approach; or, equally, the negotiation of SBS programmes should take place once the 
approach has been applied. 
 
7.2.4. Integrate appropriate technical assistance in budget support. Increasingly use 
interinstitutional TA, particularly to support reforms and institutional 
consolidation. (C2.3) 
R2.4: General and sector BS programmes must include flexible TA components capable of assisting 
with the development and implementation of reforms and thus feeding the dialogue between 
partners. TA is normally mobilised in BS in the preparation phase of programmes and in the 
identification phase of matrices of conditionalities, and also in the monitoring phase. However, 
experience (with the GBS and SBS evaluated) has shown that the availability of analytical capacity 
and/or capacity development during the implementation of programmes is essential. For this latter 
function, the aim of TA should not be strictly defined before the start of programmes, as its 
specifications should emerge as a result of the dialogue process, as has happened with GBS. It is also 
possible and sometimes necessary to extend this flexibility to the TA used for formulating and 
defining matrices (see recommendation on the flexible partnership). BS programmes could be 
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conceived, which provide for joint studies and consultations between the partners, that deal with, for 
example, the mid-term update of matrices. 
 
Experience has shown that interinstitutional technical support (TAIEX, Twinning) is very much 
appreciated by governments, which see this as a chance to establish medium-term partnership 
relations with peer institutions and/or to secure best practices resulting from the direct experience of 
their partners. 
 
7.2.5. Aim for a balanced combination of different inputs in budget support: funds, 
dialogue and conditionalities, TA, harmonisation and alignment. 
R2.5: The combined effect of different budget support inputs has proved important for the success 
of operations (C2.4). Significant financial inputs – the amounts involved in the evaluated BS 
programmes represent a good quantitative reference – are an essential condition for setting up a valid 
BS operation (C1.3 and C2.4). Dialogue and TA must be closely linked, because the first establishes 
the framework of priorities and strategic orientations, and the second ensures the development of 
capacities and competences. Harmonisation between the main donors, in the context of a sector 
approach, is a precondition: the optimum situation is represented by joint operations, such as the 
GBS evaluated. If, on the other hand, the sector approach is weak and donors’ interventions remain 
separate, the opportunity of using budget support as opposed to more traditional but more targeted 
forms of intervention should be weighed. 
 
 
7.3. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MAIN SECTORAL CHALLENGES AND BUDGET SUPPORT 
7.3.1. Support the competitiveness of the domestic market, particularly in services 
and agriculture, and the development of new economic sectors to reinforce 
growth and increase employment79 (C3.1, C3.2, C3.3, C3.4, C3.5). 
The main challenges for future years lie in several areas and the instruments to be used vary: 
· GBS – which would follow the multi-sectoral and multilateral tradition of the SAFs – could 
support the competitiveness of the domestic market, with specific components targeting 
services, investment and employment. GBS would allow taking into account the scope of the 
reforms as well as the number of institutions involved, ensuring the necessary flexibility and 
joint action by the main donors. 
· The competitiveness of the agricultural sector could be supported through an SBS, to be 
conceived taking into account instruments and models already tested within the EU’s 
enlargement process80. 
· Employment could be supported through SBS (which would also be quite complex, given the 
sub-sectors involved) or simply through GBS, which could involve policies to bring the 
education/training system in line with the labour market, as well as social protection policies 
and issues related to the governance of the labour market81. Budget support could then be 
                                                   
79 The recommendations must identify priorities and opportunities and cannot attempt to provide detailed solutions 
in a context characterised by ongoing negotiations. 
80 Agriculture and rural development are not priority sectors in the context of the ENP, particularly in Tunisia. 
Opening up the FTA to agricultural products and extending integration to other areas will, however, put pressure on 
agriculture and the rural world that cannot be underestimated. The difficulties to be tackled in this area solely in 
terms of managing trade were evident in the case of the PAI. 
81 The choice between multi-sectoral SBS and GBS would be more a question of name, as the problem lies in 
identifying the area of intervention and the institutional counterparts involved. If the area is complex and involves 
diverse sectors and institutions (for example the labour market, education, training, social protection), GBS could be 
coordinated by the MDCI and could involve other ministerial partners. It would be easier to involve the WB, AfDB 
and/or other co-financers in this. 
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combined with specific projects, at national or local level, focusing on social protection (e.g. 
Conditional Cash Transfers) and/or interventions in the education system at different levels. 
· Non-traditional sectors such as non-renewable energies and environmental management, as 
well as the information society and consolidation of the rule of law, could be taken into 
account in both BS and other forms of technical support. They could involve – unlike in the 
past – greater participation by the private sector and non-state actors in general. BS should be 
favoured in the case of medium-term strategic cooperation and support for sectoral policies 
and major reforms. Projects are more appropriate if they involve making investments or 
providing specific technical training services or if they provide support to sector upgrading. 
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8. SUMMARY OF THE CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
C1.1 The EU-Tunisia global partnership has been the driving force in the cooperation’s success. 
(EQ 1.2, 4.1 and 4.2) 
C1.2 The determination and experience of the Tunisian institutions are at the root of the success 
of the reform process supported by BS. (EQ 1.2, 4.1 and 4.2) 
C1.3 GBS has been the most appropriate instrument to support the main economic reforms. 
(EQ 1.1, 2.1 and 2.3) 
C1.4 SBS has been useful in supporting reform in the education sector, but the sector approach 
has been limited. (EQ 1.1, 2.1 and 2.3) 
C1.5 BS has contributed to the effectiveness of the dialogue framework between Tunisia and the 
EU. (EQ 1.1 and 2.2) 
C2.1 The budget support instrument has been well adapted to the context. (EQ 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 3.1 
and 3.2) 
C2.2 There has been good complementarity between GBS and the sectoral projects funded by the 
EC, despite a still limited sector approach. (EQ 2.3) 
C2.3 Limited use was made of TA in the BS programmes funded by the EC, although 
improvements and innovative approaches were recorded towards the end of the period. (EQ 1.1, 1.3 
and 2.2) 
C2.4 The use of other inputs (funds, dialogue and conditionalities, harmonisation and alignment) 
and the duration of programmes have been adequate, with weaknesses in terms of dialogue and 
harmonisation within SBS. (EQ 1.1, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) 
C3.1 Management of macroeconomic stability and public finances: GBS has helped Tunisia to 
combine stability with growth. (EQ 3.1 and 3.2) 
C3.2 Reform of the business environment: GBS has helped to significantly boost the private sector 
over the 1996-2008 period. Strengths and weaknesses of the results. (EQ 3.3.b and 4.1) 
C3.3 Liberalisation of foreign trade: GBS has helped to implement tax reform, achieve tariff 
dismantling, and has therefore contributed to the positive results in foreign trade. (EQ 3.3.a and 3.1) 
C3.4 Reforms of secondary and higher education and vocational training. SBS has contributed to 
the significant achievements made within these reforms. The results are encouraging but still 
limited, particularly in employment. (EQ 3.3.c and 4.2) 
C3.5 GBS has specifically helped to improve economic governance and legality in the business 
world; however, despite progress in both areas, more needs to be achieved. (EQ 3.5, 3.6 and 4.4) 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1.5. R1.1 Extend the EU-Tunisia partnership to make a new strategic leap forward in 
terms of cooperation. (C1.1, C1.2) 
3.1.6. R1.2 Use BS to stimulate and/or complete the main reforms in a new EU-Tunisia 
partnership framework. (C1.3, C1.4, C1.5, C3.1-4) 
3.1.7. R2.1 Ensure the targeting of BS programmes in relation to the context and a 
strategic and flexible partnership in relation to the reforms in question. (C2.1) 
3.1.8. R2.2 Continue to combine different instruments in priority macro-sectors (BS, 
technical assistance and equipment projects) by reinforcing coordination and the 
sector approach. (C2.2) 
3.1.9. R2.3 Reinforce the government’s sector approach by ensuring explicit 
coordination and strategic dialogue open to the main international partners in the 
relevant sectors. (C1.4, C2.2) 
3.1.10. R2.4 Integrate appropriate technical assistance in budget support. More and more 
use of interinstitutional TA, particularly to support reforms and institutional 
consolidation. (C2.3) 
3.1.11. R2.5  Aim for a balanced combination of different inputs in budget support: 
funds, dialogue and conditionalities, TA, harmonisation and alignment. (C1.3, C2.4) 
3.1.12. R3.1 Support the competitiveness of the domestic market, particularly in services 
and agriculture, and the development of new economic sectors to reinforce growth and 
increase employment (C3.1, C3.2, C3.3, C3.4, C3.5). 
